TOWARDS ELECTORAL CONTROL IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

by Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Nika Palaguta (eds.)
TOWARDS ELECTORAL CONTROL IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
TOWARDS ELECTORAL CONTROL IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

by
Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Nika Palaguta (eds.)

IFIS PUBLISHERS
WARSAW 2016
Projekt został sfinansowany ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji numer DEC-2012/05/E/HS6/03556

This publication has been prepared under the project *Kto wygrywa, a kto przegrywa w parlamentarnych wyborach. Od formalnej teorii do analiz empirycznych*, finance by The National Science Centre, Contract No. UMO-2012/05/E/HS6/03556

Recenzja wydawnicza
де Michal Kotnarowski

The monograph *Towards Electoral Control In Central and Eastern Europe* by Joshua Dubrow and Nika Palaguta (eds.) was reviewed by Michal Kotnarowski

Projekt okładki/Cover design
Andrzej Łubniewski

Proofreading
John Fells

Copyright C by Authors and Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN

IFiS PAN Publishers
00-330 Warsaw, Nowy Świat 72
Tel. (48) 22 6572897
e-mail: publish@ifispan.waw.pl
www.ifispan.waw.pl
# Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements ............................................................. 7

**INTRODUCTION**  
Towards Electoral Control in Central and Eastern Europe  
– *Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Nika Palaguta* .................................. 9

**PART 1: THEORY AND CONCEPTS**

**Chapter one**  

**Chapter two**  
The Electoral Market as a Mechanism of Political Inequality  
– *Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow* .............................................................. 43

**PART 2: METHODOLOGY**

**Chapter three**  
The Content and Structure of EAST PaC for Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary, 1985–2014 – *Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow* .............................. 77

**Chapter four**  

**Chapter five**  
Collecting, Cleaning, and Matching Electoral Data on Candidates and Parliamentarians in Poland, 1985–2011  
– *Zbigniew Sawiński and Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow* ............................ 99
# Table of Contents

## Chapter six
Challenges of Matching Candidate Data in Hungary, 1990–2010 – Zsófia Papp ................................................................. 115

## PART 3: CONTEXT

### Chapter seven
A Brief Political History of Ukraine in the 20th and 21st Centuries – Nataliia Pohorila and Yurii Taran ................................. 131

### Chapter eight

### Chapter nine
A Brief Electoral History of Poland, 1985–2015 – Marcin Ślarzyński, Anna Kurowicka, and Nika Palaguta ........................... 177

### Chapter ten
Electoral Gender Quotas in Poland – Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow .... 191

### Chapter eleven

## PART 4: COLLABORATION

### Chapter twelve
Multi-disciplinary Scientific Collaboration across Countries and Time: Managing the Electoral Control Project – Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Olga Zelinska ......................................................... 219

### Conclusion
Lessons Learned and New Questions – Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Nika Palaguta ................................................................. 249

### Appendix A: Coding Issue Position of Ukrainian Parties, 2012–2014 – Nika Palaguta .......................................................... 263

### Appendix B: Codebook for EAST PaC Hungary, 1990–2010 – Zsófia Papp .............................................................. 292

### About the Authors ................................................................. 305
This book is about electoral control in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and was produced by the Electoral Control project. The Electoral Control project was based on the research grant, “Who Wins and Who Loses in the Parliamentary Elections? From Formal Theory to Empirical Analysis,” funded by Poland’s National Science Centre (Sonata Bis decision number 2012/05/E/HS6/03556) from 2013 to 2016. The Principle Investigator of this project was Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow, Associate Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (IFiS), Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) and administrator at Cross-national Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training program (CONSIRT.osu.edu) of The Ohio State University (OSU) and PAN.

The Electoral Control project built an international multi-disciplinary scientific team focused on the collection and use of data on parliamentarians and candidates in CEE to address critical issues in representation, accountability and political inequality. To that end, this project produced the East European Parliamentarian and Candidate dataset (EAST PaC), composed of the candidates who stood for national parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary from the first post-Communist election to the most recent and who are matched over successive elections. In addition to bringing the project team together to various events held in Warsaw and in scientific venues elsewhere, Poland’s National Science Centre funded EAST PaC data collection and this book. We are grateful for their support.

We are also grateful for the support of IFiS PAN and the Graduate School for Social Research (GSSR) for the events held under the banner of this project. We also thank CONSIRT which provided
organizational support for the administration of this grant and the project as a whole. Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Director of CONSIRT, Professor of Sociology at IFiS PAN and Professor Emeritus of OSU’s Department of Sociology, was a key figure, both intellectually and administratively, for this project. We thank Goldie Shabad, Professor Emeritus of OSU’s Department of Political Science, and Jakub Zielinski, former Professor at OSU’s Department of Political Science and now at the Boston Consulting Group, for their intellectual contributions to this grant project. We are thankful for the intellectual support of the Institute of Political Studies at PAN, especially Mikołaj Cześnik and Michal Kotnarowski. We thank Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, Associate Professor at IFiS PAN and Projects Manager at CONSIRT, for her administrative and intellectual guidance. We are thankful to Ola Wójcicka, Ewa Dworniak, and Grażyna Drążyk for their administrative assistance, and to John Fells for proofreading the text. We thank Ireneusz Sadowski for his assistance in analyzing EAST PaC data.

The Electoral Control project brought together young and established scholars in sociology, political science, and area studies to form a multi-disciplinary scientific research team. The core of this team was Mihail Chiru, Tomek Kołodziej, Sheri Kunovich, Justyna Nyckowiak, Zsófia Papp, Nataliia Pohorila, Zbigniew Sawiński and Peter Tunkis. We were fortunate to work with such a talented group of scholars. We were also fortunate to have the enthusiastic participation of excellent PhD students at GSSR, including Kateryna Gryniuk, Anna Kurowicka, Sanjaya Chaudhary Mahato, Nika Palaguta, Marcin Ślarzyński, Anastas Vangeli, and Olga Zelinska. We thank the many attendees and presenters at our events, including Amy Alexander, Tiffany Barnes, Catherine Bolzendahl, Nazar Boyko, Henryk Domański, Gábor Molnár, Iulian Stanescu, and Claudiu Tufis. We are also thankful to Karim Khan and Melanie Hughes for their assistance to the project.

We dedicate this book to Bohdan Solchanyk, a university lecturer in Lviv and a member of the team that collected the 2006–2012 EAST PaC data in Ukraine, who died on February 20, 2014 during a protest at Kyiv Maidan. He was 28 years old. According to an article about him in The New York Times, Bohdan was “killed by a bullet ... in Kiev in the carnage on and around Independence Square.” Bohdan was a doctoral student at GSSR, and an historian and sociologist. We celebrate his life and we mourn his loss.
Introduction

Towards Electoral Control in Central and Eastern Europe

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Nika Palaguta

Comprehensive information about parliamentarians, candidates, and parties is a fundamental resource that citizens need to cast judgment on the electoral system. It allows citizens to critically evaluate the parliament, an important political body that represents citizen interests and produces the policy that impacts daily life. How can we hold the legislature accountable if we do not have a clear record of who the parliamentarians, candidates, and parties are, and of what they have done?

Theories of democratic accountability tell us that voters can use elections to control parties and politicians. Theorists assume that political representatives anticipate sanctions for poor individual and party performance and thus have an incentive to implement policies that correspond with citizens’ interests. Citizens lose control when their electoral voice does not compel parties and politicians to act according to the interests of the people who put them in power. Repeated free and fair elections are supposed to function, then, as a mechanism of electoral control.

To empirically examine electoral control, we need the right data. Many previous empirical studies on parliamentary elections, even in Central and Eastern Europe, have critical shortcomings, as they typically (i) limit analyses to elected parliamentarians although all candidates are equally important for understanding the process of electoral control; (ii) fail to adequately incorporate the history of elections although voter decisions are usually based on the assessment of the past performance of candidates’ political parties; and (iii) do not have
appropriate contrasts in cross-national settings: examining different electoral systems allows researchers to properly assess the extent to which our knowledge about the determinants of winning and losing can be generalized across the region.

In this edited book, we present a step towards electoral control with the East European Parliamentarian and Candidate dataset (EAST PaC). EAST PaC is composed of the candidates who stood for national parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary and spans the 1990s to the 2010s (Polish data goes back to 1985). Candidates are matched over time, rendering a dataset that allows researchers to track the political careers of every candidate, from the thousands who never won to the few political lifers whose parliamentary careers are decades long. By covering every parliamentary election and situating them in their particular historical moments, scholars can identify trends and dynamics of the political party systems and achieve major insights into electoral politics of the region. EAST PaC is an opportunity for scholars to better test theories of accountability, representation, and political inequality in Central and Eastern Europe from the fall of Communism to the present.

The goals of this book meet the main goals of the Electoral Control project funded by Poland’s National Science Centre (see Preface and Acknowledgments). The Electoral Control project brought together young and established scholars in sociology, political science, and area studies to form a multi-disciplinary scientific research team that (a) updated existing data on parliamentarians and candidates used in prior publications and made these data easily accessible and freely available; (b) trained graduate students and set the research agenda for the use of these data around the topics of accountability, representation, and political inequality; and (c) produced methodological and substantive works based on these data.

This book is designed to meet the methodological aims of the project, which were to provide users with all of the information they need to use these data for substantive analyses and to provide a roadmap for collecting these data in future elections and other countries (see “Conclusion: Lessons Learned and New Questions,” this book). As for substantive works, an aim of this project was to specify how and to what extent winning and losing in the parliamentary elections depend on a combination of party and candidate characteristics within
social, economic, and political contexts. To that end, we are preparing a separate edited book based entirely on substantive analyses of EAST PaC data, in addition to a series of publications in academic journals due in 2016 and 2017. This methodological book both accompanies the substantive analyses that will appear in various academic outlets over the next few years and serves as the means to further methodological advancement in the field of electoral politics in CEE and elsewhere.

THE SURPRISE OF ELECTORAL CONTROL IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Several high-profile studies on electoral control in Central and Eastern Europe based on earlier versions of EAST PaC data formed the basis for the Electoral Control project. Jakub Zielinski, Goldie Shabad, and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński’s (2005) “Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems,” published in World Politics, was a crucial work. They asked whether repeated elections function as a means of accountability; their case study was Poland during the 1990s. Using a dataset that was an earlier version of EAST PaC, they found that economic performance influences vote decisions: incumbents are elected (or not) based on how well their constituencies fare economically. Though 1990s Poland is characterized by high levels of party switching, electoral control works through political parties in a manner substantively similar to Western Europe. Zielinski et al (2005: 391) expressed surprise at their findings:

“Given the historical legacy of dictatorship and the broad sense of uncertainty that accompanies the early stages of democratization, one might have expected that it would take considerable time before voters learn how to use elections to control their representatives systematically. It appears, however, that such learning is very rapid. As a result, there seems to be no fundamental difference between new and old democracies with regard to this basic nature of the electoral process.”

Later, Shabad and Słomczyński (2011) returned to the idea of electoral control in Poland, but this time from the voters’ perspective. They used waves from the Polish Panel Survey (POLPAN) and again found evidence that electoral control in Poland functions as theorized: “Voters take both
economic performance and political performance into account,” they wrote, “in deciding whether to reward or sanction governing political parties” (316). They warned that polarization in Polish politics could lead voters to harden their political loyalties, making them less likely to push out parties with poor economic performance and thus diminish the ability of elections to function as a form of democratic control.


“Our analyses also show that electoral control in Ukraine operates through political parties or partisan blocs. Despite the informational noise that exists in Ukraine’s party system and the deliberate confusion perpetrated by ‘the party of power’, partisan labels communicate to the voters which incumbents were or are associated with political forces supportive of the presidential administration and therefore should be held responsible for economic outcomes” (104).

Similarly, Andrew Roberts (2008), in his article in *Electoral Studies*, “Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe,” asked the same question as Słomczyński and colleagues, namely, whether repeated elections engender accountability in post-Communist nations. Roberts examined aggregate data of party vote shares across ten countries. The data are based in large part on the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex and span from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. Roberts, also expressing surprise, found strong evidence for electoral control based on economic performance.

“... the communist inheritance erected a number of barriers to electoral accountability. In particular, voters’ lack of experience and participation in politics, the high uncertainty of the transition, and unformed party systems might make accountability difficult to practice. Why did reality subvert these expectations?” (542)
Roberts suggested two reasons for this. First, he argued that Communism as practiced in the CEE produced educated and urbanized citizens who “were equipped with the skills to participate intelligently in politics if they so chose” (542). And, according to Roberts, they did so choose. Second, the region's sustained radical social and political change heightened citizen interest in politics.

A healthy rate of entry and incumbency in electoral competition might indicate a robust participatory political culture expected in both new and old democracies (Almond and Verba 1963). The extreme political sensitivity of CEE voters that allow for electoral control also allow them to continually throw out incumbent parties (see Markowski 2006 and Svolik 2013). Poland, for example, had its longest period of political stability from 2007 to 2015. In 2015, despite a stable economy, Poles voted out the incumbents and voted in the opposition.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARLIAMENTARIAN AND CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS

The winning and losing of parliamentary elections should be considered in the broad context of demographic characteristics of candidates, of the party that they represent, and the electoral system. Thus, a key issue in this project is the relationship between the personal characteristics of legislative candidates and electoral outcomes. The Electoral Control project is concerned with questions directly related to how individual traits prove beneficial or detrimental to the winning of office in CEE democracies. The implications of such a relationship are wide-ranging – who political candidates are and where they are from, not to mention who the winners and losers of repeated elections may be, is consequential for the evolution of the quality of democracy in post-Communist countries in terms of representation, accountability, and political inequality of voice.

Political biographies and the demographic characteristics of those running for public office matter for the quality of democracy. Representation and accountability are central principles to a system of governance that goes beyond procedure alone (Dahl 2005; Schmitter & Karl 1991). Candidates’ backgrounds and participation in free and fair elections speak to the representativeness and accountability of
parliaments and parliamentarians. The characteristics of the winners provide us with a picture of the representativeness of parliaments and the professionalization of politics (Shabad and Słomczyński 2002). Depending on the type of electoral system, incumbent success matters in discussions about accountability.

**EAST PaC Data**

Two key features of EAST PaC data are completeness and historical relevance: (a) we include all elections that took place in Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine in the post-Communist era, and (b) we cover a long period of time that accounts for dynamics of the political party systems.

For each country, the data for all elections are pooled so that the candidate is the unit of observation, while personal characteristics and characteristics of electoral participation make up the values of variables. These data allow us to track the political experience of candidates, including dynamics of their partisan affiliations, across consecutive elections. The project, then, is concerned with the exact populations of candidates. The main sources of data on parliamentary candidates are official records from governments and state agencies responsible for maintaining election archives. For elections conducted in the early 1990s, these records were in the form of paper documents, while in later years they were stored as electronic files.

**DESIGN, CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK**

This book contains everything that scholars need to use EAST PaC data for various academic purposes – whether to use these data as they are or to combine them with survey and non-survey data. We designed the book for various audiences: for CEE experts and for those who are unfamiliar with the region; for seasoned scholars of representation, accountability, and political inequality, and for those who are newly interested in the analysis of these concepts. We hope to intrigue potential users of EAST PaC data and to attract new scholars to study electoral politics in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary.
Introduction: Towards Electoral Control in Central …

We divided the book into four parts.

Part 1 Theory and Concepts presents an overview of the main theories and concepts of the project that are fundamental for research using EAST PaC data and suggests theoretical directions. In Chapter One, Dubrow et al use recent and classic texts to explore representation and accountability that are the driving concepts of the Electoral Control project and the rationale for collecting the EAST PaC data. In Chapter Two, Dubrow considers the idea that, for as long as the structure of candidates and parliamentarians resemble the top of the stratification ladder rather than its whole, issues of electoral control are firmly connected to the issue of political inequality. We connect these ideas through descriptive representation, an ideal that is also an indicator of political equality. This chapter posits a theory of how parliaments become politically unequal places through the metaphor of an electoral market.

Part 2 Methodology covers the content and structure of EAST PaC data and the collecting, cleaning, and matching for Ukraine (Pohorila), Poland (Sawiński and Dubrow), and Hungary (Papp) written by the leaders of the data collection teams for those countries. The goal of EAST PaC was to create a high quality dataset of the universe of candidates who ran for national office and in which users can track candidates across elections. EAST PaC is matched data that covers three countries, 29 years, 23 elections, and 97,439 unique candidates. The problems and errors encountered were of various kinds: technological, bureaucratic, social and political. The solutions for matching were generally based on a combination of automatic coding based on gender, age, and political affiliation, and of manual coding, where the data collection team had to comb through the data to identify and resolve duplicate cases. The process required multiple technological solutions, some of them dedicated to this task and all of which we developed over time and improved our data. We hope that by describing these data and the process, future scholars and other data users can improve and build on these data for future elections.

Part 3 Context is composed of a series of chapters on historical and contemporary electoral politics in each country, including detailed descriptions of parties and changes to electoral laws and electoral outcomes. The purpose of this part is to provide the broader electoral context of Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary to profitably analyze EAST
PaC data. It proceeds country by country and begins with a brief political history of Ukraine that starts at the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 that created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the electoral and social turmoil of Ukraine’s post-Independent period (Pohorila and Taran). What follows is an in-depth description, with information found in EAST PaC, of the political parties, electoral systems and electoral outcomes in Ukraine from the first post-Independence election to 2014 (Palaguta and Kurowicka). Ślarzyński, Kurowicka, and Palaguta then cover the Polish electoral scene since 1985 (the first election covered in EAST PaC Poland), focusing on changes to electoral laws and the outcomes of parliamentary elections. Next, considering that gender and representation are key features of electoral politics, Dubrow provides a brief history of gender quotas in Poland. Kurowicka and Palaguta end this part with a fascinating description of the Hungarian electoral scene since 1990.

We then turn to the Electoral Control project itself as an object of study. Social scientists rarely provide in-depth reporting on the processes that led to their research. Knowledge of process is a deep layer of information that enables future scholars to critically evaluate past projects and make good decisions for their own projects. We present the “who, what, when, where, why, and how” of the project; it is a record of this project’s history, aims, and critical decisions that led to these data, this book, and the seeds of future products. Part 4 Collaboration is a single chapter that features a description of the cross-national multi-disciplinary Electoral Control project (Dubrow and Zelinska). We describe the progression of the project and the process of facilitating collaboration among the multi-disciplinary mix of young and established social scientists that comprised the team. We learned best practices about the process of scientific collaborative work by developing and adapting our ideas over time.

The appendices present technical information. First is a coding scheme developed by Palaguta on how to code the issue stances of all major parties in Ukraine 2012 – 2014. This chapter goes well beyond the scope of the well-known Manifesto project and allows future scholars to usefully code new variables based on Ukrainian parties’ political platforms. After, Zsófia Papp provides a codebook for the complicated EAST PaC Hungary data.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Electoral Control project was designed to build an international and interdisciplinary scientific team focused on the use of data on parliamentarians and candidates in Central and Eastern Europe to address critical issues in representation, accountability and political inequality. The future of democratic progress rests on knowing the past and present of electoral politics. In this regard, we hope that this book does its part for Central and Eastern Europe.

REFERENCES


Part 1

THEORY AND CONCEPTS
Chapter one

Representation and Accountability: Intellectual Foundations of EAST PaC

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow, Anna Kurowicka, Nika Palaguta, and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński

Theory tells us that by conditioning their ballots on policy outcomes, voters can use elections to control politicians. Presumably, politicians anticipate that they will be sanctioned for poor party-performance and thus have an incentive to implement policies – through their own efforts, or through parties and other political units – that correspond to the preferences of the electorate. Does the system of repeated elections function as a mechanism of electoral control, and if it does, what factors influence its effectiveness?

In the Electoral Control project, we consider this question in a broad context of studies on parliamentary elections. This chapter sets out the intellectual foundations of this project (see also Introduction, this book) and thus the rationale for collecting the EAST PaC data. We consider the two main and interrelated concepts that have guided the project from the beginning: representation and accountability.

REPRESENTATION

To address whether elections are a mechanism of electoral control, we begin with a discussion of representation. The literature on political representation is vast and multi-disciplinary as it includes views of political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and area studies specialists, among others. When it comes to pinpointing a foundational post-Second World War work on political representation, Hanna F.
Pitkin’s *The Concept of Representation*, published in 1967, is a leading text.

In her seminal book, Pitkin presents a typology of various theoretical approaches to representation. She begins by introducing the notions of authorization and descriptive views on representation. According to the authorization view, also referred to as the formalistic type of representation, a representative is granted a previously absent right to perform a limited range of actions within certain bounds. Keeping within the bounds means that the representative performs the function of representation. Stepping outside of them indicates representation failure. The represented are, at the same time, responsible for the actions of representatives that they granted the right of representation to (Pitkin 1967: 38–39).

Some subtypes of descriptive representation, or “standing for” type of representation, include proportional representation, which is considered to be a strong reflection or even replication of the population structure on a smaller scale and assumes representation of all of its groups (Pitkin 1967: 61–62). Theorists who hold this view often use the metaphor of a representative body as a portrait of the constituency they represent. Representation of this type calls for a particular methodology. Representation by sample involves randomly choosing a group from the whole population. This method assumes that such kind of non-biased selection allows for representation of the population by a small group of representatives (Swabey 1937: 25 as quoted in Pitkin 1967: 74). Griffiths’s and Wollheim’s (1960) theory of descriptive representation suggest that a representative has to share distinct similarities with the represented (188).

To reduce representational inequality, many governments, political leaders, social justice advocates, and researchers champion the concept of descriptive representation. Proponents of descriptive representation assert that those elected officials who resemble the demographic and experiential characteristics of their constituencies have sufficient empathy to evaluate and construct representative policy (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 1990). In this sense, political structures encourage representation by empathetic demographic insiders. In contrast, delegative representation makes no provisions for demographic representation, relying instead on the stewardship of sympathetic demographic outsiders (Birch 2001). In practice, descriptive
representation attempts to ameliorate inequitable social conditions by providing historically marginalized groups with opportunities to become political elites. In so doing, proponents assert, descriptive representation safeguards the interests of the disadvantaged.

Descriptive representation, while perceived by Pitkin as limited, has proved to be an important point of reference for contemporary theorists working on the exclusion of marginalized groups based on gender, race, ethnicity, or other factors. The most important of these include Will Kymlicka who in his *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (1995) argues for group rather than just individual representation; Anne Phillips who in *The Politics of Presence* (1995) explains the importance of representation of diversity in society, and Melissa S. Williams who in *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation* (1998) explores patterns of group-based advantage and exclusion that tends to be ignored by individual representation. The criticisms of traditional concepts of representation expressed by those and other thinkers focus on the conflict between group fairness of representation and individual proportional representation fairness (e.g. Urbinati and Warren 2008).

Descriptive representation is more of a concept than a theory, designed to stimulate praxis rather than merely academic research. Addressing inequitable political representation, theoretical debates focus on the tenability and “philosophy and ethics” of descriptive representation as a governance solution, especially in the light of the current state of disadvantaged group representation (Chaney and Fevre 2002: 897). Thus, it refers to both an ideal and a reality; the ideal being the governance solution, the reality being the degree to which the legislative body represents the demographics and experiences of the citizenry.

Descriptive representation has been criticized on various grounds (for a review, see (Mansbridge 1999). Most common is that descriptive representation would not lead to substantive representation, such that demographic qualities bear little to no relationship to deliberative capabilities (Mansbridge 2000: 101). Others argue that by overemphasizing group differences through claims of supra-representational abilities, descriptive representation erodes the bonds among legislators whose job it is to produce policies for all, rather than a demographic subset, of their constituency (Bird 2003).
Many other complaints focus on the difficulties of implementing descriptive representation. Choosing which groups from a multiplicity of genders, races, ethnicities, religions, age groups, physical handicaps, and social classes are worthy of descriptive representation could be so complex that random or arbitrary assignment to legislative bodies is the only reasonable way (Andeweg 2003: 149; Kymlicka 1995). Some fear that implementation of this form of representation would lead to a selection of less qualified legislators drawn from, among other places, the bottom of the talent pool. Akin to this is the argument that descriptive representatives vary as much within their group, including multiple social identities such as Muslim lower class woman, or young Silesian émigré, etc., as they do between groups. In its implementation, descriptive representation oversimplifies a complex set of demographics, leaving some subgroups underrepresented, thereby undermining the very purpose for which it was intended.

Counter to these criticisms, most proponents assert that descriptive representation is not a call for an exact microcosm of the citizenry, “such that children represent children, lunatics represent lunatics” (Bird 2003: 2). Instead, the goal is (a) substantive representation through making the legislative body demographically closer to the citizenry and (b) situation specific, in that selection of groups in need of representation should be made after careful, rational deliberation and under particular conditions (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999).

Symbolic representation is based on a notion of symbol, which does not contain a meaning by itself, but one which is attributed to it by social convention. Thus a symbolic representation is only in place, when it is believed in (Pitkin 1967: 100).

Substantive representation, referred to by Pitkin as “acting for” representation, assumes that the actions and the goals of representatives should coincide and there is a primacy of represented over representative in a way that only the latter is accountable. (Pitkin 1967: 163–165 in Celis et al 2008: 100). Celis et al (2008) further explain two different types of substantive representation and the major differences between them by highlighting the role of represented and representative. Under the first type of representation, the representative has no possibilities of actions beyond those granted them by the represented. Under the second type, the representative has more possibilities for independent actions than that strictly authorized by the represented. Pitkin argues
that there is a difference in how the representative should act in different circumstances: if representatives are more experienced and are able to propose rational, well grounded solutions in the national interests, they should act more independently. Their actions however should be limited in cases of explicitly conflicting interests with the represented or when significant differences in interests of the represented and the state occur, and in cases where both the represented and the representatives have sufficient experience and information to decide upon an issue (Celis et al et al. 2008: 100–101).

While extremely influential, Pitkin’s typology could stand some improvements, especially for the ever-changing circumstances of democratic representation. It was expanded on by, among others, Mansbridge (1999 and 2003), who discusses the traditional model of representation and adds three more models, whose features suggest that they should be judged according to a different set of criteria than the traditional one.

The types of representation proposed by Mansbridge (2003) are Promissory (traditional) representation that follows the classical principal-agent format and assumes that the agent (the representative) fails to meet their obligations to the principal (the represented) and that the represented will try to make representative accountable through the promises that the representative makes (515). According to Mansbridge this type of representation uses a “forward-looking concept of power” (515). In contrast, Anticipatory representation is a result of the idea of retrospective voting, under which representatives look forward to the expectations of their voters on the next election but not to those promises they made for the elections they have already won (2003: 515). According to Mansbridge, there is no moral attitude of the agent in aiming to meet their previous promises to the principal, but rather there is a careful anticipation with the goal of reelection (2003: 518). This new model of representation based on the idea of retrospective voting and rejection of the traditional principal-agent model has important consequences for the way the quality of such representation is judged. As Mansbridge (2003) explains,

“replacing morality with prudence in the incentive structure of anticipatory representation leads us to judge the process with new normative criteria. It makes us shift our normative focus from the individual to the system, from aggregative democracy to deliberative democracy, from
preferences to interests, from the way the legislator votes to the way the legislator communicates, and from the quality of promise-keeping to the quality of mutual education between legislator and constituents” (518).

One of Mansbridge’s great contributions to the literature on representation is her critique of previous representation theories and the development of a new one, what she refers to as “gyroscopic representation.” Gyroscopic representation is based on an idea of representation from different from classic accountability models: “The representatives act like gyroscopes, rotating on their own axes, maintaining a certain direction, pursuing certain built-in (although not fully immutable) goals” (2003: 520). Representatives are not expected to be accountable before the voters, like in traditional models, but rather to follow their goals (2003: 520). They are guided by some general principles and logically grounded necessities trying to meet voters expectations, comply with moral standards and demonstrate required proficiency levels (2003: 520–1). While a focus on the characteristics of an individual candidate is more typical of the American political context, the European model precludes politicians’ orientation towards the interests of the party that consists both of their own beliefs and of the line of the party as a whole. The party member is responsible for his disobedience before the party and the party before the citizens (2003: 521).

The Surrogate model of representation is a type of representation which “occurs when legislators represent constituents outside their own districts” (2003: 515). Under the circumstances where the representative is not controlled by financial or power instruments, accountability of the representative to the represented is absent. In cases where financial control is possible, voters are able to control representatives through the ordinary mechanism of representation and by electing representatives that would act according to pre-determined patterns pursuing their goals (“as in gyroscopic representation”) (2003: 523). This type of representation occurs, for example, in the case of minority groups having a “surrogate” representative elected from one constituency who “speaks for” an entire group, as in the case of the US Senator Barney Frank who represented the interests of the LGBT. It is often seen as a possible answer to some problems inherent in the limitations of the traditional model of a territorially-based representation (cf. Urbinati and Warren 2008).
According to Mansbridge, the last three should be judged according to different criteria than the traditional one; multiple criteria of assessment have to be applied as there are many ways of representation. “The criteria are almost all deliberative rather than aggregative. And, in keeping with the conclusion that there is more than one way to be represented legitimately in a democracy, the criteria are plural rather than singular” (2003: 515). As a result, those three types of representation do not fit into the “mandate”/“delegate” vs. “trustee” dichotomy.

Another crucial shift in the theories of representation was initiated by Michael Saward (2006, 2010). He argues that representation is not exclusively a process of choice of representatives by the represented – where representatives remain static – but that it also involves an active process of making “representative claims” (2006: 298) that singles out the representatives who wish to be chosen. Future representatives highlight the need to represent the interests of a group, geographic unit, or some other bounded territory by framing the existence of their special needs that should be represented. The process of making claims is not limited to political life only, as “interest group or NGO figures, local figures, rock stars [and] celebrities” (2006: 306) also take part in the process (Saward 2006 in Celis et al 2008: 101–102). Saward’s approach is yet another significant attempt (following Mansbridge 2003) to redefine representation so that it is more congruent with the trends in contemporary democracies and politics, discussed in Urbinati and Warren (2008).

ACCOUNTABILITY

Issues of representation and accountability are closely linked. We briefly present various approaches to electoral accountability and theories that use this term to describe features of various democratic systems.

One of the most comprehensive and widely cited texts on accountability is Democracy, Accountability, and Representation edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (1999). This collection includes such key theorists as James D. Fearon and John Ferejohn and provides an overview of many issues crucial to the topic. The first chapter of this book written by the editors provides an informative take on two concepts of representation that highlights the connection between representation and accountability.
Manin et al (1999) discuss two different concepts of representation: mandate and accountability. The mandate model occurs under three conditions: (i) interests of politicians coincide with those of the voters; (ii) politicians want to be elected and reelected and expect that it will happen if they implement policies they promised in the campaign; and (iii) to avoid losing the elections, politicians want their promises to be credible in the future (Manin et al 1999: 31–33). This vision is idealistic as it ignores other potential incentives for politicians. This mandate model also brings to the fore one of the crucial problems of representation: the potential incongruence between voters’ interests and preferences. Sometimes politicians face a choice between doing what they consider to be in the voters’ best interests and the expressed wants of the voters. According to Manin (1997), in current democratic systems, “politicians are not legally compelled to abide by their platform“ or are “subject to binding instructions,” which means that there is no legal way for the voters to force politicians to fulfill their promises (Manin et al 1999: 38). Historically, this is because: representatives were expected to deliberate and consult experts; voters do not always trust their own judgment; and conditions (the facts on the ground) may change. The only way of sanctioning politicians at voters’ disposal is the institution of periodic election, in which they can be held accountable.

The accountability model assumes that voters may control elected officials by having them anticipate that they will be held accountable for their past actions. Incumbent politicians are considered accountable when the electorate is able to assess their actions and punish or reward them during the elections according to the results of their activity (Manin et al 1999: 40). The following conditions are necessary for this type of representation to occur: voters vote for the incumbent only when the representative acts in the best interests of their constituency, and the incumbent chooses policies necessary to get reelected (40).

The standard view on accountability assumes retrospective voting, according to which the electorate would observe the performance of previously elected political parties and punish them if they do not meet their expectations (Ashworth 2012: 187). According to V.O. Key (1966: 61), citizens assess politicians’ activity retrospectively in any case, even during elections: while it seems that the population votes for the future benefits, indeed voters choose on the basis of previous
knowledge of what politicians in question did before; citizens do not vote for political promises made for the future.

Morris Fiorina (1981) wrote about how mechanisms of electoral accountability are incorporated in voting decisions of individual voters. He argues that citizens evaluate and make decisions based on the performance of the politicians’ past performance, and estimate prospective actions the politicians will likely make in future. Manin et al (1999) note that such theory of accountability only works under the assumption that voters have complete information. Complete information is rare, as it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to accurately judge politicians, and politicians do not know what they need to do to assure their reelection (1999: 42–43). Consequently, in their view, information asymmetry provokes a situation in which accountability does not lead to representation (Manin et al 1999: 44). Manin et al conclude by stating that rather than voting according to the pure mandate model (use the vote to choose the better candidate) or to the pure accountability model (use to vote to sanction the incumbent) voters try to use their vote for both purposes (1999: 45).

There are various definitions and approaches to accountability itself, and one of the most influential definitions of accountability can be found in Fearon’s (1999) chapter, “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” Fearon suggests that an agent A is accountable to principal B, if “(i) there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B and (ii) B is empowered by some formal institution or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for his/her activities or performance in this capacity” (1999: 55).

Besley (2006) in his “Principled Agents: The Political Economy of Good Government,” points out the importance of distinguishing between formal (de jure) and real (de facto) accountability. According to Ashworth (2012: 184), accountability leads to such relations between politicians and voters that the position of politicians can be influenced through the institution of elections. Besley wrote that the institution of elections determines the rules of representation, but it does not guarantee reelection of the politician that meets the formal requirements of accountability. Instead, reelection depends on the politicians’ performance that meets voters’ requirements. In weak democracies, where politicians have lower incentives to meet voters’ needs
or where voters possess very limited information about their representatives, incumbent politicians are less accountable than in stable democracies. Thus, the level of accountability may be a benchmark for democracy assessment (see also Markowski 2006).

A commonly employed theory of accountability is related to the concept of political agency. Besley (2006: 98) argues that electoral accountability arises from a principal-agent relationship between voters and political actors. Elections are meant to solve two major incentive problems: monitoring, which refers to the fact that politicians may act only in their own interests and thus control over them is necessary to reward or punish them accordingly; and there is selection, which focuses on the necessity of choosing the most competent politicians and/or those whose motivations are congruent with those of voters (Besley 2006: 99). Besley (2006) further comments on the aforementioned problem of retrospective voting. In the political agency model “voters are learning from past actions and use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs”, and that is why the difference between retrospective and prospective voting vanishes (2006: 106).

Ashworth (2012) points out two basic elements of electoral accountability. First, voters decide to keep a politician in power. Second, a politician who tries to meet voters’ expectations and two policy-making periods: in the first one the incumbent is in office, he or she chooses an action, and the voter decides how to vote, followed by the second period in which whoever won chooses an action again, only this time with no election at the end (the game ends at this point) (2012: 184–5). Ashworth (2012: 185) explains that incumbent’s behavior is conditioned by the incentives as they will adjust their behavior in order to be reelected. Consequently, the greater the incentive, such as perks, salary and other benefits, the greater responsiveness to the voters, and when there is no incentive (e.g. term limits, no possibility of reelection), the incumbent will not be responsive. According to the voter’s reelection rule (Ashworth 2012: 185), the incumbent is reelected when performance meets some standard. In most contemporary literature, this “standard [is] determined in equilibrium by the voters’ desire to choose better-performing politicians in the future” which stands in contrast to more traditional approaches, in which all politicians were identical and thus there is no reasonable scope for selection (see also Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, Austen-Smith and Banks 1989).
Besley (2006: 103) elaborates further on some modeling issues crucial for various conceptions of accountability: the nature of the uncertainty, the motives for holding office, the nature of accountability, and retrospective voting. In terms of uncertainty, Besley (2006) focuses on the types of politicians and the question whether they themselves know their own types. “A model of uninformed politicians is more in tune with the celebrated Holmstrom (1999) ‘career concerns’ model in which individuals put in effort which reveals their type to the ‘market’. Persson and Tabellini (2000) develop a political agency model along these lines, in which voters and politicians are symmetrically informed” (Besley 2006: 103). Crucially, voters are generally poorly informed about the best policy, and may be uncertain about the exact policy implemented, and the wisdom of a given policy is often unclear for some time (Besley 2006: 104). As for the motives for holding office, Besley enumerates “ego rent,” material gain, public goods concerns, as well as possibly a “legacy effect” (Maskin and Tirole 2004). Besley (2006) argues that the agency models work best with individual directly elected politicians: mayors, governors, presidents, where the basis of accountability is clearly defined relative to responsibilities (2006: 105).

According to the view of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), moral hazard creates a situation under which politicians acting according to their goals may be to some extent constrained by institute of elections and the theoretical expectations of their voters. In this situation incumbent politicians would have to decide on how prudent they should be in terms of rent seeking (Besley 2006: 106–107). Besley and Prat (2006) address adverse selection model under which the voters need to make a choice of an appropriate incumbent politician, who has no influence on their choice. This model does not consider that, under normal circumstances, politicians have the means to manipulate information flow (Besley 2006: 107; theories that combine elements of both models include those of Banks and Sundaram (1993) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1989)).

Others pay attention to the differences in behavior of politicians in terms of policy choice (Besley and Case (1995a); Coate and Morris (1995); Fearon (1999) and Rogoff (1990). They highlight that some of them intending to perform well and to be reelected on this ground may adopt more sophisticated policies that cannot be adopted by politicians with lower standards of governance, but the latter ones may try
to form alliances with the former, so that they would look better in the 
eyes of electorate (Besley 2006: 107).

Referring to the political agenda model by Persson and Tabellini 
(2000), Besely explains that it is related to the “career concerns model” 
of Holmstrom (1999) because neither the electorate nor the repre-
sentatives do not possess full information on the level of representa-
tive performance. Decision making is oriented to the future benefits 
available after the elections take place (Besley 2006: 107). The career 
concerns model is also a basis for models created by Ashworth (2005) 
and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 2008). Besley highlights 
that “This kind of approach also gets away from some of the signaling 
issues as the politicians do not know their own types. For some appli-
cations (for example where a type is some kind of competence issue) 
this may be natural. However, when preferences are part of the type, 
this is a less plausible assumption” (Besley 2006: 108).

Besley (2006: 108) summarizes his typology of accountability 
models by stating that the agency models have a positive impact on 
accountability because the behavior of politicians is regulated by their 
own incentives to adopt better decisions. The exception to this rule 
occurs when politicians are discouraged from doing what is in the 
voters’ best interests because they know they will not be rewarded for 
it: this is the case when the voters’ interests and preferences are incon-
gruent, e.g. when it comes to long-term policies. Besley explains this 
further in connection with the moral hazard models of accountability, 
when he notes that under the condition of information asymmetry, 
when politicians have more information on their performance, politi-
cal decisions may be adopted in a way that would please the electorate 
with little regard to the results of the policy (2006: 136).

Ashworth (2012) offers an alternative yet complementary typology 
of accountability models. He presents pure moral hazard models, in 
which the prediction is made by selecting the equilibrium that maxi-
mizes voters’ payoff (see also Seabright 1996, Persson et al. 1997, Shi 
are criticized in Fearon (1999) who “shows that the set of equilibria 
of the pure moral hazard model is often not robust to allowing can-
didate heterogeneity” as even a small difference between candidates 
can change the outcome if it is relevant to the voter (Ashworth 2012: 
186).
There are some prominent examples of models with assumptions about candidate heterogeneity as proposed by Fearon. The spatial policy making model (based on Fearon 1999) argues that both the incumbent and the voter have ideal points in policy space. The incumbent chooses an action in this space, but the voter is uncertain about where the incumbent’s ideal point is, as it may be close to the voter’s or it may be more extreme. The program can be implemented (based on de Janvry et al 2010) efficiently or with corruption/graft. The voter wants efficiency but does not know what the incumbent prefers, while the incumbent has all the information. The constituency service (based on Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006) is when the incumbent must allocate effort to constituency service and other activities. The voter observes the quality of service, which depends on many factors, such as oversight, competence, and others. The voter knows that the incumbent wants to spend less time on oversight, but the voter does not know the competence level of the incumbent.

The issue of potentially misaligned incentives is explored by Ashworth (2012) with two examples of models in which this occurs: the multitask model and the pandering model. The multitask model used by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Lohmann (1998), Ashworth (2005), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006), and Gehlbach (2007), and Daley and Snowberg (2011) is based on the assumption that the incumbent has multiple tasks in various arenas and the choice of which to focus on depends largely on the incumbent’s own preferences. If those preferences align with those of the voters and if electoral incentives were not in play, the incumbent would do exactly what is best for the voter. However, since the incumbent does want to win re-election, they will likely take actions with the highest impact on voter’s beliefs about their type. This leads to a distortion between high-impact actions and the optimal actions for the voters’ interests (Ashworth 2012: 188–9).

The pandering model derives from the “reputational herding” literature from Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and is adopted for elections by Coate and Morris (1995), Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004), and Besley (2006) (Ashworth 2012: 189). It has its roots in the ex-ante uncertainty about which policy is best for the voters. It also relies on the imbalance of access to information, as the incumbent tends to have more data on which policy is best but cannot share it. In
this scenario if the voter believes the incumbent to be the good type, the incumbent will still be reelected based on this conviction. However, if the voter is uncertain about the incumbent’s type, an unexpected policy choice may cost them the election. As a result, the incumbent has incentives to make the popular decision, but not the best decision; they pander to the voters. This problem might be controlled if there is enough time to resolve this uncertainty, which suggests that the problem is exacerbated close to elections (Ashworth 2012: 189). Indeed, according to Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) presidential budgets tend to be closer to the voters’ preferences right before an election (quoted in Ashworth 2012: 189). Ashworth (2012: 189) argues that some possible solutions to multitask and pandering problems should be based on weakening the link between the tempting actions and reelection. Those include limiting transparency as proposed by Prat (2005) and Fox and Van Weelden (2012) and term limits Ashworth (2005).

When discussing empirical evidence for the models, Ashworth (2012: 190) presents Healy and Malhotra’s (2009) work on two approaches to natural disasters: disaster preparedness and relief spending, finding that relief spending is rewarded electorally. Their conclusion is that voters behave in an irrational way and that situation results in reduction of public welfare as politicians will not invest in preparedness. There are two alternative explanations to the conclusion put forward by Healy and Malhotra. The first is based on the multitask model, according to which relief spending influences voters’ beliefs about the candidate type, while levels of damage depend on so many factors that they blur the image of the candidate. If taken in this light, Healy and Malhotra’s evidence can be proof of voter rationality in the multitask model (Ashworth 2012: 190). The second alternative conclusion is proposed by Bueno de Mesquita (2007) who claims that relief effort is more visible than prevention, and thus there is less chance of corruption while choosing this action, which increases community welfare (Ashworth 2012: 190–1).

Access to information is one of the most important variables in accountability; the most basic claim is that an increase in information should result in an increase in responsiveness. Incumbent politicians and voters are connected by the flow of information: information changes the perception of voters and voter opinion impacts the behavior of politicians (Ashworth 2012: 191). Another problem is
incumbency advantage. Ashworth (2012: 192) argues that “the selection mechanism implicit in political agency models predicts an incumbency advantage. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) show that, assuming incumbent elections and open seat elections get comparable coverage, this incumbency advantage is larger when media coverage is stronger. And, indeed, Snyder and Stromberg find that the incumbency advantage is larger in more congruent districts.”

One of the roles of challengers in a democratic system is as a source of information on the incumbent’s performance, whether it is in the form of a direct revelation (Ashworth and Shotts 2011) or via an indirect channel, such as in the case when the very fact of entry into the race provides information (Gordon et al. 2007; Ashworth 2012: 193). Incumbents with a challenger should be more responsive to voters, but this claim turns out to be difficult to check, as the incumbent typically runs unopposed only in very specific circumstances, e.g. when he or she is in a very strong position. This has been analyzed in research on retention elections for judges in Kansas by Gordon and Huber (2007), who found that there was a significant incentive for the incumbents to be more punitive; this suggests that increased responsiveness may under certain circumstances lead to rather problematic results (Ashworth 2012: 193). The level of partisanship in a district complicates matters. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) suggested that, in less partisan districts, incumbents would focus on constituency service rather than policy making, a proposition checked empirically by Dropp and Peskowitz 2012; Ashworth 2012: 194).

Simple models of accountability become complicated when multiple agents are involved. Simple models work best with individually chosen politicians who have clearly defined responsibilities. It is more complex in the case of multiple agents which “could be legislators who jointly pass legislation in a legislature or they could be thought of as the acts of a bicameral legislature, with agents located in each chamber” (Besley 2006: 159). This type of situation is described by Persson and al (2000) who discussed the unifying nature of agenda setting powers in a parliamentary system versus a presidential system: “A parliamentary system unifies agenda setting powers while a presidential system diversifies it. The latter tends to reduce rent extraction and tends towards smaller government” (Besley 2006: 164). In addition, term limits can impact responsiveness to voters (Ashworth 2012: 194).
The involvement of third parties – media outlets and the branches of government – also influences accountability. The research on this topic includes Ashworth and Shotts (2010) proposing a model with a media outlet as a third party, Fox and Stephenson (2011) on judicial review, Fox and Van Weelden (2010) on a situation with a veto player who has an incentive to appear competent, and Fox and Jordan (2011) on the possibility of delegation to another bureaucrat (Ashworth 2012: 197–8).

Most studies on parliamentary elections have two major shortcomings. First, they have focused on electoral success by limiting analyses to “winners” and not realizing that “losers” are equally important for the entire electoral process. From a formal point of view “who wins” and “who loses” are inseparable dual problems. Only operating on the full set of candidates for a particular election can one properly assess the determinants of winning and losing. The second shortcoming stems from ignoring the “history” of elections despite the fact that, for voters, the decision for whom to vote is usually based on the assessment of the past performance of candidates’ political parties. In consecutive elections the reappearances of “old” candidates and appearances of new ones on the political party lists are crucial for the winning/losing outcomes as is well documented in the fragmented studies.

_A Game Theoretic Approach to Electoral Accountability_

We briefly summarize the game-theoretic approach to elections that was an intellectual impetus for our project (see Fearon 1999; Banks and Sunderam 1990, and Ferejohn 1986). Our contribution consists of connecting this approach with characteristics of the parties and electoral systems. The model represents the interaction between politicians and voters as a “principal-agent” relation. Voters are the principals, and they elect their agents, politicians, to implement a policy. Voters are uncertain about the policy chosen by the politicians and about the politicians’ preferences. In short, they are simultaneously confronted with the problem of “moral hazard” and the problem of “adverse selection.” As a result, voters have to perform two tasks in a single stroke: they have to induce politicians to implement a good policy, and they have to sort between good and bad politicians. To accomplish all this, voters have only the right to vote the representatives of the party out of office and to replace them with the challenger. This is the essential problem of electoral control.
The central result of the model is that, in the equilibrium, voters condition their voting decision on policy consequences. This is not just a matter of simple retrospective voting: Voters use their information about policy consequences to update their beliefs about the party representatives. If they conclude that these people are more likely than their challengers to be “good” then they elect them. Otherwise, they opt for the challengers. In short, when voter evaluation of policy consequences is high, voters elect the representatives from that party because good policy consequences indicate that they are likely to be “good” and thus likely to behave well in the future. Conversely, when voter evaluation of policy consequences is low, voters elect the challengers because bad policy consequences indicate that the party representatives are likely to be “bad” and thus behave poorly in the future. By using their past information prospectively, voters induce “bad” incumbents to behave better. In the equilibrium, “bad” incumbents implement policy that is between the “bad” party representative’s ideal point and the voters’ ideal point. In short, by sorting politicians, voters also sanction them. In the model, sanctioning is a byproduct of sorting.

In addition to this central theoretical insight, the model generates two comparative static results. The first result is that the reelection threshold set by the voters depends on the quality of information that voters have about the policy selected by the incumbent. In the equilibrium, the reelection of party representatives threshold is a decreasing function of the variance. The second result is that the reelection threshold depends on voters’ beliefs about the quality of the challengers (non-party representatives). When voters believe that the challengers are likely to be good, they set a higher standard for the party representatives. Conversely, when they are convinced that the challengers are likely to be “bad,” they become more lenient towards the party representatives. In the equilibrium, the election of party representatives threshold is an increasing function of beliefs.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we summarized the main concepts and theories of representation and accountability which are central to electoral control. Since we are primarily concerned with modern democracies, the
notions of representation and accountability are theoretically and substantively related.

There are a variety of approaches and perspectives, but all of them deal with the basics of the ballot box: voters choose candidates and parties, parliamentarians represent their constituencies, and everyone pursues their interests through the system of electoral laws in an environment of imperfect information. The hope is that democracy will withstand the pursuit of divergent interests and that good governance will prevail.

Two other key ideas that interact with representation and accountability are democracy and political inequality. Their interrelationship is the subject of Chapter Two.

REFERENCES


Review 95(3): 862–877.
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Rep-
resentation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Inter-
est, and Historically Denigrated Status.” Pp. 99–123 in Citizenship in
Diverse Societies, edited by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Oxford
University Press.
of California Press.
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C., and Manin, B. 1999. Democracy, accountability,
and representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Press.
Seabright, Paul, 1996. “Accountability and decentralisation in government:
An incomplete contracts model.” European Economic Review Elsevier
Scharfstein, David S, and Jeremy C Stein. 1990. “Herd Behavior and Invest-
career politicians in post-Communist Poland and the Czech Republic.”
Shi, Min and Jakob Svensson. 2006. “Political budget cycles: Do they differ
“Fluid Party Systems, Electoral Rules and Accountability of Legislators in


Chapter two

The Electoral Market as a Mechanism of Political Inequality

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow

For as long as the structure of candidates and parliamentarians resemble the top of the stratification ladder rather than its whole, issues of electoral control are firmly connected to the issue of political inequality. Despite a trend towards demographic and experiential diversity in the political elite, it is axiomatic that disadvantaged groups of gender (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003), race and ethnicities (Swain 1995), and other social groups (Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998) are numerically and substantively underrepresented in the national legislatures of modern democracies. Political equality, according to social scientists and democracy theorists, is a foundation of modern democracy (e.g. Dahl 2006; Verba 2006). Yet, everywhere political power is exercised, there is political inequality. Political inequality refers to the unequal influence over decisions made by political bodies and the unequal outcomes of those decisions (Dubrow 2015). Political inequality is a subtype of power inequality, visible within the political processes of all kinds of political structures. In modern democracies, political inequality is simultaneously a dimension of democracy and a dimension of stratification. Under-representation is a key indicator of political inequality.

Our understanding of how and why disadvantaged groups are simultaneously unequal in economic, status and political domains would be enhanced by specifying the mechanisms that link micro-level voter behavior to macro-level electoral representation. Micro- and macro-level studies of women’s and ethnic minorities’
political representation dominate the empirical field while normative defense of descriptive representation of various groups dominates the theoretical field (see also Bird 2003 and Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005: 407). In descriptive representation, the composition of the representative body resembles the demographics and experiences of the citizenry (Mansbridge 1999: 629; Pitkin 1972: Chapter 4).

As a means to explain how micro-level actions of voters and parliamentarians construct the composition of a national legislature, many scholars co-opt the economic language of market dynamics, where supply of and demand for types of candidates governs a nation's state of descriptive representation (Cannon 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). The implication is that when the supply of descriptive candidates increases, voters will vote for them, and descriptive representation will be achieved (Dubrow 2007). Use of market imagery creates a state policy continuum with government intervention at one extreme and laissez-faire market solutions at the other. While the concept of an electoral market is a useful theoretical guideline, its empirical parameters are more often assumed than tested.

Research into government intervention centers mainly on constitutional and electoral law quotas and reserved seats for women and ethnicities (see also Htun 2003 and Chapter 10 of this book). Whether government intervention, in and of itself, enhances descriptive representation depends on the type of law implemented and how it is enforced (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). For example, reserved seats can actually serve to reduce women's progress in gaining representation above the level set for reservation. In addition, quota management can be used against women's interests when party leaders are more interested in recruiting docile descriptive representatives who do not challenge the status quo (Dahlerup 2002). Government intervention for ethnicities follows a similar logic. Active descriptive representation policy for ethnicities is a potential means for securing political stability, especially during the formation of heterogeneous countries born of ethnic conflict, and can be achieved through electoral support for ethnic parties and formal guarantees of political representation (Htun 2004; Juberias 2000). Government intervention for ethnicities, however, can have negative, unintended consequences, depending on how the law was written, implemented, and enforced, and how it is perceived by other ethnic groups (Stein 2000).
Research into market solutions is largely limited to the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas for enhancing women’s representation and government support for ethnic party competition without electoral guarantees (Kittilson 2006; Juberias 2000). Voluntary party quotas for gender have been shown to increase women’s representation, though like other types of descriptive representation policy, success depends on the form and magnitude of the quota, along with the sanctions for non-compliance. Though endorsement of gender quotas is widespread in the women’s representation literature, there is disagreement as to the necessity of quotas. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) argue, “Major historical leaps in women’s parliamentary representation can occur without quota provisions” (27). Jane Mansbridge, a noted descriptive representation scholar, presents a contrary view; “… as I write, significant representation by gender cannot be achieved in any existing polity without some form of quota” (2005: 622).

Quotas, however, are not the entirety of market solutions. A range of non-government action, such as party level affirmative action, social movement pressures, and changing ideology, all have the possibility to increase descriptive representation for the disadvantaged. Thus, in order to understand whether market solutions can enhance descriptive representation for the disadvantaged, we need to explore beyond just party quotas and analyze the entirety of the political market as a feasible mechanism for change.

Linking attitudes and behaviors of political leaders and voters to the demographic composition of parliaments, I advocate the use of the concept of an electoral market as a micro to macro level mechanism to explore the determinants of how new democracies create their state of descriptive representation in the national legislature for disadvantaged social categories.

Elections link masses to political elites and are a crucial mechanism through which political leaders understand mass interests. Thus, repeated elections are supposedly designed to enable the masses to achieve one or more of the following goals: (a) sanction directly the political elite by either voting for or against the extension of incumbents’ term in office and (b) vote for the political leaders that best represent their interests (Manin et al. 1999). Central and Eastern Europe has had great electoral volatility (Lawson 1999: 32–33; Zielinski et al 2005), caused in part by social cleavages translating their dissatisfaction into
vote choice during subsequent, and frequent, economic downturns (Tavits 2005, Roberts 2008). If political stability is a result of parties rooted in social cleavages (Elster et al. 1998: Chapter 7; Lipset and Rokkan 1967), then adequate gender, class, ethnic and other social groups’ representation in national legislatures in the course of repeated, free, and fair elections is crucial.

Perhaps the most convincing way to counter to criticisms, demonstrating the importance of studying the subject, is by assessing whether the demographics of the representative make a measurable difference in the representation of the disadvantaged (Mansbridge 1999; Ogmundson 2005: 319–323). Any impact of descriptive representation could be felt in two main ways; (a) raising constituents’ political engagement and/or (b) descriptive representatives’ impact on legislative processes.

While some find that descriptive representatives make little difference in either of these areas (Lawless 2004; Swain 1995), others show that descriptive representatives do have a measurable impact. In terms of raising constituents’ political engagement, whites and blacks are more likely to contact representatives of the same race (Gay 2002) and women are more likely to become politically active in states with competitive and visible women candidates (Atkeson 2003). Some explain this phenomenon in terms of legitimacy, in that “constituents are more likely to identify with the legislature and to defer to its decisions to the extent that they perceive a significant percentage of ‘people like themselves’ in the legislature” (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005: 413–414).

As for impacting legislative processes, research is mixed on whether demographic characteristics influence roll-call behavior, but is more definitive on policy introduction (for a review, see Swers 2002: 7–17 and Reynolds 1999: 548). Partisanship seems to have a larger impact on roll-call voting than voter’s demographic ties to their constituency (e.g., Latino dominated districts exert little influence on their Latino representatives (Hero and Tolbert 1999). As for gender, net of partisanship, women legislators used to consistently vote more liberally than men, though this behavior has attenuated over time (Welch 1995). Blacks consistently vote more liberally than whites and support more Black issue bills, a phenomenon dating back to Reconstruction (Cobb and Jenkins 2001). One cross-national study of wealthy, industrialized countries found that greater percentages of women in legislative
positions positively impacts foreign policy in terms of providing development assistance (Breuning 2001).

Dubrow (2007) used the concept of demographic cues, i.e. when voters vote based on the individual characteristics of the candidates, to argue that it is theoretically possible for the disadvantaged to “vote in” their own descriptive representatives. The main hypothesis was that voters are more likely to vote for parties that are demographically similar to them. For example, women are more likely to vote for parties that have women in them. He found that, for the demographic groups who do vote based on demographic cues, the contribution to overall voting behavior is much smaller than that of political attitudes toward the economy, the State Socialist past, and the role of the Church in political life. Dubrow (2007) concluded that demographic cues voting in Poland from the 1990s to the early 2000s, with its laissez faire political market consisting only of voluntary gender quotas, could not produce a descriptively similar government. Stronger government intervention could produce what a laissez faire approach did not.

Stronger impacts are felt in terms of policy introduction. Swers’ (2002) study of the policy impacts of women legislators strongly suggests that women are more likely to introduce women’s issues and feminist bills into legislative consideration than their male colleagues (see also Thomas 1994). Others find that Blacks are more likely to introduce Black issue bills and work harder for their passage than whites (Cannon 1999: Chapter 4; Whitby 2002), though some find the results somewhat mixed (Tate 2003: Chapter 4). In Eastern Europe, descriptive representation of disadvantaged groups influences the form and magnitude of policy, but primarily through ethnic political parties (Chiribuca and Magyari 2003; see also Xydias 2008).

All told, it appears that descriptive representation does matter in that demographic groups both raise constituents’ political engagement and impact the legislative process. It should be noted, however, that because disadvantaged groups have only recently entered the political elite (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998), research on the direct impact of descriptive representatives is in its early stages.
Under-representation of demographic groups in the parliament is a form of political inequality. Political inequalities are found throughout the political process, and include (A) voice, identified in the political process as participation (electoral and non-electoral) and representation (governmental and non-governmental, i.e. by third sector organizations); and (B) response, identified primarily in terms of policy (symbolic, formal and informal). For a full discussion, see Dubrow (2015).

Dahl's (2006) work suggests that democracy and political equality are distinguishable in that democracy is a system of rights and political processes, whereas political equality is the extent to which different participants have reasonably similar opportunities for voice and response within that system of rights and processes. That political inequality is a creature of the political process does not reduce all political processes to political inequality – it merely points out where we should suspect it (Dubrow 2015). From the equality of political opportunities side, the study of political inequality is a hunt for these structured differences in individual, group or organizational influence over government decisions. From the equality of political benefits side, it suggests how we should view any situation in which political processes systematically and historically lead to a pattern of unequal political outcomes.

The APSA Task Force has initiated what can be called an American school of economic inequality in politics. This school includes Theda Skocpol et al in the American Political Science Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (2004), Robert Dahl's in “On Political Equality” (2006), as well as Gilens and Page (2014), among others, who argues that there are three major dimensions of political inequality: Citizen voice, government response, and patterns of public policy-making. Citizen voice refers to how people transmit their opinions and interests to their representatives. Governments can choose to respond, or not, under the threat of electoral accountability. Patterns of public policy-making can be discerned from studying who gets what and why. Economic inequality depresses participation and opens gaps between the political power of social groups (Solt 2015). They warn that the pluralistic aspects of American democracy – the interplay of voice and response – are imperiled by economic inequalities. The reason is that the disadvantaged are less represented and less involved in
political participation and government officials and policy makers are less inclined to be responsive to the preferences of the disadvantaged.

A description of political inequality should consist of an interlinked set of components that can be applied to a wide array of contexts across levels of decision-making, time, and place, with a simple, interdisciplinary vocabulary. As such, I describe a generic political process that can be used to explain structured inequalities in influence over the decisions of decision-making bodies. The purpose of identifying the process is to indicate where political inequality is and how it is connected to political inequality found throughout. It allows us to localize where the political inequality occurs, and where it affects other parts. In sum, the aim of the model is to show (a) various types of political inequalities, (b) how these political inequalities interact, and (c) how these multiple, simultaneous and interacting political inequalities contribute to a person’s, group’s, or organization’s overall level of political inequality. My description of the process is based on the American school, and as such I have accepted their assumption that voice and response is where democracy and inequality meet, and I cannot think of other relevant parts of the political process that they did not cover.

Voice refers to how constituencies express their interests to decision-makers directly or through representatives. Voice has two main components of participation and representation and each has subcomponents. Participation can be electoral – such as voting or standing for office in elections – or non-electoral, such as attending a demonstration, contacting a public official, or joining a political organization, among others. Representation means that a person or an organization interprets the political voice and transmits their interpretation to the decision-making body. Government representation refers to those individuals and government agencies whose function is to listen to the interests of their constituency. Examples include parliamentarians, Ombudspersons, and special offices directed by the government. Non-governmental representatives include NGOs that can be non-profit or for-profit and whose function is to transmit the interests of their selected constituency to decision-making bodies. NGOs can be non-violent organizations such as Kongres Kobiet in Poland and the NAACP in America, or they can be organizations that advocate violence. People and organizations who interpret voices may or may not be expressly or directly appointed by their constituency.
Response refers to how decision-makers act and react to their constituencies and is expressed via policy and symbols. Policy can be defined as a deliberate plan of action to guide decisions to achieve specific outcomes with the intention of providing specific guidelines for future, related decisions. Policy has two main forms: formal and informal. Formal policy refers to legislation, judicial precedent or executive directives that are written and have the force of codified law. Informal policy consists of rules that lack force of codified law yet impact how decisions are made. For example, when a political party leader directs the organization to include more minorities in their candidate lists, this can either be formal within the party rule book or an informal rule, something that the rank-and-file know about but on which there is no paper-trail.

Symbolism is a response that does not set firm guidelines for future decisions. Symbols are often publicly expressed in limited-time events, such as a speech on the parliamentary floor or introducing – but not passing – legislation. Symbols also manifest in commemorative events such as “Black History Month” in the U.S. or “The Decade of the Roma” as proclaimed by the United Nations.

Symbols and policy are distinguished not by their intent, but by whether the response is a recognizable directive to guide future action and the extent to which the directive is enforced. To declare a “Decade of the Roma,” for example, is symbolic in the absence of policy measures. Enforcement is the bright line between policy and symbolism: loosely enforced policy is tantamount to symbol. A complicating factor is when policy is in the form of a symbol, such as “resolutions” and other non-legislative statements. “Symbolic policy” is expressed as policy yet carries the force of symbol (see also Tomescu-Dubrow et al 2014).

**Sensitizing Principles**

I posit the following sensitizing principles as guidelines for the interaction between components of the conceptual framework. The principles are designed to cover a wide range of political contexts.

**Dominating Principle of Context Dependence:** Social context rules all principles and all components.
Principle of Interaction: At any point, all or most of the components influence each other. At an abstract level, voice and response are in a continuous direct feedback loop.

Principle of Direct and Indirect Effects: Within voice and response, relationships between subcomponents may be indirect or direct. At some point, a voice subcomponent has a direct influence on a response subcomponent. For example, representatives [voice] make policy [response]; via campaign contributions (legal or otherwise), non-electoral political participation [voice] can directly influence symbols [response].

Principle of Unequal Influence of Components: Components differ in the extent to which they influence political inequality. Difference depends on context, where in Country A at one point in time some components emerge as more important than in other countries and times. In general, symbolic responses are less effective than policy in influencing the extent of political inequality.

Principle of Disproportionate Response: Loudness of voice is not always met with a proportionate response. At times, very loud voices are met with zero response, or with symbolic response. At other times, very quiet voice, or even implicit silence (e.g. elite consensus), is met with high response, as in the case of economic policy favoring the wealthiest, whether or not they expressly voice their interests to decision-makers.

Principle of Unintended Consequences: Voice may elicit an unintended response. Loud voice may amplify political inequality, as in the case of regimes suppressing dissent. This assumes voice is intentional, and the intention can be correctly interpreted by decision-makers. The term “backlash” fits here.

Principle of Simultaneous Inequalities: Inequality between individuals, groups or organizations can occur within any of the subcomponents. Inequalities between subcomponents interact and contribute to an overall level of political inequality. For example, inequality is possible in participation and representation. As for their interaction, low political participation by a specific group – either electoral or non-electoral – can contribute mightily to their under-representation in governmental and non-governmental bodies. Voice
inequality then influences response inequality, where policy does not reflect their interests.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN THE ELECTORAL MARKET

Debate on how best to achieve descriptive representation produces a wide spectrum of policy types. Half of the countries in the United Nations have had some descriptive representation policy within their electoral market (Dubrow 2006). Examples of government intervention in the electoral market include “selective” forms of descriptive representation policy (Mansbridge 1999: 632–33) such as race-conscious re-districting, lower thresholds for ethnic minority parties (Juberias 2000: 35), the establishment of representative councils for consultation on certain types of legislation, quotas mandated by electoral or constitutional law, and reserved seats. Examples of market solutions include affirmative action or quotas voluntarily adopted by political parties.

The electoral market imagery is attractive, most likely because the assumptions of market dynamics are well known and well tested in other areas of research. Electoral market is often used as analogy and metaphor rather than theory (Udehn 1996: Chapter 3). Use of the concept of an electoral market is decidedly situational, depending wholly on the phenomenon under study. The concept of an electoral market remains a theoretically fruitful means of understanding social phenomena, as it provides one of the only ways to link micro-level behavior to macro-level outcomes in the social sciences (see also Coleman 1990).

Though combining political and economic concepts to form theories of social behavior are common, including the use of the term “electoral market,” few explicitly define what they mean (see also Udehn 1996: Chapter 1). Since Becker’s *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* (1976), researchers have used market language of supply and demand to explain social phenomena such as occupational attainment (Kaufman 2002), marriage (Cherlin 1992), religion (Gill 2001), and crime (Becker 1976). Economists examining political processes in the context of public choice theory are most likely to use the term
political or electoral market, but few discuss it substantively (Wittman 1995: 1). In *The Myth of Democratic Failure* (1995), Donald Wittman, an American economist, asserts the primacy of the market in writing, “Most controversies in the social sciences are ultimately arguments over the nature of the market” (1). Recently, market language and the analogy of a political market has been used to explain variations in the representation of disadvantaged groups (Cannon 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997; Mackay 2004; Paxton and Kunovich 2003).

Since the goal is to understand how micro-level political market dynamics produces a given state of descriptive representation, I need to construct an electoral market as a link between micro-level behavior and macro-level outcomes. Supply and demand dynamics need to be well defined, as well as their constituent levels of analyses and the actors within them. Moreover, social structural, contextual factors need to be clearly delineated as both conceptually distinct yet theoretically integrated into the actions of the various actors. Additionally, the concept should be durable enough to be comparable across time and space.

Conceptions of the electoral market are similar to the more well-known labor market. In studies of the labor market, the supply side is generally conceived as those factors that influence the kind of job aspirants available. Demand side consists of the employers who seek types of job aspirants. In the electoral market, especially when used to explain candidate emergence, the supply side factors are such as candidate resources and motivation (Mackay 2004) that influence the kind of candidate aspirants available; the demand side as the parties who seek types of candidates.

Following previous use of market imagery, definitions of who or what influences supply and demand vary substantially from study to study. In macro-level studies of women’s representation, macro-political and economic forces define supply and demand and govern the dynamics of the market. In explaining cross-cultural variation in women’s representation in national legislatures, Paxton and Kunovich (2003) define the supply side as structural factors, such as education levels and workforce participation of women, and the demand side as political parties and electoral systems.

There are alternative visions of the concept of the electoral market. Micro-level studies seem to use supply and demand as all factors that contribute to candidate emergence and selection. In explaining
descriptive representation in the European Parliament, Norris and Franklin (1997) conceive of a “political market-place;” on the supply side are candidates and their characteristics, including motivations and political capital, and on the demand side are attitudes of political gatekeepers and party rules. In explaining Black minority representation in the U.S. Congress, Cannon (1999: Chapter 3) defines the supply side as individual politicians, the demand side as voters and their social contexts.

Voters are rarely considered as important actors in the supply and demand dynamic. A contrast with how labor markets work is illustrative. The key differences between the labor market and the electoral market are the factors that potentially influence supply. Labor market employers rarely have to consider how the public at-large thinks about hiring decisions and thus have a great capacity to conceal discriminatory hiring practices. Parties, on the other hand, must consider public, or voter, reactions. Moreover, voter demands are vital for party survival and hence must be significant in influencing supply.

Thus, my conception of the electoral market is more similar to that of Cannon (1999: Chapter 3), who includes voters into the supply and demand dynamic. Including the voter forces a change in the entire concept, defining voters as those who demand descriptive representation and political leaders as those who control the supply of demographic types of candidates. This change allows researchers to ask new questions concerning the ability of market solutions to produce descriptive representation and the extent to which voters play a role in this process.

**THEORY OF THE MARKET**

A market can be defined as an institution that governs distribution of resources (Carruthers and Babb 2000). A political market is an institution that governs the distribution of representation and other political goods using the concepts of supply and demand. This leads to the following proposition: The state of descriptive representation at the macro-level is a function of the electoral market such that micro- and meso-level actors and their interactions determine supply and demand for types of candidates under varying contextual restraints.
Levels and Their Actors

Three levels of analyses, each with their own actors, comprise the political market (Table 1).

Table 1. Levels and Actors in an Electoral Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Micro</th>
<th>Meso</th>
<th>Macro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the micro-level, individuals are the units of analysis. Actors include legislators, candidates, and voters. For both the meso- and macro-levels, organizations are the units of analysis. Influencing both micro-level behaviors and the state of descriptive representation is the meso-level, comprised of political parties and social change organizations. At the macro-level is the legislature, whose demographic composition is a product of both micro and meso-level actions. Influencing all actors at all levels are the social structural, or contextual factors.

Actors of the supply side are individuals in the political institutions, e.g. political leaders, including political party leaders and the rank and file legislators. Political institutions influence supply by impacting the structure of opportunities in the political market, providing the contexts necessary for candidates of all demographic stripes to emerge (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Norris and Franklin 1997; Wilcox et al. 2003: 44). Political leaders’ attitudes towards descriptive representation heavily influence the supply of available descriptive representatives (Cannon 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997). Political elites are capable of holding strong attitudes toward descriptive representation as a governance solution (Chaney and Fevre 2002), lending support for the contention that these influential subgroups help foster attitudes, positively or negatively, towards descriptive representation.

Actors of the demand side are individual voters. Voter demand is measured in two ways: (1) using attitudes towards descriptive representation in theory and (2) by voting behavior through demographic
cues. Attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory are the intellectual foundations of behavior outcomes, influencing propensity to vote for descriptive representatives. The second demand signal, voting behavior, assumes that individual traits on the part of the candidate cues voting behavior which in turn signals to parties a demand for types of candidates. While the intellectual foundations of demand are concealed from suppliers, vote choice is visible.

MARKET RATIONALITY

Market language as used in explaining socio-political phenomena has its roots in sociological rational choice theory (RCT), and from economics in public choice theory and the assumption of economic rationality in actors’ approach to political decisions (Buchanan 1968; Downs 1957; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Kiser and Bauldry 2005). As a multilevel theory, RCT assumes that individuals are the starting point, though influenced by macro-level conditions (see also (Coleman 1990: 5). In essence, RCT assumes Becker’s (1976) homo economicus, where individuals engage in utility maximization, selfishly seeking to increase benefits and minimize costs in any exchange situation. Thus, rational action is that which provides the greatest personal good with the least bit of bad.

RCT has been criticized on many fronts (for a review see Green and Shapiro 1994). There are two main criticisms of RCT’s main assumptions; the stability of preferences and the capability of individuals to make rational decisions based on available information. I address each in turn.

I assume relative stability of preferences across time which, for my purposes, is reasonable. I present what Hechter and Kanazawa (1997) call a “thick” model of rational choice. Opposite to “thin” models, thick ones “specify the individual’s existing values and beliefs” (Hechter and Kanazawa 1997: 194). For disadvantaged groups, whose structural position is heavily determined by their lack of political resources, preferences are dependent on whether they are voters or political leaders. As explained and tested in later chapters, preferences for both are for descriptive representation for their particular social group. Thus, women prefer women representatives, farmers prefer farmer representatives,
young people prefer youth representatives, and so on. However, demo-
graphic intersectionality and within-group heterogeneity of social and
political attitudes cause variation in preferences.

I also assume that individuals, be they voters or parliamentarians,
have sufficient information to realize their preferences, with some key
qualifications. I assume a bounded rationality within institutional con-
straints (Ingram and Clay 2000; see also Chapter 1 on accountability
and information availability). This leads to two qualifications. First,
assuming an open-information environment, politicians are aware
of voter sentiment towards descriptive representation through voter
behavior and have the possibility of reacting in a supply and demand
appropriate fashion. Also, in the absence of perfect information,
I argue that both have just enough information to realize preferences,
e.g. voters can determine demographic types of candidates.

Second, in an electoral market, hidden information can damage the
effectiveness of the electoral process to produce a descriptively similar
legislature. Thus, I argue that it is exactly the deficient information
possessed by both demanders and suppliers that can fuel electoral
market ineffectiveness. However, there is reason to support the conten-
tion that even if there was perfect information, descriptive representa-
tion without government intervention would be difficult to achieve.
Thus, the extent to which the electoral market is rational is an open
empirical question.

DYNAMICS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Dynamics of supply and demand should function such that if voters
signal demand, political leaders would furnish supply proportional to
the demand. Thus, supply of demographic types of candidates should
be directly related to demand for those candidates.

How demand influences supply is a theoretically thorny problem. Some
previous researchers consider voter demand to be an inadequate
way of influencing supply. Demand for women representatives as ex-
pressed by the voting public, for example, has been referred to as un-
organized, diffused and as a general function of attitudes toward the
role of women (Wilcox et al. 2003: 43; see also Dubrow 2007). While
demand by voters is not signaled so clearly as that of social movement
groups working specifically for descriptive representation, the degree to which the signal is unorganized and diffused is an empirical question, as is the basic assumption that demand is signaled within elections at all.

Thus, in the electoral market as I define it, the supply of candidates is partially driven by demand of voters, which is antithetical to current literature on candidate emergence (Fox and Lawless 2004; Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 1995). Candidate selection by parties is largely secretive (Kunovich and Paxton 2005). Some qualitative evidence suggests, however, that political leaders exercise prejudice against certain types of candidates:

People start with prejudices about the candidates. In the old days, they used to band them and say, ‘We’re not having anybody under 40, nobody over 50, or we’re not having a lawyer, or we’re not having somebody from the south-east,’ or whatever it might be. Whatever prejudice they decided to start with knocked out a whole lot of people many of whom might have been exactly what they really wanted. (A Conservative member of the British parliament, as quoted in Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 379).

In another research project, in Poland, some members of parliament thought the idea of descriptive representation was untenable (Pawlowski and Dubrow 2011):

“The Parliament is a legislative body, whose aim is to create laws for all citizens, not for the special interests of any social, ethnic, religious, etc group. The state stands for all equally, whether they are red-headed or blond. If we accept the idea that the make-up of Parliament is to mirror that of society it would mean that we are returning to the time of socialist realism, where a 32-year old teacher with three children from a small town could become a representative. This is nonsense.” (Member of the Sejm, quoted in Pawlowski and Dubrow 2011: 311).

Norris and Lovenduski (1993) argued that examining supply side explanations for candidate emergence, defined as those factors that influence the propensity of people to apply, is more fruitful than examining prejudice on the part of political leaders. Some assume prejudice, they argue, by looking only at the outcomes of elections, a questionable strategy considering that supply side factors may be more influential.
I argue, however, that candidate emergence is at least partially due to voter demand for types of candidates, a situation that can be gleaned by doing exactly what Norris and Lovenduski (1993) caution against; examining outcomes (379). If parties are rational, then they seek to maximize seat allotments. If vote outcomes are the sum of rational decisions, then party reactions are also the sum of rational decisions. Assuming parties know how voters vote, which is likely considering the extent to which exit polls are taken in modern industrialized nations, parties are aware of which demographic types are voting for them (or not). Thus, demand increases from a particular voting demographic should lead to supply increases for that demographic’s type of candidates, a situation gleaned from examining vote outcomes.

Voting and voter demand for types of candidates are primarily driven by three relatively interrelated factors; policy, accountability, and demographics of the candidate. Policy preferences in terms of partisanship and economic voting dominate all recent theoretical models of vote demand (Brooks and Brady 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Accountability, or the sanctioning of governments, is often measured in terms of policy preferences, though it includes other factors such as the influence of a parliamentarian’s roll-call voting history (Przeworski et al. 1999; Zielinski et al. 2005). Finally, demographics of the candidate have recently been shown to be a factor in the voting calculus (Dubrow 2007). As disadvantaged groups have only recently penetrated the spheres of the political elite, examining the contribution of individual qualities of candidates to the vote calculus is a young – but rapidly maturing – literature, and its contributions are just beginning to be understood.

MARKET SUCCESS AND FAILURE

For laissez-faire electoral markets to produce a descriptively similar legislature, two main assumptions need to be met. Electoral market analysis assumes that parties are responsive to voter demands. Voter voice is met by party response. Whether a particular electoral market is capable of producing a descriptively similar legislature in the light of the relative capability of suppliers to recognize the demand signals and react in a rational fashion is an open empirical question. Another
principle concern is the extent to which there is a choice of descriptive representatives from which the voting public can choose. Electoral market analysis assumes that every major social cleavage, gender, social class, and age, being primary demographics, are available on the ballot. Electoral markets would not be able to produce a descriptively similar legislature if voting ballots are overly demographically homogenous.

Market success and failure is dependent on the extent to which these assumptions are met. If a group loses descriptive representatives while signaling preferences for descriptive representatives of their type, and there is no government intervention on their behalf, then purely market solutions to representational inequality contribute to political market failure.

CONCLUSION

This chapter connects the ideas of political inequality and electoral control in modern democracies by focusing on descriptive representation. To summarize: The legislatures of Central and Eastern Europe, as is the case around the world, reflect the top of the stratification ladder rather than its whole. This fact violates the principle of descriptive representation, which states that the parliament should resemble the demographics and experiences of its constituency. Thus, poor descriptive representation is an indicator of political inequality, defined as the extent to which there are structured differences in influence over decisions made by political decision-making bodies, as well as in the outcomes of those decisions. We get closer to achieving a fundamental principle of democracy – that of political equality – when there is reasonable descriptive representation. This is not the case, and thus modern democracies are systems in which political inequality thrives.

This chapter then posits a theory of how parliaments become politically unequal places through the metaphor of an electoral market. An electoral market contains dynamics of supply and demand for different types of demographic candidates and parliamentarians. While some put voters on the supply side and political parties on the demand side, I argue for the opposite: Voters demand types of candidates and political parties supply them. An efficient electoral market is when voters signal demand to parties and parties respond to voter demand by supplying
the types of candidates that voters want. An inefficient market is where voters demand but parties do not supply what the voters demand. A key factor is governmental intervention. Governments can intervene in the electoral market by insisting that parties supply a particular type of candidate, under threat of sanctions. Governmental intervention does not necessarily lead to a more efficient market and by its intervention, it can privilege some demographic types over others. However, without such an intervention, some demographic types of candidates would not appear, or appear rarely, and the parliament would not get appreciably closer to resembling the demographic and experiential diversity of the citizenry.

Electoral markets exist within the political process and can be understood as a subset of the relationship between political voice and political response. In an electoral market, we talk of voters and parties. In the political process as a whole, we talk of everyone with a voice – individuals, groups, and organizations – and the response to those voices by the government. Electoral markets are thus connected to political equality and can be used to explain how legislatures become more or less equal over time.

REFERENCES


Part 2

METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the content and structure of the East European Parliamentarian and Candidate data (EAST PaC) for Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary, 1985–2014. The main sources of these data are official records found in each country’s electoral commissions. Details on the methodology for EAST PaC – collecting, cleaning, and matching – are found in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

Table 1 summarizes the sources and scope of EAST PaC data. While Ukraine and Hungary have only post-Communist elections, Polish data goes back to the Communist Party controlled elections of 1985. All told, EAST PaC covers three countries, 29 years, 23 elections, and 97,439 unique candidates.

Table 1. Summary of EAST PaC Data Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House of Parliament</td>
<td>Verkhovna Rada</td>
<td>Sejm and Senat</td>
<td>Orszaggyules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of elections</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unique candidates</td>
<td>35,791</td>
<td>46,426</td>
<td>15,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EAST PaC data are separated into each country: one for Ukraine, one for Poland, and one for Hungary. Table 2 is a visual representation of the elections in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe over time. Electoral volatility within the electoral systems led to special elections (Details on these elections are found later in the book, in Part Three: Context) Ukraine and Poland have had a few special elections, while Hungary has had only regular, four-year elections since their first post-Communist election held in 1990. Only in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2007 do elections overlap across nations.

Table 2. Elections Covered in EAST PaC, 1985–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The structure of EAST PaC is similar to that of panel data. These data are matched over time, meaning that the same candidate can be identified whenever they appear across successive elections. Table 3 is a visual representation of the structure of these data; it is the same structure across all EAST PaC data files. As a simple illustration, for “Country Z,” we present three generic candidates: A, B and C. Variables are specific for each election year. For example, Variable Y 1990 applies only to the 1990 election, and not to the elections of 1994 and 1998. Variable Y 1994 applies only to the 1994 election, and not to the elections of 1990 or 1998. In this illustration, the letter X represents the value of the variable; “missing” indicates no value for that variable.

In Country Z:

Candidate A ran for office only once, in 1994. They have a value in Variable Y 1994, and have missing values in the variables for the other election years.


Candidate C was a candidate in 1990. But in 1994, this person did not run for office and thus was not a candidate that election year. This person re-emerged as a candidate in 1998. They have values only in Variable Y 1990 and Variable Y 1998, the years in which they appear as a candidate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate C</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>missing</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In each election year, for each country, there is a different configuration of candidates. Table 4 presents the number of candidates per country and per election year. As discussed in Table 3, some candidates appear in multiple elections; thus, the total number of unique candidates cannot be computed from this table.

Table 4. Candidates per Election Year in the Countries of EAST PaC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>867</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2815</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7592</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>9471</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6536</td>
<td>5187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6219</td>
<td>4256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6954</td>
<td>3378</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11281</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7588</td>
<td>2795</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4848</td>
<td>6572</td>
<td>2471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7535</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6432</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVAILABLE VARIABLES

EAST PaC relies on official sources and thus has a limited array of variables that varies by country and election year. Table 5 presents the demographic variables available for each EAST PaC country. Name, year of birth, and gender are consistently available across all countries and all elections. Occupation is available in raw form for the 2006 - 2014 elections in Ukraine, and for Poland it is available in various forms.
between 1989 and 2011, and in Hungary, occupation is not available at all. Education is available only in Ukraine and from 1994 to 2014.

Table 5. *Demographic Variables in EAST PaC, 1985–2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Name</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Birth/Age</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1994–2014</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALL = all elections; [Year] = election years in which these variables are available.

a In 2010, there is a relatively high percent of missing values on the variable, Year of Birth. For an explanation, see Chapter Six, this book.

b These data are available in raw form, upon request. They are not archived along with the rest of the data.

**ELECTORAL CHARACTERISTICS**

Electoral variables vary across elections, but there are some core variables that each country has (Table 6). Party and district are available across all countries and elections. Votes received (except for Poland in the 1980s) and whether the candidate was elected is also generally available. However, list position is only available in Ukraine from 1998 and in Poland from 1991 and in Hungary only in 2010.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes Received</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>1991–2011</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected or Not</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALL = all elections; [Year] = election years in which these variables are available.
Electoral rules change and thus EAST PaC contains electoral variables that are specific for each country and each election. The array of such special variables for Ukraine and Poland are below (Tables 7 and 8). For Hungary, see Appendix Two.

Table 7. Variables in EAST PaC Unique to Ukraine per Election Year, 1990–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Variables Unique to Ukraine per Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Okrug, Oblast, number of votes received in the first round, won first round, elected for the second round, number of votes received in the second round, won second round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Okrug, Oblast, number of votes received in the first round, won first round, elected for the second round, number of votes received in the second round, won second round, was a candidate in additional elections, number of votes received in the additional elections, won first round of additional elections, elected to the second round of additional elections, number of votes received in the second round of additional elections, won second round of additional elections, new district if assigned for additional elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Okrug districts for majoritarian candidates, oblast for districts, blocks for elections, candidates by majoritarian system, candidates by party lists, candidates by both, party lists and majoritarian system, votes by majoritarian system, won by party list or majoritarian system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Okrug districts for party candidates from which they campaign, oblast for these districts, oblast that candidate actually lives in, majoritarian or party candidate, blocks for elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Okrug districts for party candidates from which they campaign, oblast for these districts, oblast that candidate actually lives in, blocks for elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oblast that candidate actually lives in, blocks for elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Okrug districts for party candidates from which they campaign, oblast for these districts, oblast that candidate actually lives in, majoritarian or party candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Okrug districts for party candidates from which they campaign, oblast for these districts, oblast that candidate actually lives in, majoritarian or party candidate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8. Variables in EAST PaC Unique to Poland per Election Year, 1985–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Variables Unique to Poland per Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Limited to the Sejm and only contains age, gender, type of electoral list (district or national), and electoral district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Data for Sejm and Senat, and has the same as 1991 to 2011, except it has type of electoral list (coded same as in 1985) and does not have list position or party affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>For the Sejm: Type of electoral list, regular or supplementary elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>For the Sejm: Type of electoral list, regular or supplementary elections, party affiliation and party electoral list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>For the Sejm: name of party committee, name of party affiliation/membership, and party electoral list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>For the Senat: Party affiliation and party electoral list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Nothing unique for this election year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Nothing unique for this election year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Place of residence (name of village/town). For Senat: Electoral one-seat constituencies and Electoral committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

EAST PaC data provides a way for scholars to empirically test theories of accountability, representation and political inequality in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Collected mainly from official sources, EAST PaC spans decades and almost two dozen elections; it contains nearly a hundred thousand candidates, from those who ran but never won to those who ran and won quite a few times. EAST PaC is as near a complete record of candidates in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary as one may find: it allows scholars and citizens to accurately quantify the electoral process and track the careers of politicians from the biggest parties to the smallest. Used as it is, or harmonized with survey and non-survey data, EAST PaC is the rare window into the electoral politics of the tumultuous post-Communist era and beyond.

EAST PaC data are publicly available free of charge and are archived in the Polish Data Archive (and soon in other leading data archives).
The East European Parliamentarian and Candidate (EAST PaC) data for Ukraine allows quantitative researchers to test a wide range of theories and hypotheses. EAST PaC Ukraine contains 35798 candidates in the Parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012 and 2014. The 1990 election was to the Verkhovna Rada (VR) of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, part of the USSR. The seven election campaigns from 1994-2014 were Parliamentary elections to the post-Independence VR (1994, 2007, and 2014 were preterm elections). All elections were held in March, while preterm elections of 2007–2014 were held in September – October. Candidates are matched over time; they contain all candidates who ran once or more. Individuals who ran more than once are identified across all elections. This article explains how these data were collected and matched.

Ukraine has gone through repeated social and political upheaval, with many changes to the electoral law and the political scene. This instability and radical change is reflected in the data. As such, we discuss some of these changes and how it impacted our data collection and matching procedures.

DATA AVAILABILITY

In 1990, under the pressure of Gorbachev’s Perestroika, Ukraine’s Communist Party (CPU) was forced to allow competition for the
mandates to the quasi-representative VR. Candidacy was under the strict control of the CPU and between two to eight candidates were allowed from the same district.

A primary difficulty with collecting the 1990 and 1994 data was that they were not wholly available in electronic form. The Central Electoral Committee (CEC) website was created only in 1999, and in 1990 the data did not exist in electronic form at all. The data for 1990 and partially for 1994 were collected from what was reported in the local media. Local means, here, at the rayon-level: a rayon is an administrative unit, smaller than an oblast, and there are 490 rayons in Ukraine. These reports were archived at the Vernadskiy Central Scientific Library in Kiev. In 2002, a group of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy students that I supervised analyzed about 500 regional newspapers of 1990 and 1994. In 1990 the rayonal press published very short biographic notes on the candidates who sought election to the VR of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. At that time, the standards of the candidates’ presentation in the media were not set and the quantity and quality of the information varied by locality. While in some rayonal newspapers the biographic information was given in more or less exhaustive format, in others, information was missing on age, occupation, place of residence or party affiliation. The majority of the biographical sketches lacked records of education record and place of residence. In some rayon-level newspapers, the information was given according to bureaucratic Soviet standards – only a surname with two initials such as “Boiko I. I.” In this proto-internet age, and in the information-poor environment that was early 1990s Ukraine, it was highly improbable that a person could be identified from such a rudimentary biographical sketch, especially for those who had a surname popular in Ukraine but had never been elected and never had a political career at any level. In the case of many Ukrainian surnames, even the sex of a candidate could not be established.

After all the investigation efforts of 1990, we have no first name for nine candidates for 1990, and for 49 for 1994, and for both years we cannot define the sex for 28 candidates. The data on 1990-1998 lack information for some candidates on age, education, occupation, and party affiliation (Table 1); education was not found for all the candidates of 1990. The exception was “place of residence” that was coded only starting from 2002. For the elections of 1998, and later we had very few problems of demographic data availability.
Table 1. *EAST PaC Ukraine Missing Data for 1990, 1994 and 1998 Elections, and percentage of the Data Available*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missing Data on...</th>
<th>1990 N</th>
<th>1994 N</th>
<th>1998 N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2816</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2518</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party affiliation</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes in the 1st round</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes in the 2nd round*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5731</td>
<td>n/a n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes in the 1st round of additional elections 1994*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>n/a n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes in the 2nd round of additional elections 1994*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>n/a n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the 1994 elections, the percentage is calculated from the number of the candidates registered for the second round, and from those registered for additional elections in 1994, 1995 and 1997.

In 1990 we lack information on the party affiliation for 228 candidates. We note that, in 1990, political control by the CPU severely decreased the chances of victory for independent candidates; an unspoken precondition of electoral participation was that the majority of all candidates were to be CPU members. At the same time, the elections of 1990 saw massive participation of the oppositional political movement Rukh (“People’s Movement of Ukraine in Support of the Perestroika Movement,” registered in 1989) and candidates from the Democratic Platform organized by the liberal and pro-sovereignty wing of the Central Committee of the CPU in January 1990. When the elections were over, the Ruch and Democratic Platform members gave up their CPU membership and joined “Narodna Rada” – the opposition party – which finally accounted for 125 seats at the Parliament (Pidkova 2013). Thus the data on party affiliation (which was the CPU membership) do not reflect the political spectrum of that time. Compared to 1990, in 1994, the number of candidates almost tripled.
For the 1990 and 1994 elections, centrally collected data in electronic form on all candidates did not exist. For the two rounds of 1994, thanks to the efforts of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the list of the candidates without the results of the elections was obtained in Microsoft Excel format. The new law on elections stated that only in the districts with voter turnout of over 50 percent will the voting results will be recognized as valid, and the winner should get over 50 percent of votes in the district. Because of a small turnout, insufficient numbers of votes, and various violations, only 336 deputies were elected in the two rounds of the 1994 elections. In the rest of the cases, in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997, additional elections were held, in some districts two or three times, finally finishing on the eve of the 1998 elections.

For the additional 1994 elections we collected the biographical sketches and the results of the voting from the rayon-level newspapers. The data on numbers of votes were the biggest problem of the data on the elections 1994 (Table 1). As the elections were run by the majoritarian rule, every candidate was supposed to have a record of the number of votes received. Despite our best efforts, we could not obtain most of the data on votes received in the second round of the 1994 elections, and we could not obtain two thirds of the data from the first round of the additional election.

The Parliamentary elections of 1998 were already presented in electronic format at the CEC website. The data of the CEC are publicly accessible and easily downloadable. The biographic data are on separate webpages for each candidate, supplemented by an updated photo of the candidate, supplemented by an updated photo of the candidate, as well as information on date of birth, education, occupation, place of residence, electoral system in which they stood (majoritarian, proportional), party they stood for, date of registration of the candidacy and the date of cancelling candidacy (if appropriate), and participation in previous and current elections. For candidates who ran more than once, the information on previous candidacies helped to restore some of the 1994 election’s missing data. For the elections under the proportional representation (PR) system, the lists of parties are presented with the list position of each candidate and their status of candidacy – active, canceled candidacy, and death - is provided altogether with the date of when it was canceled. The spelling mistakes in the non-Slavic names of the candidates that were
unfortunately typical for the original 1990 and 1994 data decreased markedly.

For every election, Presidential or Parliamentary, a new team at the CEC developed a new webpage and decided which data to publish; thus, the data at the CEC are inconsistent over time. Data on party funding and expenditure, and the covering of campaigns in mass media were presented only in 2002, but never before or after. Changing CEC teams also did not have the same policy on the candidates who canceled their registration before the elections: in 2002 year they were canceled from the alphabetic list of the candidates, though the personal page was maintained, while in 1998 they were left in the alphabetic list of all candidates. Nevertheless, the quality of data generally progressed every year, though we always had to supplement from other sources for a number of cases. Generally, the logic is that a candidate who canceled their candidacy before the elections cannot be considered as a participant in the elections; the records of those 199 candidates who dropped their campaigns before the elections were deleted from the dataset on the elections in 1998.

CODING AND INTERPRETATION

Occupations as the Representation of Self

Coding occupations is problematic for many reasons. Radical change of social structure since 1991, change of the norms of self-presentation, and the fight for symbolic capital made self-reports on occupations an unreliable source of information about the actual occupational structure of candidates. Occupations coded in EAST PaC should be regarded more as self- or party-dictated representation than objective reality.

There was an attempt to harmonize the occupational categories across elections. For example, the category “Officials” for 1990 contains professional CPU officials, lower and higher ranked officials, union and local communities’ party leaders, all of whom were very numerous at that time. The occupation of “party officials” suggests, idealistically, that they are all highly educated and trained professionals; but in reality, it was not the case. Every first secretary of the local party committee, regardless of education or professional training, was
a full-time party official entitled to privileges and power, comparable to that of officials in industry and state. The parliament’s abolition of the CPU caused a fundamental change in the category “Officials,” as most of those party officials moved to lower political ranks, to retirement or to unemployment. Over time, the category “Officials” shrank and changed its content.

Also as time went on, new occupational categories became more salient: students, pensioners, military and unemployed became the candidates of the new times. In 1990 and 1994, these categories were so small that they were aggregated into “Other occupations.” By 1998 they became so numerous we created separate categories for them. We note that professional politicians who have lost elections and are currently out of office often name themselves as the “temporarily unemployed.”

The complicated reality of transitional society makes “occupation” an even blurrier concept. Multiple employment, the shadow economy and lust for symbolic capital unleashed a variety of self-representation that distorts a clear picture of occupational position in the social structure. A major example of this is “private entrepreneur” (“chastny predprinimatel” in Russian, “pryvatny pidpryjemets” in Ukrainian), which is a form of legal registration that allows one to claim an individual business. The quasi-legal status of many businesses and their instability encouraged many to describe their occupation as “private entrepreneur.” In reality, “private entrepreneurs” can be businesspersons in big or small enterprises, an owner or employee, self-employed or even unemployed.

Further evidence that occupation is representation of self is that candidates wish to symbolically align themselves with the outside interests who fund or otherwise form their party or political ideology. Thus, candidates present themselves as the heads of some political union or ephemeral “society,” while the job that brings them income remains unknown. The information can be restored only at the level of deputies; the study of the deputies of the VR shows much larger share of business in parliament compared to the one obtained from the CEC (Semenova 2012).

The fight for symbolic capital is also reflected in the marginal share that defined themselves as the leaders of NGOs, unions and societies. The task of differentiating large NGOs from little ones is beyond our resources, and it is nearly impossible to detect all the fictitious organizations they claim to be a part of. Some candidates presented themselves
as heads of lesser known organizations with exotic sounding titles (e.g. “Cossack’s Headman”), and not “Party officials”.

As a result, we have a version of occupational coding for the 1990s, and have raw data for 2006 to 2014, both of which are available upon request to the Electoral Control project team.

*Party Blocs*

The Election Law adopted in March 1997 allowed for the creation of party blocks. In 1998, parties often united in blocks in order to consolidate small parties’ chances and to include the strong political figures who had no party affiliation at all (Viktor Yushchenko – for example, leader of the Bloc “Nasha Ukraina” never had a party affiliation). Ukraine adopted a mixed system with 225 seats filled by SMDs and 225 elected by the proportional system with closed lists of the candidates. Titles of blocks sometimes coincided with titles of parties; this caused confusion during the coding process. The number of parties grew over time. Many parties were ephemeral and some re-grouped or appeared as a result of a schism such as the successors of the CPU and Rukh. Sometimes the new party titles differed only in the order of the adjectives like Narodna Partia and Ukrainska Narodna Partia and Ukrainska Partia. The composition of the blocs changed from election to election as did, of course, membership of candidates in the parties. The overall total of parties that participated in Parliamentarian elections from 1990 to 2014 is 248.

**MATCHING**

We matched candidates from separate elections in two stages. First, the 1990-2002 data were merged and matched. Next, the 2006-2014 data were merged and matched with those from 1990-2002. The matching was done using five variables: surname, first name, father’s name, year of birth and gender. As the data from the CEC website were in Cyrillic, the first step included transliteration into the Latin alphabet. We began with automated matching via Excel. After deleting “duplicate cases” – candidates with identical records – we then had to manually go through each double and decide whether these were two different individuals.
If we suspected that the two records were actually the same person, we checked their place of birth, oblast of residence, party affiliation, and photo and biography, if available. If at least some probability remained that the two records belonged to two different persons, we left both in the data set.

Matching problems with candidates who stood several times were often caused by the change in spelling of their names in Cyrillic or Latin alphabets in 1990–2014, while only to a minor extent were they caused by errors in the year of birth, change of name (adding the surname of a spouse) or missing data in the record.

There were two types of changes in Cyrillic spelling of the surnames and first names in the period 1990–2014. The greatest trouble in this regard concerned the spelling of Russian surnames. In 1990–1994 the names of the Russian candidates were spelled as they sounded in Russian; they were transliterated – not translated – into Ukrainian, following a quasi-phonetic rule. In 1998 elections the situation changed: soft vowels were transcribed by Ukrainian letters as shown in the first row of Table 2 and followed the morphological rule according to which names and surnames are translated into Ukrainian if, in the Ukrainian language, such names (or names that became the origins of the surnames) existed. There are several possible reasons for this change. The first is the orthography rules that, in June 1992, were adopted by the Ukrainian government were those developed by the Orthography Commission in the Academy of Sciences in Ukraine and published in the “Ukrainski Pravopys” volume, which is annually published by “Naukova Dumka,” Potebria’s Linguistic Institute and the Institute of Ukrainian Language since 1993. The second row of Table 2 illustrates the rules for transliterating of Russian surnames as documented in Article 104, “Phonetic rules of spelling the Slavic names.” The second reason is the procedure of the exchange of Soviet passports for the passports of Ukrainian citizens which officially started in 1995. Ukrainian passports have two versions of the name of the owner – the Ukrainian version on the first page and the Russian version on the second. If a candidate decides to write their name in Ukrainian but previously used the Russian version, the double record appears in the data set.

The third reason could be the wave of “Ukrainization” that was visible in the disputes on more correct orthography that started in late 1990s. The reformist wing of linguists argued about traditional or
morphological schema that calls for translation into Ukrainian of all foreign words following the old rules (Nimchuk 1999). This project although presented to the Verkhovna Rada by the Commission on Spelling [Komisiia z Pravopysu] created by the Ukrainian government in 1994, was never adopted. The project was hotly criticized as an attempt to make the Ukrainian language archaic, denying of phonetic principle in Ukrainian transliteration (Rusanivski 2002). It is hard to believe that the candidates followed the disputes of the linguists, but it is possible that some unspoken instructions were given to local Executive committees that registered the documents of the candidates to translate the names in the Ukrainized manner. Ukrainization since 1998 affected not only the surnames but also first names. Thus, in Western and Central Ukraine, the candidates with names that had similar spelling to that of Russians changed the spelling to a more Ukrainian one: Olexander became Oles, Les’ or Oleksa, Illia became Ilko. A fourth reason was that, for the proportional system, the lists of the party candidates were created by party functionaries who could make mistakes or change spelling by their own whim.

The change in the spelling of Russian names was so massive that it caused multiple duplicate cases in the merged dataset of 1990–2002. The very large number of combinations of differences in spelling in surname, first name and father’s name forced us to also manually clean the data. The decision on the version of the surname which will be left in the data set was taken based on the Ukrainized version of the late 1990s. When we continued the work on collecting the data on candidates in 2013, we discovered that, after 2007, many candidates who stood repeatedly changed the spelling of their names again, turning back to the phonetic rule of spelling Russian surnames (e.g. with soft vowels, row 3 in Table 2). Many others stayed with the Ukrainized version. In the case of long surnames, we found four versions of one surname (Kolesnykov, Melnykov). We can only assume that the inhabitants of the Eastern and Southern oblasts did this most frequently. Understandably, when the data on the 2006–2014 elections were added to the 1990–2002 data, the problem of matching by name re-emerged. In the future, the problem will likely to appear again, as some candidates who take a break in their electoral career will reappear with a Ukrainized or Russified version of their names different from the version they gave before.
Table 2. Change in the Spelling of Soft Vowels in Russian surnames, 1990–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–1993</td>
<td>“-е-” as “-є-”</td>
<td>Колосников</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-и-” as “-і-”</td>
<td>Алексєєв, but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-єє-” as “-єє-”</td>
<td>Андрєєв</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Вячеслав</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2002</td>
<td>“-е-” as “-е-”</td>
<td>Колосников</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-и-” as “-и-”</td>
<td>Алексєєв, but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-єє-” as “-єє-”</td>
<td>Андрєєв</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using apostrophe for diphthong В’ячеслав</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2012</td>
<td>Both versions: as before 1993 and since 1993</td>
<td>Колосников</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>are met</td>
<td>Колосников</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Колосников</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Алексєєв</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Алексєєв</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem with transliteration of Ukrainian names into the Latin alphabet also led to many double records. Since the databases were created in two stages – 1990–2002 and then 2006–2014 second – it was not possible to transliterate all names of the candidates in eight elections according to unique rules. Because the list of the candidates for 1994 obtained from IFES was already transliterated by the rule of the early 1990s, it should be adjusted to the new rules adopted in the early 2000s (Table 3). However, in January 2010, by order of the Rada the official rules of spelling were changed once more. Both changes touched upon the transliteration of the soft vowels and are described in Table 3. The soft vowel at the beginning of the word, and the soft vowels in the middle part of the name, received different transliterations. Therefore, the names of 2006-2014 were transliterated according to the new rules and later matched with 1990-2002 data and cleaned once more.

We merged most duplicate cases into one case that lengthened the candidate’s electoral history. Table 5 illustrates the cleaning process. We note that as the data was cleaned, duplicate cases disappeared and single cases dropped. All told, automation allowed us to clean out about half of all duplicate cases, and the other half was done manually (Table 4).
Table 3. *Change in the Transliteration of Soft Vowels in Russian surnames, 1990–2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Change in Transliteration</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–1994</td>
<td>“-є” as “-ye-”</td>
<td>Yakovlev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-й” as “-y-”</td>
<td>or Yakovlyev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-ю” as “-yu-”</td>
<td>Yoffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-я” as “-ya-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2002</td>
<td>“-є” as “-ie-”</td>
<td>Iakovliev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-й” as “-i-”</td>
<td>Ioffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-ю” as “-iu-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-я” as “-ia-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–2014</td>
<td>At the beginning of the word</td>
<td>Yakovliev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-є” as “-ye-”</td>
<td>Yoffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-й” as “-y-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-ю” as “-yu-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-я” as “-ya-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At all other positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-є” as “-ie-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-й” as “-i-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-ю” as “-iu-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“-я” as “-ia-”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of records in the initial dataset</td>
<td>33708</td>
<td></td>
<td>36170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First cleaning (automated)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>‘2000</td>
<td>35963</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second cleaning (manually)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>‘400</td>
<td>35897</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third cleaning (manually)</td>
<td>31295</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>35798</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of the cleaned up duplicate cases</td>
<td>2413</td>
<td></td>
<td>372</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Changes in Elections Won by Data Cleaning Stage, 1990–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>33933</td>
<td>33749</td>
<td>33691</td>
<td>33594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won once</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>1438</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>1426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 times won</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 times won</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 times won</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 times won</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 times won</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 times won</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 times won</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Candidates</td>
<td>36170</td>
<td>35963</td>
<td>35897</td>
<td>35798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

We have presented the process of collecting and matching EAST PaC Ukraine, a problematic process that, over time, reflects the political turmoil of Ukraine’s political scene. The main problems in collection were data availability and consistency across time, as well as in matching based, in part, on the ever-changing spelling of names.

Data availability in the early 1990s was particularly challenging. The data were posted in rayon-level newspapers, but not wholly in electronic format. In these early years, without webpages, some candidates were impossible to find. As with Hungary and Poland, this problem was common for the candidates of small parties and independent candidates who were placed low on party lists and were never elected. The situation changed when, in 1999, the central elections commission of Ukraine created a website. For the 1998 and subsequent elections, the CEC created an electronic file of the entire candidate roster. Since then, the data have been electronically available. The data reported have been inconsistent as the CEC changed the available content election by election. For example, in one year, party funding and expenditure were available, but not in other years.
Matching data had its own difficulties, heavily due to changes in the spelling of names. This caused duplicate cases that, in all likelihood, were two records of the same person. The matching process had two stages. The first was automation, using gender, age, occupation, education, and party affiliation to sort and merge the candidates. Automation is imperfect because it could not merge records when the candidate changed names. Bureaucratic changes in official spelling necessitated a manual check of names.

In using publicly available information, we built the world’s most comprehensive, matched, and high quality dataset on candidates for Ukraine’s VR from 1990 to 2014. With this chapter, we have also left a roadmap for future scholars to update these data for future elections.

REFERENCES


This chapter presents the process of collecting, cleaning, and matching the East European Parliamentarian and Candidate data (EAST PaC) for Poland. These data span every national election for the Sejm (1985–2011) and Senat (1989–2011). EAST PaC is based on a former dataset, POLCAN (Polish Candidate data) 1989–2007, that was continually expanded, and was described and used for substantive research questions (e.g. Shabad and Słomczyński 2004; Zielinski et al 2005, Dubrow 2011; Kunovich 2012). EAST PaC Poland has expanded the time span of these data (back to 1985 and forward to 2011) and re-cleaned them. This chapter describes this process in detail.

COLLECTING DATA

The data were collected from official sources and supplemented with publicly available information. Official data include the election report (Wyniki Wyborów do Sejmu), the official webpage of the Polish parliament (Strona Internetowa Sejmu i Senatu), and the annual statistical almanac (Rocznik Statystyczny). When data are incomplete, they are supplemented with publicly available information from personal and media websites. Earlier versions of the data were collected from non-electronic sources. The Polish National Election Commission (PKW) has, since the 2000s, placed all available information online. Demographic variables are limited to gender, age, and occupation.
Electoral and party information includes votes received, whether they won the election and whether to Sejm or Senat, voivodship (administrative district of balloting), list position, and party affiliation. EAST PaC only records this information at the point of election. Countries in Eastern Europe have high levels of party switching (Shabad and Słomczyński 2004) but this is not recorded in EAST PaC between elections.

All characteristics of the candidates are self-reported to the PKW via candidate forms. Thus, the data are subject to errors in reporting. We investigated the case of occupational categories to illustrate the sources of these errors, and thus how best to interpret the variables created out of them.

**Occupational Categories**

Occupation is self-reported, and reported to the PKW. In most cases the descriptions of occupations are rather general, like “a farmer”, “a lawyer” or “in science”. Akin to the Ukrainian data (see Pohorila, this volume), occupation is more of a presentation of self than an objective indicator. To understand this, we describe the process of reporting and coding occupation for candidates.

According to the Polish electoral law candidates have to report their occupation [zawód] to the electoral commission. In Polish

1 As stipulated in the electoral law from 1991 (“Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 1991”, Art 68. 4.; attached), 2001 (“Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2001” Art. 144. 1.) and 2011 (Kodeks Wyborczy Art. 212. § 1.; attached): “Zgłoszenie listy okręgowej powinno zawierać nazwisko, imię (imiona), zawód i miejsce zamieszkania każdego z kandydatów.” The English translation is, “The submission of the district list should include surname, name (names), occupation and place of residence of each candidate”. The text in the law from 1991 is slightly different, but the meaning is the same. See also the document issued by PKW in 2005 (“Wyjaśnienie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 8 sierpnia 2005 r. w sprawie zgłaszania okręgowych list kandydatów na posłów”) according to which: [W opinii Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej, dla zapewnienia wyborcom właściwej informacji o kandydatach, wskazane jest podawanie zawodu wykonywanego (zajęcia) kandydatów, zwłaszcza w przypadku, gdy kandydat nie ma wykształcenia specjalistycznego lub wykonuje zawód niezwiązany z kierunkiem swojego wykształcenia. W przypadku studentów stosowne jest użycie określenia „student”, wskazujące zajęcie kandydata]. Translation: “In the opinion of PKW, in order to provide the
“zawód” can refer both to the job that a person is qualified to do and their practiced occupation. ”Occupation” can refer to an individual’s current job or, really, any job that the candidate wishes to report. The instructions that the PKW issues before every election are based on the electoral law currently in force. There is no disambiguation in these laws as to the way in which the candidates should treat the term “zawód”. Oddly, in the case of the presidential election, the law is very precise: the candidates must report their education and practiced occupation.

According to the law, the PKW does not have – and has never had – an obligation to issue specific forms of the documents for the candidates. Information that should be given in the documents is specified in the electoral act, but the forms can be created by each party or individual involved in the registration of the candidates. In 2009, the PKW attempted some standardization: they placed on their website examples of the forms for the candidates for the EU Parliament, but there was no obligation for parties or candidates to use the documents. In fact, it is written underneath that these are only examples. In 2011, the PKW started to use registration software in order to facilitate the process of candidates’ registration.

We asked the PKW specifically about the extent to which the registration information on the candidates – especially on the occupational characteristics – is verified and if there are penalties for false information. The PKW replied that they only verify this information for a candidate if someone specifically asks them to, i.e. if there is a complaint that the information is inaccurate. They have no formal verification structure other than this.

voters with appropriate information about the candidates, it is advisable to report candidates’ practiced profession (activity) [zawód wykonywany], especially in the case when a candidate does not have higher education / vocational training or exercises a profession that has no relation to his/her education. In case of students it would be appropriate use the term “student” as an indication of the candidate’s professional activity.” The 1989 forms that were produced by the Electoral Committee (as a “response” to the documents that the candidates had to submit) are very similar to those produced in 1991 and 2001.
Coding Occupation

For 1989–2007, the codes of occupations were available in the existing data files. For 2011 the Polish team coded from text descriptions directly into SCO-2009 codes (Domański, Sawiński and Słomczyński 2009). Thus, for the 1985–2007 data, “the old” coding frames were originally used. They were based on 2-digit codes, and a number of codes were slightly different in each election. It was also found that more than one code was assigned to some occupations (See the Appendices in this chapter for the syntax for recoding occupations into SCO-2009 classification).

We designed the coding such that cases can be compared at the level of social classes. This assumes that the class structure is comparable through time; caution must be taken with that assumption (see Słomczyński et al 2007). The comparing of detailed codes must also be done with caution as the numbers of detailed occupations in the original coding frames were different in each election.

An additional, but somewhat minor problem, is that a new “Sales and Service” category has been introduced in the 2011 data. In previous elections, the sales and service occupations were partly coded to manual workers, and partly to non-manual workers of the lowest level. The class, “Sales and Service Workers,” did not appear for candidates until 2011, and its members do not appear at all as parliamentarians.

Cleaning and Matching

Cleaning and matching were done iteratively. Valid matching requires data that are free of errors; as such, the initial step was to carefully clean the data in each dataset. But some errors cannot be identified this way, as when the name of a candidate in each data set is recorded in a slightly different way. Matching can reveal some errors that cannot be found during the separate cleaning of datasets. After correcting the errors, the matching starts again, usually by creating some new errors. The process is stopped when the matching process no longer produces errors, and we can assume that the matching is done properly. At this point, we have nothing more to do, because we have exhausted all available means to identify the errors.
Data Cleaning

Data cleaning is a process that removes errors and anomalies from the dataset. Errors and anomalies, which we shorten to “errors,” can come from all phases of the data collection life cycle. Errors can come from: (a) The data source: Since EAST PaC is collected from official data sources – national election offices, mainly – and supplemented on occasion from parliamentarian and candidate websites, the data source itself may introduce the error; (b) The data entry: Human error arises from people entering information from the data source into the data set. If automated, there is less chance for human error, but as humans write the programs, human error is always possible; (c) The matching process: EAST PaC is unique in that it follows the same candidates through time. Errors can be introduced in the matching process itself. The matching process that connects candidates from one election to another is frequently done with software. This software is good at reducing duplicate cases, but it does not eliminate them. Thus, error is possible, here; (d) The data cleaning process: If not treated with extreme caution, the data cleaning may introduce new errors.

Since EAST PaC data are a continuation of data collected for previous elections, knowing “what should be” is based on these previous data. Of course, there may be errors for the previous elections, and as such when it was possible we tried to refer to the initial sources. Some variables, such as number of votes received, district, and the like, can be checked against the data source from which it came. Proper detection includes a combination of statistical procedures, knowledge of the data sources and its collection, and logic. Detection of numeric errors begins with descriptive statistics (tables) and histograms and scatter-plots (graphs). The tables and graphs we produce from the cleaning process may show outliers, illogical or impossible values, and strange patterns. We have been attentive to the possibility that the error we find in a specific case (candidate) is part of a larger pattern. Suspicion of error and confirmation of error have different thresholds. We set a low threshold for suspicion of error: anything that is not immediately clear was flagged as suspicious. This was done in the automation phase of the matching and cleaning process. Confirmation of error has a higher threshold. To confirm an error, we had to be reasonably sure that outliers and strange patterns are truly illogical or impossible.
Confirming error required us to closely examine the individual case in which the error appears and compare it with other, similar cases (those without suspicious errors).

The candidate data was collected over years and, as a result of the Electoral Control project, merged with 2011 data and renamed EAST PaC. The history of these data matters, as technological standards influence the quality of the earliest data and our methods for matching and clean these data. The earliest data, which came from the 1980s and 1990s, had to be transferred from one electronic format to another. The era of personal computers began after 1990, and early mainframe computers, because the equipment came from abroad, did not account for the nine unique Polish letters, or “characters.” In Poland, some companies tried to develop standards for reading Polish characters, and many standards were developed. Old databases collected before 2000 used one of the many standards, or they used no standard. The era of one standard began after 2000.

Early computer software put some limitations for string variables, such as the number of characters in strings. When the software arbitrarily sets limits on string length to eight characters, critical information about the name is cut off. For example, traditional gender naming rules in Poland are simple. All given Polish female names have an “a” at the end, and all male names have letters other than “a.” There are some exceptions that can be caught, such as names from a foreign origin, but these traditional rules capture the majority. Thus, the case-record “Kazimier” could have been Kazimierz (male) or Kazimiera (female). Candidate gender cannot always be determined if the last letters of the name are not there. From elections 1985 to 2007, there were 13,888 family names corrected, 9,794 first names and 5,915 middle names, and the total number of records was 42,385.

We also needed to correct year of birth. The election commission changed reporting of age such that it was not consistent across elections. In some elections, year of birth data was not published, but age was. We converted age into year of birth (subtraction of age from the year of election). Age matters in electoral politics and candidates may change their ages year to year. A candidate can make themselves one year younger. This causes matching problems, and because there were many such cases, we checked this with software (the software we used was PASCAL based), and others we did manually. If two different cases
were merged together because of this problem, we used internet sources to verify the age. For 1985–2007 data, we found nearly 1400 candidates with year of birth that needed correction, or 3.3 percent of the sample; we also found that 212, or 0.5 percent, have no year of birth.

Even after corrections of this type we encountered duplicate candidates. Data on year of birth were gathered in each election; when data were merged previously, we had as much information about year of birth as there were elections and thus we could compare the records. If the same candidate had two records, but same name and year of birth, then we suspected that it was a duplicate record. To combine two records into one, we needed the right information. We started by keeping each election in a separate data file. It was important to be sure that the data on elections did not overlap. If it were two different persons, then it would be likely that the same person would be in the same election. If they were in different elections, we suspected that these data were not matched properly, and it is truly a duplicate record. The opposite but rarer problem was dividing one candidate into two. Some data about the elections were merged into the wrong candidate. All told, for the dataset 1985 to 2007, there were 1398 candidates moved into one candidate and only 22 candidates divided into two candidates.

Though they represent a small proportion of the total records, there are consequences of incorrectly matched data. Table 1 shows the differences between unclean, original data and the newly cleaned, corrected data. In the uncorrected data, there were 34,901 candidates who participated in only one election. But this is overestimated, since after correcting these data, the number is 32,962. Perhaps six percent of overestimated cases are not much, but in the cases of underestimation, the problem can be large. For example, of the candidates who appear in four elections, the underestimation was 27 percent, or over a quarter of the population. We thought there was only one candidate who participated in all elections, but after corrections, we saw that there were three such candidates.
Table 1. Differences between Uncorrected and Corrected Data by Number of Elections Participated, 1985–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Elections Participated</th>
<th>Uncorrected data</th>
<th>Corrected data</th>
<th>Number of Over- and Underestimated</th>
<th>Over- and Underestimation in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>34,901</td>
<td>32,962</td>
<td>+1,939</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>-92</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>-240</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>-154</td>
<td>-27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42,385</td>
<td>41,009</td>
<td>+1,376</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matching Process

When we tried to merge the old data file with candidates from 1985 to 2007, with the new one from 2011, we got zero matches. Why? The answer was invisible characters. These are characters available from the keyboard, but you cannot see them on the screen, e.g. tab-char (ASCII #9), end-of-line (ASCII #13), and blank (ASCII #32). We decided that we cannot use the standard software for this project, and that it was necessary to develop dedicated software that controls for invisible characters. We used some procedures that are not available in standard software, so that we could delete blank spaces at the beginning and the end of data fields, replace double blanks with single blanks, and delete “enter” keystrokes.

We then merged the newly corrected 1985–2007 data with the newly corrected 2011 data. Thankfully, not many improvements were made to the 2011 data: we corrected 48 for family name, none for first name and nine for middle name. Gender was compared with last letter of first name with almost zero errors. However, the electoral commission did not report year of birth in 2011. We asked the PKW for an explanation, but the PKW did not say why age was missing for 2011. We
were forced to complement 89.9 percent of the 2011 cases (or, 6776 cases) using external data, that – in some cases – required us to improve 1985–2007 data, also. All told, 10 percent of the 2011 candidates (or, 759 cases) are missing year of birth.

We then merged the old and new data with a two-step procedure. First, we divided candidates into groups using an initial key, which was family name plus their first name (because not everyone had a middle name). Next, we created a complete key merging the first step with middle name and then year of birth. When the complete key produced a duplicate record, we thought that, most likely, it was the same person. But no computer program given this information can distinguish the two of them, so a human researcher must make the decision. Such suspicious cases sometimes required referral to internet sources.

Table 2 presents the basics of the merged, matched and clean data: there were 46,426 candidates between 1985–2011, and nearly 81 percent of them ran only once.

Table 2. Electoral Participation in Parliament, 1985–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Elections Participated</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>37,428</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,931</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,829</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Below 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Below 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,426</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we describe how EAST PaC Poland 1985–2011 data was collected, cleaned, and matched. The goal of EAST PaC was to create a high quality dataset of the universe of candidates who ran for national office and in which users can track candidates across elections.

The problems and errors we encountered were of various kinds: technological, bureaucratic, and social and political. Technological problems included merging data created with computer systems designed in different eras and thus had to be retrofitted to be compatible. Bureaucratic problems included the vagueness of what is reported about the candidates to the PKW, and what the PKW provides as data, all of which changed over time. For example, for unknown reasons, the PKW declined to publish the age of the candidates in 2011. This caused problems in matching and required extra effort from the research team. Social and political problems include not only the vagueness of the laws and policies that govern the PKW, but also the decisions of the parties and candidates in what and how they report to the PKW. According to social norms, after marriage, many women change their family names. A changed name causes difficulties in matching candidates across elections. One can suspect, but cannot prove, that for political reasons parties and candidates change what they report to the PKW as to the age of the candidates. The technological, bureaucratic, and social and political issues, and their combination, were the main challenges of this project.

The collecting, cleaning, and matching required multiple technological solutions, some of them dedicated to this task and all of which we developed over time and improved our data. We are confident that these data are the best that they have ever been. We hope that by describing these data and the process, future scholars can build on these data for future elections.
REFERENCES


For 1989–2007 data, we calculated 75 different codes. We present them in the format of a table which was applied to recode original codes into the SCO-2009 categories. In the first two columns you find an original 2-digit code (or two codes in some cases) and a corresponding original label. In the last two columns the SCO-2009 categories are presented which, in our opinion, suited the original category in the best way. The rows are ordered according to SCO-2009 categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original codes</th>
<th>Categories in 1989–2007</th>
<th>SCO codes</th>
<th>SCO-2009 categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Parliamentarians</td>
<td>0111</td>
<td>Parliamentarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31; 71</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>0170</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>0290</td>
<td>Top management, directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>0300</td>
<td>Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Professionals and specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Artists</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>Artists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>1113</td>
<td>Journalists, and commentators in TV and other media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Scientists</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>Research scientists and faculty of universities and colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13; 49</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>Teachers and school inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Political scientists</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>Sociologists and political scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sociologists</td>
<td>1142</td>
<td>Psychologists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Psychologists</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>Economists, and specialists in banking and finances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Economists</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>Specialists in social sciences and humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>Law professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Historians</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>Lawyers, attorneys at law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Chemists</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td>Chemists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>1173 Physicians medical doctors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>1175 Pharmacists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Veterinarians</td>
<td>1185 Veterinarians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Agricultural engineers</td>
<td>1187 Agricultural engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>1190 Clergy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Specialists not classified</td>
<td>1200 Specialists in technical fields</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Other engineers</td>
<td>1220 Engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Mechanical engineers</td>
<td>1222 Mechanical engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Electronic engineers</td>
<td>1223 Electrical, electronic, and power industry engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39, 65</td>
<td>Electrical engineers</td>
<td>1224 Architects and construction engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Construction engineers</td>
<td>1225 Geodesy, geology, and mining engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mining engineers</td>
<td>1226 Geodesy engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Geodesy engineers</td>
<td>1230 Engineering specialists, technologists, constructors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Technologists</td>
<td>2120 Technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>2122 Mechanical technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Mechanical technicians</td>
<td>2123 Electrical, electronic, and power industry technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Electromechanical technicians</td>
<td>2125 Construction technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Construction technicians</td>
<td>2126 Construction middle level specialists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>2300 Specialized office workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td>2325 Finance inspectors and advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Banking specialists</td>
<td>2326 Computer operators and DP technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Financial advisor</td>
<td>2339 Officers of governmental administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Computer specialists</td>
<td>3120 Nurses and middle-level medical personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Self-government activists</td>
<td>3140 Middle-level specialists in agriculture and forestry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Technicians in animal rearing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Agricultural technicians</td>
<td>3150</td>
<td>Real estate, insurance, and trade agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Real estate managers</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>Bookkeeping clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Economic middle level specialists</td>
<td>3212</td>
<td>Clerks in statistic and economic departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Policemen</td>
<td>3310</td>
<td>Policemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Military officers</td>
<td>3320</td>
<td>Military officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Sportsmen</td>
<td>3420</td>
<td>Athletes, sportsmen, sport officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Manual workers</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>Manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Foresters</td>
<td>5100</td>
<td>Foremen and supervisors of manual work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Miners</td>
<td>5210</td>
<td>Miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Electricians in construction</td>
<td>5220</td>
<td>Electricians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td>5240</td>
<td>Mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Railway workers</td>
<td>5272</td>
<td>Railway workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>5274</td>
<td>Car, truck, and bus drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Motor vehicle operators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>7100</td>
<td>Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs and business owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>8110</td>
<td>Self-employed craftsmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Owners of stores</td>
<td>8600</td>
<td>Owners of stores and other trade facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Without occupation</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>Without occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>9100</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>9200</td>
<td>Pensioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>9300</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Running the household</td>
<td>9400</td>
<td>Running the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>9500</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9900</td>
<td>Other not classified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B:
SYNTAX FOR RECODING SCO-2009 OCCUPATIONS INTO SOCIAL CLASS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCO-2009 Code</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000..1199</td>
<td>1 Non-technical intelligentsia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200..1999</td>
<td>2 Technical intelligentsia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000..3999</td>
<td>3 Middle and low-level non-manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000..4999</td>
<td>4 Sales and service workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000..6999</td>
<td>5 Manual workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7000..7999</td>
<td>6 Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000..8999</td>
<td>7 Business owners, self-employed in sales and service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9000..9900</td>
<td>8 Without occupation, not classified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>9 Missing data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C presents the percentage of candidates within each class category for each election since 1989.

Table C1. Social Classes in EAST PaC Poland, 1989 to 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia, non-technical</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical intelligentsia, engineers</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle and low-level nonmanual workers</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and service workers</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual workers</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owners, self-employed in sales and service</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working, without occupation</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter describes the Hungarian data collection process and discusses the challenges of data matching in Hungary. Although several projects engaged in collecting data on political elites, they rarely choose parliamentary candidates as their basic unit. In the early 2000s, two projects aimed at collecting basic socio-demographic and career information on Hungarian Members of Parliament (MPs) between 1884 and 2006 (Ilonszki, 2005, 2008, 2009). This dataset was later updated with data from the 2010–2014 and 2014–2018 electoral terms (Ilonszki et al., 2016). As to legislator data, an international research network was initiated to harmonize data collection efforts and to create a common codebook that enables comparative analysis. As part of this framework, a new MP dataset was created to make the connection between career paths, parliamentary activities and electoral performance. However, not only legislative elites are of major concern in Hungarian political science. Efforts of data collection focus on the governmental (Ilonszki, 2011; Ványi, 2015) and local political elites.
(Várnagy, 2012) as well. The above projects centre around collecting and organizing information that is available to the general public, but was presented either sporadically or in a way that does not support systematic analysis.

The other method for obtaining data on political elites is structured interviews. Legislators and mayors were surveyed in 1992, 1995, 1999\textsuperscript{6}, 2007, 2008\textsuperscript{7}, 2009\textsuperscript{8} and 2003, 2015\textsuperscript{9} respectively by multiple research groups. Legislative candidates were interviewed systematically in 2010 and 2014 utilizing a web-based survey\textsuperscript{10}. However, these samples were neither randomly drawn nor representative of the entire population of candidates. A recent major effort to collect candidate information started in 2012\textsuperscript{11}, and covered five national elections (1998–2014). On the upside, the project covered a wide range of variables, thus it offers substantially more information than EAST PaC. On the downside, due to the large number of variables, only candidates of parliamentary parties were taken into account. Although this approach enables the researcher to identify candidate selection patterns, its main problem is that it is difficult to explain candidate performance without having information on all other candidates competing in the district.

The Hungarian EAST PaC data is unique in that it aims to create a longitudinal dataset that contains all electoral data on the basis of candidates. Due to the restricted availability of candidate data in Hungary, this dataset cannot compile a wide range of variables, but designing the dataset in wide form (Weiss, 2006, p. 24) allows researchers to follow the careers and performances of the individual candidates over time from the first democratic elections in 1990 to 2010. The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the major challenges the researcher has to face when she wants to build such datasets in Hungary. The two main problems of data collection are (1) information availability and (2) merging multiple sets that contain electoral data from different

---

\textsuperscript{6} Centre for Elite Research at the Corvinus University of Budapest; DKMKA
\textsuperscript{7} Integrated and United project (INTUNE)
\textsuperscript{8} Participation and Representation project (PARTIREP), http://www.partirep.eu/
\textsuperscript{9} Political Leaders in European Cities (1st and 2nd round).
\textsuperscript{10} The data collection was administered by the Hungarian Election Study in 2010 and by the OTKA project “Candidates and Parliamentarians” in 2014.
\textsuperscript{11} “Candidates and Parliamentarians. Individualistic and Partisan Representation” (Gabriella Ilonszki, OTKA K106220)
Challenges of Matching Candidate Data in Hungary…

Electoral data are collected and published by the National Election Office (Nemzeti Választási Iroda – NVI). Parties and independent Single Member District (SMD) candidates have to register to request a recommendation sheet, on which they have to collect 750 signatures from voters in the given constituency. They have to supply the following information: candidate’s full name, candidate’s identification number, candidate’s date of birth, proof of citizenship, candidate’s address and other contact information. Candidates nominated on party lists have to provide the same information as SMD candidates. The National Election Office does not collect any additional information, with the exception of profile photos that the candidates may supply. It is clear that the information requirement for Hungarian candidates is considerably smaller than that of candidates of other Eastern European countries. In Poland, for instance, candidates have to provide information on occupation as well, which makes research on social class possible.

As it is stated above, there is limited publicly available official information on Hungarian candidates. An additional problem of data collection is that the National Election Office destroys election related documents 90 days after the election; this makes retrospective

---


13 From 2011 on, each candidate has to collect 500 signatures. However, contrary to the previous practice, one voter may sign for multiple candidates.

14 28/2013. (XI. 15.) KIM rendelet
investigation extremely problematic. However, even if the documents were to be available years after the election, the NVI handles the above information as private data. From the viewpoint of data collection, this privacy policy\textsuperscript{15} is especially problematic in the case of year of birth that is often used to match data from different elections. On the official election webpage, the Office publishes aggregate data on the candidates’ age and gender\textsuperscript{16}. Profile photos and short curriculum vitae (CV) – if supplied by the candidate – are published on the website. Candidate photos turn out to be quite useful in data matching, while CVs provide accurate information for key variables. Unfortunately, only a small minority of candidates submit these additional attachments with their registration. Additionally, data from the early elections (1990 and 1994) is not available on the NVI website. NVI provides election results in a digital format for these elections, but there is no access to candidate CVs.

As opposed to candidate data, information on legislators is well documented. Both profile photos and detailed CVs are provided in digital format and in print by the NVI and the Office of the National Assembly (Országgyűlés Hivatala). This is excellent news from the viewpoint of legislative studies, as we can obtain a wide range of variables about the MPs’ socio-economic and career backgrounds. However, this data provides only for a small percentage of all candidates who ran for office.

Due to the problems of data availability, relative to other participating countries, only a restricted amount of variables could be incorporated into the Hungarian part of EAST PaC. With regards to background variables, name and gender are available for each candidate. Year of birth was collected from candidate and MP CVs (if provided), web sources and printed almanacs. In the case of candidates placed lower on partly lists and those of small parties, this information was often not available at all.

Before turning to core variables, a few words on the Hungarian electoral system are in order. During the period under investigation, Hungary had a three-tier electoral system. On the first tier, candidates

\textsuperscript{15} Based on correspondence with the chair of the Election Information Service, that is responsible for citizen orientation.

\textsuperscript{16} In the case of the 2010 election, the Office did not report on age and gender on the aggregate level.
are elected in 176 single member districts (SMDs) by the rules of absolute majority in the first round, and should the first round be invalid or unsuccessful, simple majority in the second. A maximum of 152 and a minimum of 58 legislators receive regional and national list mandates from the second and the third tiers, where closed party lists are nominated. Voters cast two votes: one for a candidate in their SMD and one for the party list in their region. The sum of all non-utilized votes from the first valid rounds on both the SMD and the regional list tier forms the basis of mandate allocation on the national level.\footnote{From 2014 on, 199 representatives are elected in SMDs (106) and national party lists (93) in one round. Voters still have two votes, one cast for a candidate and one for a party list. All non-utilized votes on the SMD tier pools to the national level.}

Based on this, the following core variables were collected using official electoral data: constituency and county of nomination (for SMD and second tier candidates), number and percentage of votes (for SMD candidates), election success and nominating party for all candidates. For the 2010 elections, \textit{additional variables} were coded such as party list information, also using official data.

\textit{Merging Election Data}

The restricted number of variables is important because it causes substantial problems at the stage of merging. Merging is the process of fitting together candidate data from various elections in wide form. The primary goal of merging is to produce a dataset that contains each candidate only once, and that defines each variable at different time points, so one can clearly see the candidates’ electoral path. In other words, merging identifies if a candidate at election \( T \) is the same as a candidate in election \((T-1)\). Obviously, the larger the number of variables describing the candidates’ background, the easier it is to differentiate between candidates, thus the easier matching will get. The limited number of candidate-specific variables in the Hungarian dataset makes the matching procedure especially difficult. To increase reliability one has to establish two different sets of rules: (1) for \textit{automated data matching} and (2) for \textit{matching problematic cases}.
At the start of the project, we were advised to conduct the automated part of matching based on three sets of information: candidate name, gender and year of birth. As male and female names are very distinctive, gender did not prove useful in the Hungarian case. Furthermore, as the availability of the year of birth variable was limited, it could not be used effectively as a matching variable. This left us with matching candidates solely on the basis of candidate names. Thus, the first task was to create a name variable that is suitable for matching. This is more problematic as it sounds, especially as there are more than 15 thousand observations in the dataset.

The first problem arises in every language that uses macrons or special characters: different types of software handle special characters in different, often not compatible ways. This was especially true in the case of the Hungarian data. While the dataset that contained candidates from 1990 to 2006 came partly without macrons, the 2010 data displayed Hungarian characters correctly. In the case of first names, this problem is relatively easy to solve, because these only have one version. As in the case of family names, different versions exist, the solution was not so straightforward. For example, the family names Hegedűs and Hegedüs look the same without the macrons, but they obviously mark two different names. The same applies to Győrfi – Györfi, Hajdú – Hajdu, Szöllősi – Szöllösi, or Szűcs – Szücs, to name a few. Only unambiguous cases could be corrected while scanning through the list of names. The rest had to be corrected in the stage of matching problematic cases.

The second problem relates to the structure of Hungarian names. As many candidates have prefixes in their names, which they use quite inconsistently, the easiest approach appears to be to split the full names into components like prefix, family name, maiden name, first name

---

18 Hungarian prefixes are: Dr., Id. (Sen.), Ifj. (Jr.), Özv. (Widower). With some exceptions, prefixes come before the family name. In the case of married women, the Dr. prefix might be placed after the family name, if the doctorate is attached to the maiden name (e.g. Alakszainé Dr. Oláh Annamária). Furthermore, one candidate might have multiple prefixes in her name (e.g. Dr. Vidorné Dr. Szabó Györgyi, which indicates that Dr. Szabó Györgyi married someone named Vidor who also happen to hold a Dr. title).
and something we called middle name and extra name. Middle name refers to an undefined part between the family name and the maiden name (or first name in the case of male candidates), like the “F.” in Török F. Tibor. Candidates have extra names if they have multiple first names. The first name listed became the first name in the dataset, and all other given names were coded as extra names (e.g. Takács László Krisztián). To obtain the above name components the trimming and splitting procedures of Excel were used. The automated splitting of the full name categorized all name components into the correct category based on their order in three-fourths of all cases. In the remaining fourth of all cases, manual corrections were in order. There were many problems because either that the candidates’ family names consist of multiple parts (e.g. Tóth Mácsai Árpád, where Mácsai is part of the family name), or that they are married women (Tarjányiné Bozóki Erzsébet, where Bozóki is the maiden name).

Automated matching was eventually carried out by using all the name components but the prefix. Unfortunately, the automated matching does not match candidates from different elections without error. First of all, there are a lot of candidates with the same name. Second, candidates are allowed to change how they appear on the ballot: they can drop the “Dr.” prefix, and one or more of their extra names. The problem with this is that they do this inconsistently throughout the different elections (Vincze László appeared on the ballot as Vincze László Mihály in 2010, whereas earlier, he did not use his extra name). Thus, we lose the advantage of the additional information that prefixes and extra names could provide. Inconsistency might also rise from the changes in names over time. This is especially problematic in the case of female candidates who marry and change their names between two election periods. There are at least seven forms in which they can transform their names. Table 1 demonstrates that there are cases in which there is no indication of the candidate’s birth name, which makes the identification of these candidates extremely difficult.
Table 1. Versions for the names of married female candidates (fictional examples)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Versions</th>
<th>General example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s maiden name</td>
<td>Tóth Andrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s husband’s name</td>
<td>Szabó János Gábor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s family name + Husband’s first name</td>
<td>Szabó Jánosné</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s family name + Husband’s first name</td>
<td>Szabó János Gáborné</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s family name + “né” + Maiden family name + First name</td>
<td>Szabóné Tóth Andrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s family name + “né” + Maiden family name + First name</td>
<td>Szabó Jánosné Tóth Andrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s family name + First name</td>
<td>Szabó Andrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s family name + Maiden family name + First name</td>
<td>Szabó-Tóth Andrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First letter of husband’s family name + Maiden family name + First name</td>
<td>Sz. Tóth Andrea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is rare for authorities to check if the name on the ballot matches the official name of the candidate. Although the following example is not from the general elections, it beautifully demonstrates how candidates may change their names on the ballot. The problem is that once a candidate is registered under a name, the NVI must put that name on the ballot, even if something clearly went wrong. At the 2006 and 2010 local elections in a village called Tiszabő, the majority of registered candidates appeared using their nicknames. Local authorities referred to an official statement of the OVB from 1998 in which it declares that one

22 National Election Committee (Országos Választási Bizottság - OVB)
can register using a stage-name or a name that was used in public affairs. As 60% of Tiszabő bears the name Mága, the identification of the candidates was very problematic for the voters.\(^{23}\) Therefore, it seemed reasonable to somehow differentiate between candidates. As a result, candidate Mága Gyula appeared on the ballot as “Little Gyula”, a different Mága Gyula as “The Son of Pipe-smoker Gyuszi”, Mága Zsolt as “Postman” referring to his place of work, Surányi Gusztáv as “The Son of Limping Guszti” and Turó Zoltán as “Rooster”.

**Matching Problematic Cases**

As described above, the five components of the candidate’s name were used to match candidates. Due to this strict correspondence criterion – five variables must coincide in order to reach a valid match – it is very unlikely that false matches cause substantial problems in the cases of more complicated names (i.e. in cases where most of these variables take a value). In the case of simpler candidate names, the matching process might result in mismatches. For example, Szilassy Gábor Cézár or Tábori László Mária are very likely to find their matches, whereas we will most certainly have trouble with the name Szabó József, which consists of two very common parts. The procedure also leaves us with non-matched candidates who are either newcomers (i.e. correctly classified as candidates with no match) or were nominated under slightly (or completely) different names (i.e. incorrectly classified as mismatches). A common example is Deutsch Tamás, who – after getting married – changed his name to Deutsch-Für Tamás. Automated matching will identify him as two different persons. In a more extreme case, Rónaszéki Balázs became Rónaszékiné Keresztess Mónika. As a consequence, at the stage of matching problematic cases, automated matching must be double-checked.

\(^{23}\) Voters could not have known who they vote for, because all candidates appeared on the ballot as independent. Although the solution created odd results, it was necessary for voters to be able to decide who is who.

\(^{24}\) Appeared on the ballot as “Mága Gyula Kis Gyula”.

\(^{25}\) Appeared on the ballot as “Mága Gyula Pipás Gyuszi Fia”.

\(^{26}\) Appeared on the ballot as “Mága Zsolt Postás”.

\(^{27}\) Appeared on the ballot as “Surányi Gusztáv Sántaguszti Fia”.

\(^{28}\) Appeared on the ballot as “Turó Zoltán Kakas”.
Table 2 identifies five problems that may result in mismatches at the stage of automated matching. These are the centre of attention at the stage of matching problematic cases. The table shows the results of the automated matching process. In other words, this is what the researcher sees at this stage. In the first case, one of the Kovács Bélás at election T was classified as not being nominated at the election (T-1). At the automated matching stage, the decision of which of the two candidates named Kovács Béla is matched with the Kovács Béla at election (T-1) is quite random: whichever comes first on the list of candidates from election T. Therefore one has to decide which Kovács Béla – if either – from election T has been nominated at the previous election.

Table 2. Examples for problematic cases after automated matching

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Election (T-1)</th>
<th>Election T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem nr. 1</td>
<td>Kovács Béla</td>
<td>Kovács Béla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem nr. 2</td>
<td>Szabó József</td>
<td>Szabó József</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem nr. 3</td>
<td>Szabó József István</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem nr. 4</td>
<td>Tóth János</td>
<td>Tóth János</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem nr. 5</td>
<td>Ágoston Balázs</td>
<td>Ágoston Balázs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second problem is very similar, but the other way around: the name Szabó József appear twice at election (T-1), and once at election T. The question is whether the one at election T is the same as either those at election (T-1). Note the randomness of matching again: the result of matching these candidates depends on the order in which the two Szabó Józses appear at election (T-1). Additionally, there is a candidate called Szabó József István (Problem nr. 3), which is very similar to Szabó József. Remember that candidates can decide whether they want their extra names to appear on the ballot. As a consequence of such a decision, Szabó József István at election T might be the same person as one the Szabó Józses at election (T-1). Problem nr. 4 demonstrates a combination of Problems nrs. 1 and 2. After the
automated matching, both Tőth János’s at election T were matched with Tőth János’s at election (T-1), but – as the matching is solely based on their names – there is no guarantee that they are matches. They may be matches to different candidates or even be newcomers. Similarly, matched cases with unique names (Problem nr. 5) need to be double-checked to decide whether Ágoston Balázs at election T is the same as the candidate under a similar name at election (T-1), or whether they just have the same name.

This stage of matching consists of identifying and solving the problematic cases described above. The first step of identification involves finding cases that were identified as newcomers (i.e., were not identified as a match to any other candidate), but have names that already appear at previous elections (see Problem nr. 1). The second step is to find cases at election T that are classified as matches (see Problem nrs. 2, 4 and 5). The remaining candidates are hypothesized to have unique names, with one exception: similar names must be examined closely (see Problem nr. 3). For the identification of similar names, the family and first names were taken into account. Additionally, the dataset was organized in alphabetical order according to family name, as we tried to find similarities manually. Obviously, the order of these steps can vary, and there might be alternative, perhaps simpler solutions.

To demonstrate the extent of the problems discussed above, let us see a few examples from the Hungarian EAST PaC data. The specific task to solve is that of merging a dataset that contains candidates from the period 1990–2006 with the 2010 candidate dataset. The biggest problem with the Hungarian data is that there are a lot of candidates with very common Hungarian names. Family names Horváth, Kovács, Tőth, Papp, Farkas, Balogh, Kiss, Szabó, Nagy, Molnár, Németh, Varga, just to name a few, come up often with the most popular first names like László, István, János or József. To name two extreme cases, there are 26 candidates named Horváth László in the 1990–2006 dataset, and 3 were nominated in 2010 under this name. This means that one has to separate all 26 candidates running at the previous elections to be able to tell which of the 2010 Horváth Lászlós have been nominated at previous elections. The same problem creates a similar workload in the case of the name Kovács István, which appears 28 times at previous elections, and twice in 2010. Consequently, solving the above problems is time intensive.
The solution for these issues is problematic as, in most of the cases, double-checking the results of the initial matching must be done manually. An automated solution would be viable if there were additional reliable candidate-specific information available. The year of birth could serve as such auxiliary information, but there are two problems with this. First, as stated earlier, the year of birth data was not available for a certain part of the population. Second, even if it is available, sometimes, it gives no clear solutions. For example, there are two candidates named Király Zoltán born in 1948. Both ran running in 1990 and one was also nominated in 1994 and 1998. The question is what happens if this is the case?

There are several solutions. First is visual information (as in the case of Király Zoltán in the previous example): photos and videos served as extremely important clues in deciding who is who. Second, the details of electoral experience proved to be important as well. Party affiliation and geographical location were the two major types of information to lean on. This, of course, cannot handle party switching and inter-regional mobility. As to party switching, during the period between 1990 and 2010 several parties were formed and after disappeared. Very often, if the party disappeared, the candidates re-appeared as candidates of another party at later elections. Inter-regional mobility is very often associated with candidates of small parties. The reason for this is that as the nomination of regional party lists is dependent upon the ability to nominate SMD candidates for at least a quarter of the constituencies per county (but in at least two), these parties are often not able to nominate a regional list in all counties. Additionally, they have a limited pool of potential candidates to draw from. Therefore, they nominate their candidates wherever they are entitled to nominate a party list.

Thirdly, any other additional information that helped identify the candidates was taken into account. In several cases, newspaper articles helped shed light on candidate identity; in other instances, the websites of local governments provided us with information on the candidates’ election history and political careers. In the most extreme cases, the candidate’s e-mail address gave us the information about the presumed year of birth. Also, publicly available Facebook profiles and personal contacts helped us clear the picture.
CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I discussed the process of candidate data gathering in Hungary. The two most important challenges are related to the limited availability of candidate information and the difficulties of merging the data of different elections. Limited availability is the product of the restricted amount of publicly available, systematically collected official information. Additionally, there are a lot of candidates who do not have any trace on the internet. This is particularly true for the candidates of small parties, independent candidates, and those who were placed low on party lists. As a consequence of the limited number of variables, the data can only be used to investigate a limited array of questions.

Merging data from different elections also has problems. Naturally, if we know only a few things about a candidate, there are just a few things by which we can differentiate her from other candidates. The other consequence of too-little information is that the limit of automated matching comes quite early in the process. Name-based automated matching leaves us with a lot of double-checking to do at the later stages.

Despite all the problems, the data can be considered valid and reliable across elections. The data are a good basis for investigations of the continuity of political elites, constituency-level election results and female participation in electoral politics. To widen the scale of research, future data collection efforts could focus on the local political background and the occupation of candidates as well as holding in party offices on the different levels of politics.

REFERENCES


Part 3

CONTEXT
In August 1991, the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared its national independence and announced the emergence of a new state. The will to exist as a separate state was confirmed by 90 percent of those who came on December 1, 1991 to the national Referendum and answered affirmatively to the question: “Do you approve the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?” The encouraging international climate surrounding the post-Communist revolutions, taken together with enthusiasm for liberation in Ukraine, seemed to ensure plenty of opportunities for a successful state-building process. Several obstacles at its start impeded this process from occurring smoothly.

The idea of Ukrainian national sovereignty grew on the wave of the nationalistic movement of the second half of 19th century and was cemented by the rapid industrial and cultural modernization occurring at that period in Eastern Europe. In the 19th century this movement passed all the stages from individual “going to the people” (narodnik movement), through creation of culturally enlightening organizations to the creation of political parties. In the conditions of the weak development of a national bourgeoisie in the Russian empire, the

* We would like to express our gratitude to Christa Sawko, then Research Assistant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington D.C., for editing the first version of this Chapter.

1 The Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine itself was approved by the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (VR), on August 1991 and its text was attached to the text of the referendum.
intelligentsia took the lead of the nationalistic movement and made cultural enlightenment a primary goal; the bourgeois revolution of February 1917 opened a unique opportunity to fulfill their dream of building an independent Ukrainian nation state.

There were three desperate attempts in 1917–1919 to establish a Ukrainian state: the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), the Ukrainian state (UD) and the Directoria (renewed UNR) were the names of Ukrainian governments that consecutively succeeded each other in 1917–1919. In Galicia, the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic was created and ceased to exist in 1918. All these governments worked for 7–12 months and then collapsed. Finally, during the Civil War, they lost to the Bolsheviks. Their failure is explained by the extremely difficult international situation and weak cohesion between various social layers, between intelligentsia and peasants.

After the Civil War, the Bolshevik party established itself in Kiev, and the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine. In December 1922, the Soviet Union—a federal state composed of national republics—was created and headed by the Bolshevik² party. The newly born state nationalized industries, confiscated lands, and proclaimed the establishment of communism as its goal.

Creation of the USSR permitted those who craved for a Ukrainian nation to find it within new geographic and statehood borders. This advantage was enhanced due to the policy of “Ukrainization” which was launched by the Communist party in order to avoid another Civil War with nationalistic slogans. Ukraine-born members were welcomed into the Communist party and the Soviet administration, where the official language was Ukrainian. Working class trade unions were Ukrainized; peasants were united in cooperatives and unions. National education, book-publishing, and culture reached their height of development in a modern, vanguard form that later was given the name, “Ukrainian renaissance.” From the economic point of view, national consolidation was solidified by the New Economic Policy (NEP), initiated by Lenin in order to rescue the country’s economy after the Civil War. As a result of this policy, trade and small factories were soon returned to private owners and confiscated land distributed among the poor peasants. The Stalinist Constitution of 1937 declared the equal rights

²This party was later referred to as the Communist Party.
of all eleven Soviet republics and their right to self-determination — including the right to withdraw from the Soviet Union. However, this right, in fact could not be exercised.

Dramatic changes were brought about to Ukraine by Stalin. In 1928, he adopted the first five year plan of economic development and the policy of rapid industrialization. The Soviet Union aimed to develop rapidly to the level of economic advancement of Western countries. Industrial growth led to urban population growth that required a more extensive supply of agricultural products. The Communist Party demanded that the Ukrainian republic would be its resource supplier.

Investments of material and human capital into industry soon yielded results. From 1926 to 1939, the urban population of Ukraine doubled but in the rural areas the changes were not as promising. The campaign of voluntary collectivization of private farms conducted in the 1920s was not successful. Grain purchases monopolized by Soviet state were met with hostility. Peasants concealed the wheat and preferred to slaughter their livestock rather than sell for prices well below their value.

In 1929, Stalin launched a massive campaign against rich peasants and enforced obligatory collectivization. Many thousands of average to well-to-do peasants were killed or exiled to the extremes of Northern Russia, and practically all household farms were forced into collectivization by 1933. The NEP was cancelled.

Soviet repressions against peasants in the early 1930s were only the forerunner for repression against many social classes and occupations, including the scientific and cultural elites, priests, small businessman, land owners, former officers and politicians. In 1937 political repressions reached unprecedented levels. Those who were suspected of disloyalty to Soviet policies or insisted on Ukrainian autonomy were arrested, framed, and assassinated, or sent to labor camps. This time, the repressions went far beyond even loosely defined class-enemies, reaching Communist party officials, with the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) being the main punitive organ. In 1938, all Ukrainian Soviet government officials were assassinated, two-thirds of party managers of all levels were repressed, 80 percent of Ukrainian writers were killed and nine out of ten members of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine were executed (Krawchenko 1985).
Moscow halted the policy of Ukrainization. The curricula at universities and schools was heavily Russified again, and even the number of Ukrainians among scientists decreased from 49% to 31%, more than half of all journals in Ukrainian were closed, and many books ceased to be published.

These were the conditions under which the new Ukrainian political elites were born.

At that time, from 1919 to the late 1930s, approximately one fifth of all ethnic Ukrainians lived outside of the Soviet Republics in countries such as Poland (Galicia and Volyn’), Romania (Bukovyna), and Czechoslovakia (Transcarpathia). The relationship between the Ukrainians and the ruling ethnic majorities varied: sharp and confrontational in Poland and Romania, and moderately peaceful in Czechoslovakia. The constitutions of all three states allowed some degree of dissent and freedom of speech; Ukrainians were represented in the Parliaments of these countries, and acquired substantial experience of the constitutional fight for the rights of the Ukrainian minority. Volyn’ and Galicia became parts of the Soviet Union in 1939, while Soviet power was established in all four regions only after the end of World War II, in 1945.

ELECTORAL POLITICS OF WORLD WAR TWO

In 1939, after the USSR signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Germany, the Nazis invaded Poland from the West and the Red Army occupied Eastern Poland (contemporary Ukrainian Galicia). Soviet rule offered Galicians the opportunity to identify themselves as Ukrainian citizens, to use Ukrainian in public life, and get education and media in the Ukrainian language. Galicians were then confronted with the reverse side of Stalin’s national policy: all the foundations of civil society created in Galicia – cooperative societies, political parties, educational organizations, the enlightenment society “Prosvita,” and the Greek-Catholic church – were banned or closed down. This was also followed by political repressions. The same story was repeated in contemporary Ukrainian Bukovyna, which was annexed by the USSR in 1940. Only Transcarpathia remained out of Soviet reach until the end of the war.
During the USSR’s war with Nazi Germany, there was a short-lived attempt to restore self-government in Ukraine. As the emergence of a Ukrainian state was not anticipated in the Nazi’s plan, soon after Germany took control over Ukrainian lands, the Nazi party assassinated activists and dissolved political organizations. World War Two in Galicia turned out to be particularly violent. In addition to the German invasion, it involved participation of partisan military units and outbreaks of brutality on ethnic grounds.

In Central and Eastern parts of Ukraine the situation was different, as the experience of economic and political emancipation of the 20th century was shorter and well forgotten after the purges of the 1930s. Soviet historiography instituted the meaning of World War Two for Ukrainians as the Great Patriotic War and associated Stalin with the defense against fascists, though some Soviet Ukrainian writers and film directors interpreted these events differently.

Popular enthusiasm caused by the end of World War Two was skillfully used by Soviet propaganda to consolidate the public efforts necessary to reconstruct the dismantled Soviet economy. Extensive exploitation of these efforts allowed surprisingly fast growth in Ukrainian industry and, consequently, some improvement of urban living standards. It is believed that this period of industrialization gave a rise for “red directors” – appointed heads of the industrial plants and mines who embodied the economic power in the USSR and came into politics in the 1990s, when the political power of the Communist party was dismantled. The industrialization was paralleled by migration from Russia and a massive Russification of economy and culture.

FROM “KHRUSHCHEV’S THAW” TO PERESTROIKA

After the death of Stalin in 1953 came a palpable lightening of the political regime. This post-Stalin historical period is associated with the name of Khrushchev, the newly appointed general Secretary of the CPSU, the initiator of “Khrushchev’s thaw.” For the first time in the Communist Party, leaders recognized the mistakes of Stalin’s governance, named the main figures and their misdeeds, and in 1956 they publicly condemned them during the famous 20th Congress of the Communist Party. There was a wide-ranging amnesty of political
prisoners and a relaxation in political censorship over media, science, and culture. The dissident movement headed by prominent representatives of the intelligentsia – poets, philosophers and scientists – appeared in that period and proved to have the innovative character of a new political style. The national renaissance in Ukraine was permitted only within the frame of “Ukrainian Soviet nationalism” and did not lead to any changes in political system.

After ten years of Khrushchev’s rule, Leonid Brezhnev, a more conservative Communist leader, came to power. The policy of his team was aimed at the preservation of the existing economic situation, although promises of rapid growth were made. The growth of a consumer-oriented economy that commenced in Khrushchev’s period had continued until the middle of the 1970s. Later, only heavy industry was developing smoothly. The potential of extractive industry and labor productivity decreased. At the same time, the educational level of working people in Ukraine increased greatly and, due to some liberation of political censorship that allowed some Western broadcasts and some trips abroad, information about high living standards in Europe infiltrated the USSR. This information disclosed the backwardness of the Soviet economy and could have been a stimulus for rising material aspirations especially among young educated workers.

Striking interregional and cross-sector differences in incomes were observed. Politically supported military- and heavy industry was well-developed and provided fringe benefits. Most of these industries were located in the Eastern and Southern regions that were more modernized in that they were equipped with better infrastructure and educational opportunities. The situation of consumer goods and agricultural products, most of which were located in Central and Western Ukraine, was far worse in all these respects.

In April 1985, the newly appointed General Secretary of the Communist party Mikhail Gorbachev announced a new policy. This policy was designed to liberate public opinion and initiate a peaceful conversion of the economy through moderate reforms. These policies were named “glasnost” and “perestroika.” The government declared some economic reforms and foreign policy revisions. To everyday folk, the most tangible effect of Gorbachev’s reforms was the outburst of liberal critique of the former nomenklatura. In Ukraine in late 1980s, thirty thousand informal organizations were registered (Subtelny 1993).
The most important of them “The People’s movement for Rebuilding” (‘Narodny Rukh za perебудову’) demanded democratization of the political regime. In Lviv and Kyiv, people went into the streets in support of nationalistic demands; in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk workers organized anti-communist strikes. Electoral campaigns for the “Verkhovna Rada,” the Parliament of Ukraine, in 1990 revealed strong support for Rukh, the anti-communist and nationalistic party.

In June 1990, Boris Yeltsyn was elected as the President of the Russian Federation and the independence of the Russian Federation from the Soviet Union was proclaimed. His election became the culmination of the ongoing conflict between the Soviet Union and Russian Federation’s political elites. Nationalist revival was observed in all Soviet republics. On July 16, 1990 the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine was proclaimed. The political role of Moscow became undermined and the process of its further dismantling was fostered by the nationalist uprisings and ethnic conflicts in Vilnius, in Southern Osetia and Nagorny Karabach. An attempt at a coup d’état was made on 18–19 August 1991, but it was not successful and all republics announced their independence one after another. On August 24th, 1991, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada announced the national independence, a decision supported by popular vote in a national referendum on December 1, 1991. The trilateral summit in Bielovezhskaya Pushcha denounced the Soviet Union.

Under these new circumstances, Ukraine had little experience in statehood besides that of 150 years of Cossack Hetmanship and several episodes in 1917–1919. Not only did this result in an absence in experience in democratic governance, but an absence of experience in governance at all.

POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CADRES

The doctrine of the power in the USSR did not foresee a legislative-executive power division in action, as all the power in the Soviet Union ‘belonged to the people.” The Communist Party doubled as the national executive power and the administration at all sub-national levels. The General Secretary of the Communist Party was at the same
time the Head of the Ministries (Soviet government), of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR (representative body) and of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU that adopted all political decisions.

The Supreme Council (Soviet Parliament) had a two-chamber structure: the Council of the Union and the Council of the Nationalities, the latter was purported to be the means of representation of the interests of national republics such as Ukraine. The Ukrainian Republic, as all others, had its own legislative body – the Verkhovna Rada – and the executive in the form of the Council of Ministers. In practice, those two bodies did not perform the legislative and executive functions as a free nation would, as all decisions had to be approved in Moscow. The elections to the Supreme Councils at all levels were conducted without alternative candidates, and sessions were called only twice a year and only lasted a couple of days. The Supreme Council in Moscow approved the Constitution, the Laws and the State plan. The Soviet government in Moscow developed a budget, and sent it down to the national republics.

The Communist Party of Kyiv had delegated to it the right to control enterprises in accordance with the State plan. Some enterprises – the largest industrial, machine-building, mining and military complexes – were subjugated directly to Moscow. Later, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the directors of those enterprises comprised the informal group, later called the “red directorate”. The only ready-made candidates for rule in the independent Ukraine were the former Soviet administration, the “red directors” and the Communist nomenklatura.

The “red directors” obtained skills for managing large state-owned industries that translated well into managing businesses in a post-Communist environment. Former Communist leaders lacked practical skills that turned them to a group somewhat dependent on the power of the “red directors” (Levin 1997). Both groups of the former nomenklatura had social and political capital that was greater than that of the new elite that struggled to emerge. The new elite came from the ranks of political dissidents and from humanitarian organizations that were inspired by liberal reforms. The new elite lacked leadership experience and were perceived as alien by the Russian dominated industrial regions of east Ukraine. Throughout Eastern Europe, political dissidents such
as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa obtained national support, but in Ukraine, the old nomenklatura from the eastern regions of the country enjoyed decisively stronger support than the nationalist former dissident leaders who originated from the Western part of Ukraine.³

**POLITICAL PARTIES IN AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE**

The first active Parliament of Ukraine was elected in 1990 and, since the Communist party was the only party that had been allowed under the Soviet Union, the Verkhovna Rada (VR) was dominated by it. A quarter of the seats were taken by the pro-reformist candidates, mainly members of the right-wing nationalist organization “Rukh,” who were elected by the single mandate districts and later formed the Democratic Bloc. The representatives of the Democratic Bloc were responsible for the much needed economic reforms. Communist party members blocked these economic reforms by excluding thousands of large enterprises from the privatization list. Liberal reformers themselves did not work in accord with each other and did not provide a resolute privatization program. The limitations that the Communist Party placed on the privatization process, and the infighting among reformers, had lamentable consequences for the economy in the 1990s. It hobbled development in the private sector (Aslund 2001), and thus standards of living declined. This fueled the failure of radical reforms and caused soaring inflation. Since liberal reforms were associated with the Democratic Bloc, the blame for deterioration of living standards’ fell on them (Haran and Maiboroda 2000). Inner schisms deprived Rukh even of the thin support it had. By the 2000s, Rukh ceased to exist as a political force (Table 1).

³The only organized opposition in the Soviet Union was the nationalist-liberal movement Rukh za perebudovu (movement for Perestroika) that accounted for 280 thousand members in 1989. In the 1994–2002 parliamentary elections, Rukh never managed to raise more than 9 percent of the vote. Its leader, Viacheslav Chernovil, was not successful in the 1994 Presidential elections. In the 2000s, Rukh failed to maintain its popularity and unity. After the internal split and the death of its leader it ceased to exist as an appreciable political force.
Table 1. Left-wing, Right-wing and Other Parties in the Ukrainian Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>Majoritarian</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist party</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other left parties (only SPU since 2002)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing parties: People’s Rukh in 1990–1998, Svoboda in 2012</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Region in 1998, 2006–2012, FUU in 2002</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties of the “Center”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This column refers to the Parliament elected in 1990, as it operated in 1991, in independent Ukraine. The data are presented in a separate column because in August 1991 the Communist Party was banned and majority of the former Communists found themselves with no affiliation to any political party. The CPU has operated again since 1993.

** Extraordinary elections to VR.


Left-wing parties have always been better organized than the right-wing democratic parties. Although the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned in 1991, it was allowed as the Communist party of Ukraine in 1993, and obtained 22 percent of seats in the first Parliament elected in independent Ukraine in 1994 (Table 1). Other left-wing parties were registered – moderately nationalist Socialist, Progressive Socialist and Rural parties – that took away votes from a new
Communist Party that was radically oriented toward restoration of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the electorate of leftist parties was massive in the 1990s: it obtained half of the seats in the VR elected by the proportional representation system in 1998 (Haran’ and Maiboroda 2000) but in the 2000s this support diminished to 5% of the Parliament seats taken by the Communists alone (Table 1).

In the 2000s, the non-leftist parties began to grow. These parties were vaguely associated with support for market forces and they took a nationalist stand. Their economic programs were similar in their extreme populism. The only ideological difference among the “parties of power” was in their orientation in foreign policy. Nostalgia toward unity with Russia and interest in protection against the opposition defined the Eastern-oriented policy of the Party of Regions, the SDPU and the ZaEDU. Although Moscow ceased to be the center for Communist ideology, it remained a center of influence that impacted Ukrainian politics. The orientation toward independent development and the Western-style market and society defined of the parties “Nasha Ukraina” and BUT. The support for both parties was based in the Western region.

In time, these parties became known as representatives of Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs), large corporations, and oligarchs. The majoritarian electoral system— with seats in the VR allocated through single-mandate district seats – is often said to be responsible for the increase in the number of deputies who were loyal to no ideology or reform strategy, and loyal only to gaining of their opportunistic ends and not listening to party dictates (Meleshevych 2006). Table 1 shows that, in the elections of 1990 and 1994, the share of no-party deputies was very high. In 1998 and 2002, when the non-compensatory mixed electoral system was adopted with half of the seats allocated through proportional representation and half allocated through the single-mandate district system, the situation changed. It seems that the candidates who wanted to stand within the party lists opted rather for these parties, dubbed as centrist parties, than for leftist or rightist parties. Deputies of these parties often shifted their stance according to whichever party had the political advantage; as such, political observers named this phenomenon, “party of power.”

\[^4\] ZaEDU, SDPU (o), Nasha Ukraina, Hromada, later Yulia Tymoshenko block, later BUT and the party of the Regions.
Political reforms adopted in December 2004 changed the electoral system from a majoritarian-proportional one to voting for the party lists. Although some experts greeted the growth of parties’ influence as a democratic step (Meleshevych 2006; Mostova 2010), others noted that proportional voting did not solve the problems of corruption and interest-based activities (Kohut 2007). At the level of local governance, the results were practically the inverse of what was expected: party members were distracted from their electorate and were preoccupied with their personal interests and corporatist interests of their parties (Kohut 2007) and as such the interests of the people were poorly represented. Political parties had not gained in their strength and unity and coalitions became difficult to create.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER

In the Presidential elections of 1994, the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk – who entered office in 1991 – was replaced by Leonid Kuchma, a former “red director” from the eastern part of Ukraine. It was not until Kuchma’s presidency in 1994 that an intelligible privatization program was offered. The long history of confrontation between President and Parliament began when Kuchma had to oppose the left forces in the VR in order to carry out his privatization plan.

Amendments to the 1978 Constitution of Ukraine approved by the VR in 1991 set up the political structure of Ukraine as a Parliamentary republic. The Constitution of independent Ukraine adopted in 1996 granted more authority to the president. Thus, Ukraine adopted a semi-presidential republic structure. This decision was taken as a resolution of the acute conflict between the President Kuchma and the VR. In time, strengthening of Presidential authority led to more authoritarian rule. The president used informal networks and administrative prosecutions of the Parliament as an instrument of pressure. Both presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych demanded more authority for conducting reforms. This prevented Ukraine from establishing a parliamentary republic with strong accountability of power and political pluralism.
The first of Kuchma’s two presidential terms was marked by a continuing drop in GDP. This drop in GDP stopped in 2000 after Kuchma appointed Viktor Yushchenko as the Prime Minister. After Yushchenko’s appointment, Ukraine experienced remarkable economic growth. During Kuchma’s rule, vast corruption networks, state capture, and criminalization of power relationships grew.

Kuchma’s legacy is difficult to assess. Despite his initial intention to embark on a rather pro-Russian policy, he pleased Western Ukrainian voters by taking a course that was moderately independent from Russia. His re-election was partly due to the support that he gained from westerners due to this policy. Thus, since beating Kravchuk, in the 1998 presidential elections, Kuchma has been supported by the nationalist West as a proponent of national independence and free market development against the Communist candidate, Petro Symonenko. Yet, Kuchma’s policies severely endangered the possibility for democratic governance. Although free elections in 1994–2002 were held, the results were manipulated, rights of the opposition and free media were abused that the leading political scientist Lucian Way to classify Ukraine as a “competitive authoritarian regime” on a par with Russia, Serbia, Albania, and Armenia (Way 2005).

ORANGE REVOLUTION

The protest events of Autumn 2004 are known as the Orange Revolution. The color was associated with the symbol of the party “Our Ukraine” (Nasha Ukraina) and associated with the opposition leader and former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. The electoral protests in Ukraine broke out because of the obvious corruption of the presidential campaign in 2004, during which President Kuchma allegedly tried to ensure the victory of his pro-Russian oriented successor-candidate Viktor Yanukovych by using the so-called administrative resource: pressure on socially significant actors to organize voters for his support and prevent opposition’s access to the media and public.

5 Not all of the observers agree that the events of the Autumn 2004 can be typified as a “revolution.” Kalandadze and Orenstein gave the events of the early 2000’s in Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia and Kyrgyzstan the more cautious name of “electoral protests” (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009).
On November 22, in spite of an exit-poll that proclaimed the victory of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, the media announced the victory of Yanukovych. On the next day, a massive crowd of protesters gathered at the Maidan of Nazalezhnist, the main square of Kiev, to protest against the fraudulent results of the elections, criminalization of economics and politics, and Kuchma’s cavalier disregard for public opinion.

Over the next several days the crowd increased to one million and became a twenty-four-hour sit-down strike. As the outcome of a mostly peaceful 33-day long strike and demonstrations, the results of the second round of Presidential elections were declared invalid; and the third, additional, round of elections was to be held on December 26. The victory of Viktor Yushchenko, known as the Orange party leader⁶ was proclaimed on January 14, 2005. Yulia Tymoshenko was appointed as a Prime Minister and the Orange coalition became the ruling party in the Parliament.

Although the main conflict of 2004 broke out between the power holders and civil society, it engendered a deep split between Western and Eastern Ukraine. This was visible in the votes that were cast in the elections. For the Westerners, the Donetsk-based Party of the Regions of Yanukovych embodied the same moral principles in politics as Kuchma, such as corrupt economic relationships, devaluation of national independence, illegal pressure on civil society, and a definite pro-Russian turn. The adherents of the Blue party, or the Party of the Regions, denounced their protests and accused the Orange party of electoral fraud. In 2004, Ukraine saw open confrontation between two opposite camps and representatives from both sides arrived in Kiev in large numbers. Fortunately, the interregional conflict did not erupt in violence. Moreover, economic slogans for more open relationships in the economy and transparent elections were shared by both sides (Stepanenko 2005).

The years of Yushchenko’s Presidency were marked by growth of GDP and the trend was broken only in 2008, largely due to the global financial crisis. Re-privatization of enterprises that were unfairly privatized

⁶ The official name of this party was “Nasha Ukraina.” During the events it received the name of the Orange, symbolizing its adherents. Later on, the adherents of the confronting party, the Party of the Regions, chose the color blue as its symbol.
under Kuchma was launched as one of the first steps of Timoshenko’s government. Yet, economic relationships did not become more transparent. The much anticipated economic growth did not reach a satisfying level. Although international observers noted the improvement in democratic quality after the Orange revolution (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009), Ukraine still is still considered as highly corrupt with low regard for the rule of law (Kaufmann et al 2010).

In 2005, following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine seemed to be on the verge of democratizing its political system and uniting Ukrainians around a common goal. However, personal ambition and a lack of initiative prevented the top executive leaders – the President and the Prime-Minister, companions-in-arms of the Orange revolution – from working together. In less than a year, the Orange coalition was dissolved and the government of Tymoshenko had been dismissed. The defeat of the “Oranges” is also explained by the regional basis of their support in Central and Western Ukraine. The supporters included the multi-colored group of those dissatisfied with Kuchma’s regime, who soon became dissatisfied with Yushchenko. Finally, in 2006, the Party of the Regions won 186 of the 450 seats in Parliament in more transparent elections. The “Oranges” had 243 seats that allowed creation of a coalition and appointment of a Prime-Minister. The conflicts between Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc, “Our Ukraine” and the Socialist Party inspired the Socialist Party to form a coalition with the Party of the Regions. Although “Our Ukraine” was not in the coalition, Yushchenko, its leader, appointed Yanukovych as a Prime Minister and eight Ministers were nominated from this party.

The Yushchenko-Yanukovych alliance was a fragile one and lasted only two months before the Parliament dissolved it. Extraordinary elections in 2007 changed the structure of the Verkhovna Rada. The Party of the Regions got 175 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc – 156, “Our Ukraine” – 72, the CPU – 27 and the Lytvyn bloc – 20. The electorate was polarized even more than in 2006. Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc and “Our Ukraine” created a coalition, however, the conflicts between Yuliia Tymoshenko, the newly appointed Prime-Minister and Yushchenko brought the further decline of the popularity of the Oranges and the growth of the support for the Party of the Regions. As a result, Viktor Yanukovych won in the Presidential elections of 2010, which were deemed to be fair.
Yanukovych turned to Russia. He signed a Treaty on a gas price discount in exchange for allowing the Russian fleet to be stationed in Sevastopol for an undefined term. Yanukovych strategically placed his supporters in the key positions and punished political opponents, including the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko. In the summer 2010, Yanukovych abolished the Constitutional reform of 2004 on the transfer of the authority from President to Parliament and bringing him back to Kuchma’s level of authority. Yanukovych consolidated a much narrower circle of loyalist around him than did Kuchma; while intractable oligarchs and politicians were to be punished by coercion and by deprivation of the rent-seeking opportunities given to those loyal to him (D’Anieri 2013).

On the eve of the 2012 elections Yanukovych solidified the electoral chances for the Party of the Regions. While lacking any positive changes in economic sphere, the Party of the Regions built their campaign on the basis of interregional language split and presented themselves as the defenders of the Russian speaking population. He introduced the mixed – proportional and majoritarian systems, changing the regulations of the Verkhovna Rada’s work, abolished party blocs, increased the election threshold to 5 percent, and changed the rules for the local electoral commissions. The Party of the Regions swept themselves to victory in 2012 (Vysotskii, 2013). Yanukovych rewarded his supporters. New multi-millionaires emerged in Ukraine, one of whom was Yanukovych’s son. Yanukovych’s approval rating dropped, and in October 2013 the polls showed that he would lose the elections to Vitalii Klyuchko as a possible presidential candidate.7

At the same time, Yanukovych intensified talks with European Union on the issue of associate membership. A few days before the summit in Vilnius, where the treaty was supposed to be signed, the government stopped the talks. No public explanations were made, and protesters started to gather yet again on the Kyiv Maidan. On November 24, 2013, many thousands came to the Maidan, while the same protests occurred in all regions of Ukraine including the cities of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Luhansk.

7The Razumkov Center on October 2013, N=2000, 18+, representative for the adults of Ukraine.
The government decided to end the protests. They directed the police to attack student protesters on the night of November 30, 2013. The response was a mobilization of about a million on protesters, who stayed at the Maidan until the second part of February 2014. Every attack protesters evoked more protests. The leaders of the opposition – Oleh Tyahnybok, Vitaly Klitchko and Arseniy Yatseniuk – tried to launch negotiations with the powers that be, but the idea was not well received even among the protesters because they distrusted the political parties. Three European mediators attempted negotiations with Yanukovych, but instead of compromise, on February 20 they learned of a tragedy: about 100 protesters were killed. Infuriated protesters doubled their efforts, and on 22 of February Yanukovych ignominiously fled the capital. Olexander Turchynov became the Deputy President and the Constitution of 2004 was restored.

After Euromaidan in Kyiv, there were separatist riots in the Ukrainian regions in the east and south. In Kharkiv, Sevastopol and Simferopol there were attempts to seize state buildings. In Crimea the separatists seized the Crimean Parliament and other state buildings. On March 1, 2014, the Russian Federation officially agreed to use regular Russian troops to annex Crimea. After the seizure of state buildings and Ukrainian military units, on March 16 a referendum on joining Russia was conducted in Crimea. In April 2016, separatist forces, largely believed to have come directly from Russia, occupied Slov'iansk and Kramatorsk cities, and in a few weeks, Donetsk and Luhansk. The war in the east raged. By September 2016 Ukraine had lost the lives of 2700 members of the military; altogether, the war took the lives of nearly 8000 and 1.5 million people fled the region.

On May 25, 2014 extraordinary presidential elections were held in Ukraine and Petro Poroshenko won. On October 26, 2014 extraordinary parliamentary elections were held and resulted in the creation of a coalitional government headed by Arseniy Yatseniuk. The Party of the Regions, after its leading figures followed Yanukovych to Russia, reorganized itself into the Opposition bloc and earned about 10 percent of the vote. The new government had to conduct important reforms of social provision, national security, state trade and against corruption. By the February 2016 no crimes of the security forces committed on the Maidan had been investigated and no initiator prosecuted.
REFERENCES


Mostova, Yuliia. 2010. “Viktor Yanukovich perestal putat’ svoio s obschestvennym I poschital vsio svoim. [Viktor Yanukowych stopped to confuse private and public and deined everything as his private].” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, October 01.


Vysotskii, Oleksander. 2013. “Legitymatsiini tekhnologii politychnyk
syl v Ukraini ta jikh rezultatyvnist’ u zdobutti pidtrymky suspištva
na parlaments’kykh vyborakh 2012 r. [The Legitimating Technolo-
gies of Political Forces in Ukraine and their Performance in Obtaining
Public Support in the 2012 Parliamentary Elections].” Pp. 194–210 in
Parlaments’ki vybori 2012 r. v Ukraini [Parliamentarian Elections in
Ukraine 2012], edited by Yuriy Levenets’. Kyiv:Instytut politychnych i et-
nonatsionalnych doclidzh im.I.Kurasa.
racy. 16(2): 131–145.
Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/
Chapter eight


Nika Palaguta and Anna Kurowicka

The previous chapter presented a broad overview of politics in Ukraine from 1917 to the present as context for this chapter on Ukraine’s post-Independence electoral history. We present details of the electoral laws, election outcomes, and political parties in Ukraine from 1990 to 2014. The information on the results of elections, legislation and ideological positions of parties was taken from academic journal articles, publicly available government sources and webpages of political parties.

INDEPENDENCE

The leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was legally binding in the USSR. In practice, it meant that the Communist Party was the only party in power. When the Soviet Union collapsed, former members of the Communist elite had more access to political and economic decision-making than newly emerged organizations and parties. Ukrainian nationalists and independent forces had great difficulties in obtaining mass support. Leonid Kravchuk, a chairman of the Parliament, was in favor of making a compromise with sovereignty-oriented movements, as he assumed that a rebuild of the USSR was unlikely. In the early 1990s, the Communist party was banned for a short period of time, but old members of the elite became members of the parties with new names. When the Communist Party reemerged, even without the backing of the now defunct USSR, it gained significant support.
As a result of relative political liberalization, a significant number of new parties were registered. There were parties with ideological orientation, both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian, that failed to share common ideas, and there were a various little parties with little influence. During Soviet times, the voting electorate was not obliged to make serious political decisions. It now faced an astonishing array of choices, especially taking into consideration that, immediately after independence was proclaimed, significantly less information on political parties was available. While in the beginning of independence, there were a lot of small parties, and because it was understood that small parties cannot win large support, by the mid-1990s there could already be seen a tendency to merge and group. The names of political parties tended to change from election to election (a problem that persists to this day), thus the ordinary citizen was confused with splits, unifications, and the creation of new parties. The ‘lifecycle’ of a political force or any politician could be rather short as political opponents were swept away unscrupulously, frequently via administrative force. The impotence of parties manifested itself in the popularity and charisma of party leaders. By 2000, the tendency towards a division between the power elite and the opposition became apparent.

**ELECTORAL LAWS**

The parliamentary Elections of 1990 were held under the “Ukrainian Socialist Republic’s Law on the elections of the members of the Parliament of Ukrainian SSR” of 1988. Members of the Parliament had to be elected according to the majority system in 450 electoral districts (Law of Ukrainian SSR № 8304-XI). The Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council – Parliament), elected in the Ukrainian SSR in 1990 was recognized as that of independent Ukraine and continued its work until new, early elections in 1994.

1 Constant rebranding impedes clear classification of parties: e.g. the People-Democratic party of Ukrainian Patriots used to be the Liberal-Democratic party of Ukrainian Patriots and before that the Party for Rehabilitation of Ukrainian People, which had the Party for Rehabilitation of the Gravely Ill as a core; Party “United Center” used to be the Party of Private Property, and so on (Karamazina 2012).
The law of 1989 was substituted by another one, the “Ukrainian law on elections of the members of the Parliament of Ukraine,” in 1993. The majoritarian system was kept: 450 MPs must have been elected by absolute majority. Minimum turnout had to be 50 percent. The law also changed a mechanism of parties’ registration to a more complicated one. The term of the Verkhovna Rada was limited from five years to four years. Political parties, citizens and worker’ collectives gained the right to nominate candidates. Finally, the electoral minimum age was raised from 21 to 25, with a provision that the candidate had to have lived in Ukraine for a minimum of two years (Law of Ukraine № 3623-XII).

In 1990, the alliance of many opposition parties, the Democratic Bloc, won about 25 percent of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada. Five political blocs began to form after this election (Wilson and Bilous 1993).

The ultra-nationalist bloc, consisting of the Union of Independent Ukraine Youth, the Federation for Ukrainian Statehood, plus some other groups, stood for the priority of national interests, a strong state and armed forces. The national-democratic bloc included the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), and the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), and was a conservative, Christian-democratic bloc supporting national statehood and private property. The liberal-democratic bloc, including the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, and the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, as well as some business structures, supported good relations with Russia and experienced internal conflicts about of pro-market positions. The state-bureaucratic bloc, the so-called “party of power,” was an ex-Communist bloc led by President Leonid Kravchuk. It supported the national cause and lacked formal party structure after the temporary banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine (the CPU). The Socialist Bloc, comprising the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Peasant’s Party of Ukraine, was in favor of state control and against economic liberalization.

Due to legal conditions, the outcome of the elections was an incomplete Parliament. In the first round only 49 seats were filled, in the second round a further 289. Thirty constituencies remained deputy-less for the entire duration of the term. The Parliament could not work having only two-thirds of MPs elected, thus elections continued until April 1997.
The problems the country faced in 1994 were taken into account in a new 1997 electoral law. The system of elections was changed from a majority to a mixed one. 225 MPs were elected from the parties’ lists and 225 in one-seat electoral districts by a simple majority of voters. As for the turnout, the rule of obligatory participation was cancelled. The threshold to enter the Parliament was set at four percent (Law of Ukraine № 541/97-BP). Such a system was particularly suitable for big parties, as the size of the districts was big enough that candidates with strong party support and significant assets could hope to be elected (Shveda 2009). Seats were distributed by the Method of Largest Remaining. The other half of the seats was filled in single member districts in a single-round plurality vote. In 2002 the proportional-majority system was retained (Law of Ukraine № 2766-III).

Unlike the early 1990s, by the 1998 Parliamentary Elections there were already several large parties that could gain serious support of voters. Thus, the major political parties that entered the 1998 Parliament were: the CPU (the Communist Party of Ukraine), the “Rukh” (NRU – the People’s Movement), the “Hromada” party, the “Green Party,” the SPU (Socialist Party of Ukraine) together with the Peasant Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party (in 2002 a part of Natalia Vitrenko’s Bloc), the SDPU(u) (the Social-Democratic party (united), the PDP (People Democratic Party). In 2002, the PDP became a part of the Bloc “For United Ukraine” and were also competing with two more major forces the “Nasha Ukraina” Bloc and BYT (the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko).

POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE, 1990–2002

In this initial period of Independence there could be seen a certain ideological division between major Ukrainian political parties, which can be roughly grouped into two categories: communists/socialists/social-democrats and national-democrats.

One of the first big left-wing parties in post-Soviet Ukraine was the Socialist party of Ukraine (SPU) led by Oleksandr Moroz, who was a former secretary of the Parliament responsible for agriculture. It was founded in 1991 as a response to banning of the Communist Party. Naturally, the party included many former Communist Party members.
The main narrative of the party was a firm loyalty to building socialism and the protection of the working class. Internal discipline (with occasional splits) and a wide regional network, together with party newspapers, were the SPU’s main assets (Mostovaya and Rahmanin 2002).

In 1994, the SPU had 18 MPs from and Moroz himself became the head of the Parliament (Bilecki and Pogrebinski 1997). By 1994, the SPU faced a serious problem: the Communist Party was made legal again and many members of the SPU left to join them. A comfortable niche for Marxist-Communist advocates was occupied again. Thus, Moroz started to reorient his party to a Ukrainian-specific socialism, leaving nostalgia for the the USSR to the CPU. The SPU now proposed to create a socialist state inside Ukraine. By 1997, the party was firmly social-democratic. Those who held more radical positions were excluded. Among them was Natalia Vitrenko, the future leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and Natalia Vitrenko’s Bloc (that pulled off the votes of SPU and stigmatized Moroz in 1998, and all opposition in 2002 as Western/oligarchic/capitalist agents). Moroz and Kuchma (Ukrainian President, elected in 1994) had different points of view on state building. Kuchma always wished be granted to more power to the President, but Moroz opposed it. The SPU leader stood as a candidate for the Presidency several times, but lost every time (Mostovaya and Rahmanin 2002).

In 1997, the SPU created a coalition with the SelPU – the Peasant Party of Ukraine – currently a non-active party, which represented the interests of former collective households; its electorate mostly consisted of peasants. Officially it proclaimed protection of peasants as its main goal, practically it was mostly visible during elections (Golobutski et al 1996). Together these parties entered the Parliament with 8.55 percent of the vote.

Moroz was counting on being the head of the Parliament after the elections, but this did not happen and Moroz started to criticize Kuchma openly. In 2000 he publicized the Gongadze murder, also known as the “cassette scandal”\(^2\) and a political movement “Ukraine without Kuchma,” in which many well-known political figures took part: Yulia Tymoshenko, Levko Lukianienko, Taras Chornovil, Levko Lukianienko, Taras Chornovil,

---

\(^2\) A cassette presumably contained a record of a dialog between Kuchma, the head of the President administration Lytvyn, and Minister of Internal Affairs Kravchenko, all plotting an assassination of journalist Gongadze.
Aleksandr Turchinov, and Stepan Khmara, among others (Mostovaya and Rahmanin 2002). After the cassette scandal, which was received rather passively by the population, the SPU had a hard fight for the electorate. In addition Moroz became not only a political opponent, but a personal enemy of Kuchma.

Despite obstacles, the SPU entered the Parliament in 2002 with 6.87 percent of the vote. One of the main competitors and occasional ally of the SPU reemerged in 1993 under the name of the Communist Party of Ukraine (as distinct from the CPSU – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). It was initially registered in 1991, but after the failure of the putsch in Moscow in that year, many party members left. In the same year, the Ukrainian Parliament decided to ban the Communist Party. Reemergence of the CPU was certainly a counterbalance to a rather popular SPU that lost not only votes, but also many party members. Petro Symonenko became the leader of the CPU and he has been the head of the party ever since.

The CPU was very successful during the 1994 election, as a result of which it created numerous groups in the Parliament (84 MPs). In spite of this, the party did not take part in the 1994 Presidential elections. Communists became leaders of parliamentary electoral campaign in 1998 with 24.65 percent. Party rhetoric was focused on criticizing the ruling elite. The CPU did not participate in the anti − Kuchma campaign. By 2002, the party was well-organized and it targeted non-urban dwellers. It won 19.98 percent of the vote and was the second after Yushchenko’s Bloc.

Another major political force of that time was the SDPU(u) – the Social – Democratic Party of Ukraine (United). It had a long and complicated story of creation and dissolution until 1995, when Viktor Medvedchuk, a lawyer and a member of a highly successful business group, became a member of the party council. Some of the most important projects of the group were creation of the Ukrainian Credit Bank and the Closed Corporation “Industrial-Financial concern ‘Slavutich.’” “Slavutich” business interests were vast: oil refining, metallurgy, agriculture, media, etc. Medvedchuk and his companions appeared on the party list for the 1998 parliamentary elections.³ In 1998 the

³ For further information on content of party list of SDPU(u) refer to Central Election Commission of Ukraine.
party gained only 4.1 percent of the vote and 6.27 percent in 2002. Later, in 2002, Medvedchuk became the head of the President's administration and two party members entered the government.

The national-democrats in early 1990 were represented mostly by the party with a catchy name “Rukh” (Movement) – “Narodnyi Rukh Ukraini,” the NRU, which later became a symbol of Ukrainian national-democratic political forces. The NRU regarded itself as a successor to socio-political organizations that existed as an opposition to the Soviet regime: the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, national-democratic unions “Memorial,” “Prosvita,” “Zelenyi svit” association and others. Some of the leaders of the organization and later the party, were well-known dissidents: V’yacheslav Chornovol, Myhailo and Bogdan Goran’, Ivan Dzuba, Lievko Luk’ianenko, and Ivan Drach, among others. The main goal of the party was creation of an independent state of Ukraine. Among other aims, political pluralism, different forms of property, a new constitution that would comply with international norms, freedom of use of national languages and local cultural development, freedom in religious preferences, and legalization of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic church (Bondarenko 2012).

Social activity and the spreading of Ukrainian culture were the first instruments which “Rukh” used to influence society. Rukh frequently used demonstrations, actions of civil disobedience, and the media as instruments to bring attention to the problems the NRU referred to. One of the most famous events was organized by ‘Rukh” on January, 22 1990 to celebrate the Act of Unification of the ZUNR and the UNR and 500 years of Ukrainian Cossacks, including educational events near Berestechko, Baturin, in Lubny and Hotyn (Goncharuk 1997).

Rukh gained a lot of support in the 1990 election. It took 125 seats and became a leading member of the opposition. V’yacheslav Chornovil took part in the presidential elections of 1991 and he lost to Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk instead invited Rukh to support his policy. Chornovil and his allies refused the offer, but many others, including Drach and Goryn agreed (Bondarenko 2012). As a result of

---

4 The UNR (Ukrainian People Republic) – a short lived Republic on some Central, Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine in the beginning of the 20th century. The ZUNR (Western Ukrainian People Republic) – a similar republic, which included Western parts of contemporary Ukrainian territory.
internal struggle in the party, Chornovil gained most of its support. Chornovil died in a car crash in 1999. Before he died, the party went through a split, and a part of it organized a separate party called the “Ukrainski Narodni Rukh” (the Ukrainian National Movement).

Another strong non-left-wing party participating in the 1998 parliamentary elections was “the People’s Democratic Party of Ukraine” (NDP-Narodno-Demokratychna Partiya) with Valerii Pustovoytenko (a Prime Minister) as head of the party. The PDP was largely a pro- Presidential party, but just before the elections it experienced a split as some members, led by Matvienko, came up with new conditions in exchange for the support. The PDP won 5.01 percent, which was not good enough for a party including so many representatives of the power elite. For the parliamentary elections in 2002, the PDP became a part of “For United Ukraine” Bloc (Za Iedynu Ukrainu – Za EdU) that also included the “Labor Ukraine” (Sergii Tigipko), the Party of the Regions (Mykola (rus. Nikolai) Azarov), the Agrarian Party and the Party of Entrepreneurs and Manufacturers (Anatolii Kinakh). Number one on the Bloc list was Vladimir Lytvyn, a head of the Presidential Administration. Sergii Tigipko, the head of the “Labor Ukraine,” was a former Minister of the Economy.

The Party of the Regions was not monolithic, as it was constructed in 2000 from “Solidarnist’” (Solidarity) (Petro Poroshenko), “For Beautiful Ukraine” (Leonid Chernovetski), “the Party of Regional Resurrection” (Vladimir Rybak), “the Party of Labor” (Valentin Landyk), and the “All-Ukrainian Party for Pensioners Protection” (Genadii Samofalov). In order to strengthen the party it also engaged the support of Donetsk Governor Yanukovitch and oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov, Sergii Liovochkin, and Sergii Taruta, among others. Due to skillful politics, the Party of the Regions soon had subdivisions in all regions of the country. Generally, this party was always open about protecting interests of the business elite. It is remarkable, that the majority of the parties united into the Party of the Regions were representatives of the interests of the Eastern and Southern business elite and many of them were connected by common business interests (Karamazina 2012; Bala et al 2006). “Solidarnist’” left the Party of the Regions and became a part of the “Nasha Ukraina” Bloc. The Party of the Regions itself could have become a part of it, but negotiations were unsuccessful. The strong side of the “For United Ukraine” Bloc, were certainly its
members, experienced politicians and business professionals, but it was also its shortcoming, as a lot of them had their conflicts in the past over political interests or business. The party had a wide range of local subdivisions and as an openly pro-presidential bloc with large administrative resources. As for political advertisements, the party had plenty of air time on the STB and the ICTV TV channels.

The Party of the Regions won nearly 12 percent and came in third after “Nasha Ukraina” and the CPU. Most of the votes were gained in the East, especially in Donetsk region, where competitors had little chance to win.

There were two national-democratic forces that appeared in the elections of 2002: the “Nasha Ukraina” Bloc (Our-Ukraine) and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) (Block Yuliï Tymoschenko). They had less ideological attachment to their programmes than their predecessors. Instead, they stood in opposition to pro-government forces and represented the emerging opposition to the business elite.

“Nasha Ukraina” had a number of founders: the NRU (“Rukh”), the UNR (“Ukrainski Narodni Rukh”), the “Reforms and Order” Party, Solidarity (“Solidarnist’”), “Go, Ukraine!” (led by Viktor Musiaka), the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (CUN), the Liberal Party of Ukraine, the Youth Party of Ukraine, the Republican-Christian Party of Ukraine and the Christian People’s Union (Bala et al 2006). The “Reforms and Order” party was founded just before the elections of 1998. The party as a whole did not enter the Rada, though four members of the party, including the leader Viktor Pinzenyk, won in single-seat electoral districts. The list of members was not very homogeneous. It included politicians and former members of other parties and business professionals who more and less right oriented. That is why from the very beginning it was hard to keep the Bloc together. The leader of “Nasha Ukraina” was Victor Yushchenko. He became especially popular as he was actively criticized by the power elite and was disliked by the President (although Yushchenko did not confront Kuchma openly).

The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) was named after its leader Yulia Tymoshenko, who came into politics with ex-Vice Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and was one of the top managers of the corporation “United Energy Systems” (Iedyni Energetychni Systemy). When Tymoshenko came to Kiev she was one of the founders of the
party “Hromada” for the parliamentary elections. Tymoshenko and Turchinov left the party and created a new one called VO “Batkivshchyna” (All-Ukrainian Union ‘Fatherland’), and due to a conflict with Kuchma, Lazarenko soon had to leave Ukraine. In 1999, Tymoshenko became a Vice-Prime Minister (the Prime Minister was Yushchenko). After the “cassette scandal,” Moroz, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko decided to enter the Parliament separately. The BYT emerged as a union of VO “Batkivshchyna,” the “Sobor” party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party. The party included several powerful business professionals and made a special effort to promote itself and its leader in the media (Bala et al 2006). BYT won 7.26 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections of 2002.

Another big player in the Ukrainian political arena of the 1990s was the “Green Party.” It was formed from the organization “Zelenyi Svit” (Green World) in 1991 that proclaimed a need for ecological vigilance. But members of the party (then MPs) represented corporate business interests above all else: Vasyl’ii Khmielnitski – a head of “Zaporizhstal” (Steel of Zaporozhje) – a metallurgy giant and “Zaporizhoblen-ergo” (energy supply in Zaporozhje region); Sergii Krivosheia the head of administration board of “Ukrinbank”, Sergii Rys’ – president of oil company “Shelton” and the head of the administration council of “Ukrinbank”, and Igor Kirushin – “Shelton” vice-president; Oleg Polishchuk – assistant director of administration board of “Kirovograd-niefteprodukt” (“Oil products of Kirovograd”), to name a few.

The secret of the “Green Party’s” success (5.43 percent of the vote in 1998) was that it was well financed with a well-managed campaign and the party leader, Vitalii Kononov’s, ability to manage complicated relations with party members. It mainly targeted young people; many party members were young. Another way to attract votes was to collaborate with famous people and organize music concerts. Vitalii Kononov himself was one of the founders of the popular singing festival “Chervona Ruta” (Rahmanin 2002).

In 2002, the “Green Party” decided not to put on music concerts anymore, but to concentrate on colorful advertisements in the streets and on television. The main idea promoted by the party was to think about the future. It thus referred to both young people and their parents (Rahmanin 2002). At this time, the party faced some hardships as it had to cope with the fact that Vasyl’ii Khmielnitski had
founded his own party “Zinki za maibutnie” (Women for the Future). “Zinki za Maibutnie” turned out to be slightly more successful in 2002 than the “Green Party” with 2.11 percent of the vote, but it did not allow them to enter the Rada. The “Green Party” only won 1.3 percent of the vote.

Summary of the 1990s

The Parliamentary Elections in 1998 contained a reemergent the CPU, pro-President parties (the PDP and largely the “Green Party”, and Vitrenko’s Bloc), anti-President parties (Socialists, led by Moroz, Pavlo Lazarenko’s “Hromada”) and the SDPU(u), with former President Kravchuk holding first place on the party list. In 2002, two major groups crystallized: a pro-Presidential group (composed of a “For United Ukraine” Bloc, a semi-independent the CPU, an anti-SPU Vitrenko Bloc, and a self-sufficient SDPU(u)), and an opposition (“Nasha Ukraina Bloc,” the head of which made an effort not to be seen as oppositional, the BYT and the SPU). By the end of the 2002 the pro-Presidential and the oppositional groups had split the elections (38 percent to 37 percent).

The main tendencies of this period can be described as follows. By 2002, a group of big, powerful parties came to power, and their power was assured by manipulating elections; the national-democratic forces lost power, parties with entrepreneurial interests developed, financial-industrial groups formed. Access to power became more likely through the party system. Parties started to become attached to business groups, but official party actions were designed to convince the electorate that they were independent from business interests (Moroko 2012).

ELECTORAL POLITICS IN THE 2000s

Electoral laws were changed to fit the needs of the elite and to reassure corporate business interests. A proportional system was introduced for the parliamentary elections. This helped to promote clandestine deals, including but not limited to the buying and selling of places on the party list. The later return to a proportional majority system did not
change essential problems, such as the dependence of the party on the leader's charisma, or that the un-promoted section of the party lists was intended to reassure the interests of business groups (Valevski 2012).

The next parliamentary elections were held after the presidential elections of 2004, i.e. after the “Orange Revolution,” through which Victor Yushchenko became President. The political landscape of Ukraine changed significantly. Political parties started to form even bigger entities called “Blocs” that were organized not on ideological grounds, but according to the interests of the business groups that they represented.

“Orange Revolution” and After

The conflict between the anti-Kuchma group gathered around “Nasha Ukraina” and came to its climax with the presidential elections of 2004, in which Viktor Yushchenko (“Nasha Ukraina”) faced Kuchma’s successor and Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovych (The Party of the Regions). This Orange Revolution led to a second election won by Viktor Yushchenko and the establishment of a new cabinet under Yulia Tymoshenko, whose bloc had entered an alliance with “Nasha Ukraina” earlier in 2004.

In 2004 a new electoral law was also adopted (later amended in 2005 and first used in the 2006 elections). According to the new law, all 450 deputies were elected in a proportional system in a single nationwide constituency. It was only possible for candidates to run from party or bloc lists; this meant that independent candidates could not run. Further, only parties existing at least one year prior to the elections were able to submit a list and the minimum threshold to enter the Parliament was lowered from four percent to three percent of the vote. The length of term of the Verkhovna Rada was changed from four to five years. The same system was also used in the 2007 preterm elections (Law of Ukraine № 1665-IV).

By the 2006 parliamentary elections, political parties changed significantly. First of all they stopped attempting to be known nationally; one of the signs of which was a diminishing number of party offices in all regions. Many parties did not have them at all. Parties gradually stopped being created for the purpose of developing a national presence. As there is no state funding for political parties, they have
to find sources of financing elsewhere. Luckily for them, there are various interest groups, business among them, with great financial means and a desire to ensure their material interests are represented in the government. The sources of financing of political parties are not officially disclosed, except for the information that occasionally surfaces in the media. Information on the activity of the parties that the Ministry of Justice is supposed to collect is largely unavailable for scholars (Karanzina 2013). Naturally, the more successful the party is, the more expensive it becomes. In order to become successful, parties have to “disguise” their ideology, rebrand, and be prepared to become a part of bigger projects. In addition, parties realized that it is useful to unite into coalitions against a common enemy. This was apparently the case for the “Orange revolution”. The period after the “Orange Revolution” in Ukrainian history became largely known as a period of political crisis as quarrels of party leaders over state power constantly interrupted the work of the government. Under such circumstances Ukraine came to the 2006 parliamentary election.

With Yushchenko and Poroshenko on one side and Tymoshenko on the other, they could not create one Bloc. The third main rival was the Party of the Regions that gained some popularity because “The Orange” failed to coordinate its actions. The CPU and the SPU had their own electorate. Volodymyr Lytvyn joined the race with his own force, the “People Lytvyn’s Bloc.” Natalia Vitrenko, as well, rebranded to “Natalia Vitrenko’s Bloc “People’s opposition.” As a result of the parliamentary elections in 2006, the Party of the Regions won 32.14 percent of the vote, BYT – 22.29 percent, “Nasha Ukraina” – 13.95 percent, SPU – 5.69 percent, the CPU – 3.66 percent, Vitrenko – 2.93 percent, Lytvyn – 2.44 percent.

Immediately after the elections, the coalition between the BYT, “Nasha Ukraina” and the SPU was announced. But the stumbling block was the position of the head of the Parliament. Meanwhile, the Party of the Regions had to pave its own way. The SPU became dissatisfied, and it was announced that a coalition will be formed by The Party of the Regions, the CPU and the SPU. The gap between the Eastern and the Western Electorates widened. The ruling coalition now covered the electorate of the East and the BYT and “Nasha Ukraina” were supported in the West. This division was the subject of extensive political speculations. Moroz became a Head of the Parliament and a leader
of the Party of the Regions – Victor Yanukovitch – became Prime Minister. The coalition failed and Yushchenko decided to schedule early elections. The Rada tried to oppose the dissolution, and the rest of the coalition gathered protesters on the streets. New parliamentary elections were scheduled and took place in 2007.

For the early parliamentary elections in 2007, Yushchenko united several parties into a larger Bloc, called “Nasha Ukraina – Narodna Samooborona” (Our – Ukraine – Self Defense), which also proclaimed that in the event of success it would form a democratic coalition with BYT (Karamazina 2012). The BYT, which included VO “Bat’kivshchyna” and the “Ukrainian Social-Democratic party” (V.Korniichuk) now was joined by the party “Reforms and Order” (Karamazina 2012). In the early elections to the Parliament in 2007, the Party of the Regions won 34.37 percent, the BYT – 30.71 percent, the “NU-Ns” – 14.5 percent of the vote, the CPU – 5.39 percent, Lytvyn’s Bloc – 3.96 and the SPU – 2.86 percent.

Finally, “Nasha Ukraina” and the BYT and Lytvyn’s Bloc managed to form a coalition, with Tymoshenko as a Prime Minister, and Lytvyn as Head of the Parliament. The period of Tymoshenko as a Prime minister was especially memorable for the financial crisis and “gas war” with Russia and also as a period of formation of a geographically polarized society. Politicians were aware of the existence of some regional differences and deliberately used them as a wedge to attract votes (Yakymenko 2010). By the time of the presidential elections of 2010, Yushchenko was not widely supported and he lost the election. The main struggle was between Tymoshenko and Yanukovich. Yanukovich won with 48.95 percent to Tymoshenko’s 45.47 percent. Yanukovich returned to presidential power and his chief rival, Tymoshenko, was quickly accused of illegal activity stemming from the “gas war,” and sentenced to jail.

The Party of the Regions became very influential in the Parliament and it had allies. In the 2006 and 2007 Elections, the Party of the Regions’ list consisted of numerous business professionals and well-known politicians including Rinat Akhmetov (a business professional, a head of the SCM Group active in the coal mining, steel-making, and energy industries), Boris Kolesnikov (a business professional), Andrei Kluev (an experienced politician), and Jukhym Zviagilski and Volodymyr Rybak were still there. The head of the party was Victor Yanukovich.
There was also another group of influence inside the party, the so-called RUE group\(^5\). The RUE group was practically not seen on the list but the group remained strong in the Rada and in government. Yurii Boiko had the position of Minister of Energy and Mining in Azarov’s government, Liovochkin was a head of Yanukovich administration. Akhmetov also kept strong positions\(^6\).

The Party of the Regions was accompanied by so called “technical parties,” which would allow them to have “their” people in committees subdivisions (among them: “Russian Unity”, “The Russian Bloc”, “Rus’ Jedyna”, “Zelena Planeta” (Green Planet), “People Labor Union”, The Liberal Party of Ukraine, The Union of Anarchists of Ukraine, and “Bratstvo” of Dmytro Korchinski). Direct and indirect buying of votes was not a rare thing; electoral shenanigans included giving away food, paying money for votes, “charity” actions charged to the budget with the names of the appropriate candidate made obvious, registration of the deceased, and making workers of state enterprises to register as members of the party. Many candidates in local elections engaged in party switching in order to win. The Party of the Regions also merged with Sergii Tigipko’s smaller “Sylna Ukraina.” As for competitors, The Party of the Regions had at it disposal a number of parties that were intended either to pull votes away from the opposition or discredit it. Information about parties was conveyed not only through state controlled media, but also through indirect party (or candidate) promotion: billboards which would announce charity activities of representatives of the party, putting forward symbols of the party, and constant promotion of positive achievements of the party (UNAS 2013). In the 2012 Parliamentary Elections, the Party of the Regions won 30 percent of votes.

Oligarchization of political parties was on the rise. As for The Party of the Regions, Yanukovitch took a lot of power, but had to cope with other oligarchs and influence groups. His strategy was to diminish the possibility of conflict among them by increasing the risk to them in case of disobedience (D’Anieri 2012).

\(^5\)“RUE (RosUkrEnergo) group” usually refers to three influential politicians and business professionals: former Vice – Prime Minister Yurii Boiko, former head of President Yanukovich’s administration, Sergii Liovochkin, and Dmytro Firtash, an official head of DF Group.

\(^6\)For further information refer to the Central Election Commission of Ukraine on the Parliamentary Elections 2012 for the List of the Party of the Regions.
In this period of success the Party of the Regions allied with the CPU, which by 2012 was not as popular as it used to be back in the 1990s. The CPU felt threatened, and it protested against raising the threshold to enter the Parliament to five percent. In 2011, the CPU launched a campaign against the Party of the Regions itself (UNAS 2013). Eventually the CPU ended the race with 13.18 percent of the vote.

The Parliamentary Elections of 2012 brought a surprising success to VO “Svoboda” (the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”), a radical nationalist party that won 10.44 percent of the vote. The list of the party did not sport known names, except for the leader Oleg Tiahnybok, who was famous for his racist speech in “support” of candidate Yushchenko in 2004. VO “Svoboda” is a rebranded Socialist-Nationalist party of Ukraine that initially consisted of different small organizations and was created and oriented towards the electorate in Ukrainian Galicia. Although based on the party ideology of its previous incarnation, its new leaders claimed it to be less closed and radical than the previous one. For instance, the SNPU rejected alliances with parties of slightly different ideologies and did not allow former communists and atheists to join. The new VO “Svoboda” insisted on political alliances with the likeminded (Iovenko 2015). “Svoboda” changed its image and claimed it wished for the triumph of the idea of the nation, and of “Ukrainians in Ukraine.” Their party programme does not specifically indicate that the party dislikes other nations; on the contrary, they perceive them as friendly, as long as they share the same ideas as their party does. They have no identifiable economic policy. They perceive religion as very important, have a desire to ban abortions and to allow open carrying of weapons (VO “Svoboda” Programme). Radical “patriots” from “Svoboda” did not improve the image of supposed national-democrats from “Batkivshchyna.” As for “Svoboda” itself, unlike many other Ukrainian parties, there might be good reason to talk about their ideology, not necessarily because it is shared by all party members, but because it can be shared by the voters and young activists.

The Party list of VO “Batkivshchyna,” led by Arsenii Yatsenyuk instead of the imprisoned Tymoshenko, included both old Tymoshenko allies and newcomers from Yatsenyuk’s party. Number one on the list was Yatsenyuk. Unity with Yatsenyuk’s party was not easy to achieve, as Yatsenyuk, being an ambitious person, was interested in making himself visible, and “Batkivshchyna” was a good instrument,
as it was more influential than his own “Front Zmin” (the Front of Changes). They were joined by other parties and formed a united opposition, and the brand of “Batkivshchyna” was put forward as it was the most recognizable (UNAS 2013).

Another pro-democratic opposition party was Vitalii Klichko’s UDAR Party (the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms) created in 2010. By 2012, when the new parliamentary elections were to be held, the list of the party consisted of rather different personalities. The UDAR strongly insisted on a party image as young, democratic and dynamic with a pro-European orientation. Although the list of party members may not leave such an impression, the programme certainly does. Vitalii Klichko was a good face for the campaign, as the country knew him as a very successful boxer. The party won 13.96 percent of the vote.

In the 2012 Elections the mixed voting system was used: 225 seats were filled in SMDs and 225 from party lists by proportional representation; that is the same system that was used in 1998 and 2002. The threshold for submitting party lists was five percent. The length of the parliamentary term continued to be set at five years.

There were two major political changes at this time. First was the representation of financial-industrial groups (FIGs). FIGs became heavily involved into Ukrainian political life and invested in political parties. They might not be present themselves on the party lists, but they could influence the behavior of politicians. Another major change was a division of votes by regional criteria. Now there was a group of the Party of the Regions (consisting of different groups of interest) that had its main electorate in the East where it competed with the CPU and VO “Svoboda.” Two parties were rather popular in the West: the center-right VO “Batkivshchyna” and the centrist UDAR.

MAIDAN, WAR, AND THE 2014 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

In 2013, the government was engaged in active preparations to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, expected at the Vilnius Summit in November of that year. A week before the event, the government announced that it would not sign the agreement. This triggered protest
events throughout Ukraine known as the Maidan, or the Revolution of Dignity. In late February 2014, men in military uniforms that apparently were allied with Russia (or, as is widely suspected, were Russian troops) began taking over state buildings and military installations throughout Crimea. On March 1, the Russian Federal Assembly granted President Putin the right to use the Russian army in Crimea and later that month, the newly-proclaimed Crimean Republic became a part of Russia. Meanwhile, a civil war emerged in the eastern region of Ukraine that involved the Ukrainian military.

The Parliamentary Elections of October 2014 in Ukraine were held during a war. Crimea was already officially a part of the Russian Federation, according to Russian law, and a so called “antiterrorist operation,” launched in the spring in eastern Ukraine, continued. The elections were also peculiar from the point of view of the internal political environment. The new Ukrainian government was trying to ban the Communist Party that had enjoyed stable support since the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in the east of the country and had collaborated closely with the previous regime. Despite this opposition, the CPU was registered by the Central Election Commission. New faces and new parties emerged. Many of the newly emerged candidates for parliamentary seats were so-called civil activists.

There were 29 parties registered for parliamentary elections in 2014. The former power elite were represented by the Opposition Bloc. The names on the party list were recognizable and well known and they were mainly former Party of the Regions members. Sergii Tigipko left the party and recreated his own project “Sylna Ukraina” (Strong Ukraine). Yanukovich’s group was excluded, at least partially. The Opposition Bloc gained 9.43 percent of the vote in the election. It could not form a coalition and thus it stayed in opposition in the Rada.

The former opposition included VO “Batkivschyna”, Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc and the “Narodniy Front”. VO “Batkivschyna” was headed again by Yulia Tymoshenko.

A former Tymoshenko ally, Yatsenyuk, founded the “Narodniy Front” party and incorporated many civil activists: Tatyana Chernovol (a journalist, who, according to the official version was attacked by the representatives of Yanukovych for her critical articles), Yuriy Bereza, a head of the “Dnepr-1” battalion and Dmytro Tymchuk, a head of the news outlet “Information resistance.” “Narodniy Front’s” aggressive
narrative found much support, and the party gained 22.14 percent of the vote and ended the race with the best result, somewhat ahead of its main competitor Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc.

Petro Poroshenko formed Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc. As it is stated on the official webpage, it was created on the foundation of the previously existing party “Solidarist” and Vitalii Klichko’s “UDAR” party. Thus, the party is composed of many well-known politicians, such as Yurii Lutsenko, an ex-Minister of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Groisman, an former mayor of the city of Vinnitsa, Mustafa Dzjemilev, a head of Tatar medzhilis in Crimea, Irina Geraschenko, former press secretary of President Yuschenko, and Sergej Kvit, a minister of education, former rector of Kyiv-Mohila Academy, among others. There are also some very well-known journalists, writers, and celebrities: Mustafa Nayyem, who became famous during Maidan 2013/2014 (sometimes he is even named as the person whose Facebook post started the Maidan), Sergij Leshchenko, Nayyem’s colleague and co-worker on the television channel Gromadke.tv, Maria Matios, a writer, and Oksana Bilozir, a singer. Poroshenko’s Bloc lost a lot of votes to “Narodnyi Front,” which took a more intolerant and radical position, but it gained 21.82 percent of the vote.

In order to encourage people to vote for the party, Tymoshenko chose the image of a strong woman. She campaigned with a second woman whom Tymoshenko “generously” let have the first place on the list, Nadiya Savchenko, a Ukrainian pilot, who has been kept as a captive in a Russian jail after she was captured in Eastern Ukraine. A name “Nadiya” in Ukrainian also means “hope,” which made it a good instrument for the political campaign. Support Nadiya = Support Hope became one of the slogans of VO “Bat’kivschyna.” Together their party entered the Parliament with 5.68 percent of the vote.

Right Wing Parties

As for the right wing parties, VO “Svoboda” (the All-Ukrainian union “Svoboda”) failed to attract new votes because of its campaign during the Maidan. It lost a lot of votes because of many competitors, old and new. The party gained 4.71 percent of the vote and thus (according to the law, which indicates a minimum threshold of five percent), did not
enter into the Parliament. Six members of the party were elected in single-member electoral districts.

Among VO “Svoboda’s” new competitors, the “Samopomich” (“Self-Reliance”) Union (Ob`jednannya Samopomich) is prominent. Andriy Sadovyi, the mayor of Lviv, became the face of the party, whereas he himself was number 50 on the party list. Another attraction of the party was Semen Semenchenko, number two on the list, who became known for being the head of the so-called “Donbass” battalion. The party also had several civil activists such as Hanna Hopko and Iegor Soboliev. The party itself emerged in 2004, first as a civil union. The aim of the union was to increase the level of education of the citizens, and volunteers’ organizations, and popularize a healthy way of life. Sadovyi turned his organization into the party in 2012 (“Samopomich” [“Self-Reliance”] Union). In 2014 the main idea was to show the party as a real union of civil activists. Their idea is that each person, by banding together with other people, can improve the situation in the country, throw out the old corrupt elite, and vote in honest leaders. Thus the image created by the party coincided with social demands, especially because of civil activity during the Maidan 2013–2014. Due to successful promotion, the “Samopomich” Union became popular very fast and gained 10.97 percent of the vote. The programme of the party proclaims Ukraine as a place for peaceful co-existence of all nations, as long as everybody is Ukrainian. As a creation of the 2014 parliamentary elections, Samopomich reminds voters about the duty of every citizen to protect the country and expresses the need for a so-called “new military doctrine” (“Samopomich” [“Self-Reliance”] Union. Programme).

“Pravyy Sektor” (the “Right Sector”) became popular on Russian state controlled TV channels that pictured it as a fascist group, but it gained only 1.8 percent of the vote. Their party programme and activity can be characterized as radical nationalist. Neither democratic values nor state building are the party’s primary concern. The most important is the nation, as well as cooperation with Ukraine’s traditional (in the 19th Century sense) neighbors: Poland, Lithuania and Sweden. Right Sector argues for the necessity preservation of religion, and that religiosity will guide Ukrainians to fight ‘Satan’s helpers’ (an exclusive the Right Sector metaphor to describe some citizens of the Russian Federation) (Pravyy Sector Programme). The Right Sector emerged as
a result of the unification of several organizations, which had existed before, mainly the VO “Tryzub” (the all-Ukrainian union “Tryzub”), the UNA-UNSO and a football fans’ organization “Bilyi Molot” (“The White Hammer”). Their party leader, Dmytro Yarosh was elected to the Rada in a single-seat electoral district. Another party member, Borislav Bereza, was elected, but he was not assigned to the party itself.

Oleh Liasho’s Radical Party was built entirely on the image of the head of the party as a relentless fighter against separatism. The main instrument they chose for the party’s promotion were numerous videos on YouTube, where Liashko himself interrogated “terrorists”/ “separatists,” whom he “had just caught” and a numerous videos of him at the frontline. The list of the party includes military activists (a leader of “Aidar” Sergii Meilnichuk, was later excluded), and some business professionals. The programme of the party did not bring a coherent policy, but did have slogans and proclamations. The party did surprisingly well during the elections. It gained 7.44 percent of the vote, mostly in Chernihiv region (Liashko comes from Chernihiv region), but also in some eastern parts of the country.

After the events of 2013–2014 in Ukraine, some new political forces emerged, but this did not change the fundamental functioning of political parties, namely regionalism and their dependence on business groups. It also became apparent that citizens are regarded as a resource to legitimize power.

REFERENCES


kaya_partiya_ukrainy.html]. Internet Archive. [https://web.archive.org/web/20160511120030/http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/ukraina_partiynaya_chast_v_sotsialistiche-
kaya_partiya_ukrainy.html].


Official WebPages and Documents:


Chapter nine

A Brief Electoral History of Poland, 1985–2015

Marcin Ślarzyński, Anna Kurowicka, and Nika Palaguta

Electoral Laws Since 1985

The electoral law that was in force in Poland 1985 was in many respects similar to procedures functioning throughout the whole period of The People’s Poland (Polska Ludowa). The latter term refers to the time between 1944 and 1989 but was not an official name of the Polish state then: in the period 1944–1952, i.e., from the proclamation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) to the passing of the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic (Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej), the official term was “the Republic of Poland” (Rzeczpospolita), and in 1952–1989 it was the “Polish People’s Republic” (PRL).

The tenth election held in the history of The People’s Poland, like previous ones, could not be called “free.” Voters could not choose between different political programs. In 1985 only the following parties and organizations that had officially accepted the electoral declaration of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) – which was a pro-governmental umbrella organization – could take part in the election: the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), the United People’s Party (ZSL), the PAX Association (Stowarzyszenie „Pax”), the Christian Social Association (ChSS), the Polish Catholic-Social Union (PZKS) and the Alliance of Democrats (SD). On the voivodship level, only organizations that belonged to voivodship units could put forward candidates in specific districts which were equal to
a voivodship or a part of one. The composition of the national list was fully dependent on the decisions of the National Council of PRON which had a big influence also on the voivodship level. In practice, the election had two levels: one of politicians running in particular districts (who would take 410 of the seats in the Sejm) and one of candidates comprising the National List (50 seats). In the first level, the candidates would take part in elections in multi-member districts where two candidates were competing for one seat. Candidates who were elected had to have an absolute majority of votes and in whose districts with a voter turnout of at least 50 percent. In the case of the candidates from the National List, only those standing in districts in which the voter turnout was at least 50 percent could be elected. A rule applicable on both levels was that voters had to cross out candidates for whom they did not want to vote. It was assumed that, if no candidate was crossed out a candidate, the vote was cast for the first candidate on the list.

Since 1989, Poland has had a bicameral legislature: deputies to the Sejm, the lower chamber, are elected in a proportional electoral system, and to the Senate, the higher chamber, in multi-member districts in a plurality voting system. Since 2011 they have been elected in single-member districts. Except for 1989 when in order to win a seat in the Senate a candidate had to gather an absolute majority of votes, a plurality of votes has been required (in 1989 plurality was a condition only in a potential second stage). The Senate was established along with the institution of the Presidency as a result of the Round Table (Okrągły Stół) negotiations in 1989. In the same negotiations, a partially competitive election system was established for the 1989 parliamentary elections. The negotiations over the new electoral law were held mostly between the President (Lech Wałęsa) and the parliament. In the same negotiations, a partially competitive election system was established for the 1989 parliamentary elections.

Electoral regulations were designed to function in the particular period between 1989 and 1993. In comparison to the period of the PRL, they introduced many new elements. Apart from reestablishing the Senat, which had been abolished in 1946, it also established a set of rules related to: (i) the way in which candidates were registered; (ii) voting techniques/mechanisms; (iii) rules for the calculation of the election results; and (iv) electoral district system.
With regard to registration, candidates for the Sejm and Senat could be put forward by political parties (in practice by all political factions that were signatories of PRON), all-Poland social and professional organizations (under the condition of gathering at least 3000 signatures for each candidate) and by groups of at least 3000 voters from a particular electoral district. Furthermore, candidates were put forward separately for each of the seats (there was no limit as to the number of candidates for each seat) in alphabetical order.

Regarding the second new element, a voter, for both Sejm and Senat, had to choose a candidate for each seat (there were from two to five seats in each of the electoral districts for the Sejm, at least one of them had to be reserved for a non-partisan candidate) by crossing off all their rivals and leaving on the list candidates whose number would not be higher than the number of available seats. According to the Round Table agreements, if necessary, there would be two voting rounds. After the first stage only the candidates who received more than 50 percent of the votes would become members of the Parliament. In the second round, if none of the candidates had received an absolute majority of votes, the two with the highest results competed for a particular seat. In the case of the Senat elections, each voivodship was an electoral district, which means that there were 49 of them, each with two seats except for the Warszawski and Katowicki voivodships where voters would choose three candidates. This particular regulation was functioning until 2001.

The first elections organized after the Round Table were completely free only for the Senat: 60 percent (276) of the seats in the Sejm was reserved for the coalition (i.e. the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD), five percent (23) for the members of Christian associations (the PAX Association, the PZKS and the Christian-Social Union [the UChS, earlier the ChSS]), 35 percent (161) for non-partisan candidates. It was also agreed that up to ten percent of the candidates would be elected from the national electoral list, the rest in 108 electoral districts whose borders could not cross voivodship borders.

Since 1991, only electoral committees have been able to register candidates for the elections to the Sejm and Senat. Candidates are not registered individually, but have to be put forward as a part of a particular list. In order for the list to be registered, in 1991–1993 the committees had to gather at least 5000 signatures, and starting from
the elections in 1993 (in 1993–2001), they had to gather at least 3000 signatures. As for the Senat, from 1991 to 2011, in order to take part in the elections, each candidate had to gather at least 3000 signatures of voters living in the given electoral district. In 2011, together with the introduction of single-member districts into the Senat electoral system regulations, the number of signatures was reduced to 2000. In 2011, the gender quota law was introduced, and the number of either women or men cannot comprise less than 35 percent of the total number of candidates for the Sejm registered on a particular list. Citizens vote primarily for the lists and indicate their candidate preference. Both actions are executed by putting “x” next to the candidate’s name.

Three different methods of seat allocation have been used since 1991 as a part of the regulations of the elections to the Sejm: Hare-Niemeyer’s (in 1991), d’Hondt’s (1993, 1997, 2005 and 2007) and a modified Sainte-Lague’s with first divisor equal to 1.4 (2001). In 1991–1993 the requirement for parties to take part in the seat allocation in the Sejm was that they acquire at least five percent of the votes or five seats (the total number of seats was 391) in the district elections. Since 1993, electoral thresholds have been five percent for non-coalition electoral committees and eight percent for coalition committees.

Since 1991, the number of Sejm members elected from each of the electoral districts has been determined by the number of their inhabitants. In 1991–1993 an electoral district was a voivodship, part of a voivodship or a number of voivodships. Since the elections of 1993 voivodship were also electoral districts, except for the two most populous ones: Warszawskie (two districts) and Katowickie (three districts). Since the 2001 elections the area of an electoral district of both the Sejm and Senat has been equal to the area of the whole voivodship or its part with the restriction that it cannot cross powiat borders. According to the Sejm electoral law introduced in 1991, there were 37 electoral districts, and according to the one enacted in 1993, there were 52. Until 2001, a total of 391 Sejm members were elected from the electoral districts and 69 in the all-Poland electoral list. The law of 2001 liquidated the national list and introduced 41 electoral districts in which the total number of 460 Sejm members could be elected. In the Senat elections, the number of districts in the same period was 40. In 2011, however, this number has been changed to 100.
The parliamentary election in 1985 was organized two years after the end of Martial Law. An additional complication was added by Solidarity – which was officially outlawed – that called for a boycott of the election.

The election did not differ from the earlier ones: one can say that they were fake on two levels. On the first level the voters could only vote for one list. The turnouts were nevertheless always very high: from 1961 to 1980 they were not lower than 90 percent, and in most cases they exceeded 95 percent even despite the popular consensus about the purposefulness of the elections, which in 1985 were additionally influenced by Solidarity’s call for a boycott. In this aspect the 1985 election was special since the turnout was officially 78.9 percent. According to the members of the anti-communist underground structures, in reality this number was perhaps 10 percent lower; this showed that the calls for boycott had not been as successful as Solidarity hoped (Ligarski 2014). The second level of deception concerns the fact that the Sejm practically did not have decisive power in the PRL. Its influence on state affairs was secondary to the leadership of the PZPR, specifically the Political Bureau of the PZPR or the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PZPR. Due to the fact that the Sejm was officially voting for laws, candidates for the elections had to be selected by the leadership of the PZPR.

In 1985 the following parties took part in the elections: the PZPR (53.2 percent of the votes), the ZSL (23 percent), (the SD 7.6 percent), the PAX Association (2 percent), the PZKS (1.1 percent) and the UChS (1.5 percent). The remaining seats were won by unaffiliated candidates. After the election Zbigniew Messner became the Prime Minister, he was replaced in 1988 by Mieczysław Rakowski.

The 1989 Roundtable Elections

The death of Tadeusz Mazowiecki on October 28, 2013, was a highly symbolic event that connected the first years of Polish independence, when Mazowiecki was the last Prime Minister of the Polish People’s Republic and the first Prime Minister of the Third Republic of Poland
from 1989 to 1991, with current political debates and conflicts about the lasting influences of the political transformation in Poland.

Mazowiecki became the Prime Minister after the Round Table elections in 1989. The opposition candidates from the Solidarity movement won 160 out of the 161 seats in the Sejm that were reserved for the opposition, while in the (free) elections to the Senat candidates associated with Solidarity won 99 out of 100 mandates, with the last seat taken by an independent candidate.

The Round Table agreements about the division of power resulted in Wojciech Jaruzelski, the President from the PZPR, nominating the Solidarity candidate for Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. His Minister of Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz, put Poland on the fast track to a free market by introducing “shock therapy,” a series of quick and quite drastic economic reforms, which met with mixed approval from Polish society as they had a negative impact on people’s earnings and economic situation.

The Post-Communist Elections of the 1990s

When the first fully free parliamentary elections took place in Poland, it was the last Eastern European country among the satellites of the USSR to hold them: the revolutionary compromise solutions of the Round Table became outdated by the speed of changes happening in the Eastern bloc. The proportional representation electoral system used was a result of protracted fights between the President (Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa elected in 1990) and the Sejm. Interestingly, while both sides preferred a mixed majoritarian and proportional system, in the course of negotiations and compromises the majoritarian element disappeared from the law. The proportional system was thought to favor smaller parties, and indeed 36 election committees registered their lists in two or more constituencies.

The major parties in the running can be roughly divided into three groups: heirs of Solidarity, successor parties, and others (Millard 1992). The previously cohesive Solidarity movement (which originated as a labor union), now became fragmented as different political views, opinions about the beginning of systemic transformation, and personal issues divided its leaders.

Democratic Union (UD) with Tadeusz Mazowiecki supported the government and Balcerowicz’s economic reforms. Its base was
mostly the urban intelligentsia as it was self-consciously anti-populist. The Congress of Liberal Democrats (KLD), headed by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who was the Prime Minister from January 1991, was similarly pragmatic and professional, as well as more devoted to the ideas of free market and laissez-faire liberalism than the UD. The Center Agreement (PC) was a pro-capitalist, Christian-democratic party that originated to support Presidential candidacy of Lech Wałęsa. With its leader Jarosław Kaczyński, the Center was against the reforms introduced by the UD and Balcerowicz and campaigned for greater state intervention in the economy and lustration. The Christian National Union (ZChN) with Wiesław Chrzanowski was a right-wing nationalist and clerical party. It was a major force behind Catholic Election Action (WAK), which was a proponent of highly traditional family and patriotic values, and economic interventionism, and had the support of the Catholic Church. In addition to those key players there were also a few minor post-Solidarity parties in the running.

The major successor party was certainly the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDRP) with Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller, which participated in the elections as an element of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD). It favored the economic “third way” similar to that of the Western social democratic governments; since it had no scope for forming coalition it had no hopes of ruling. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) with Waldemar Pawlak was perhaps the most openly class-based political party, but its political base was threatened by elements of the Solidarity peasant movement.

The other parties are often referred to as “coach parties,” nicknamed as such to convey the idea that some of them were so small they could fit all their members on one railway coach. The most important of them included Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), an aggressively anti-communist and anti-Balcerowicz group with incredibly populist campaign promises. The Union of Political Realism (UPR) with Janusz Korwin-Mikke is a conservative libertarian party. The Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party (PPPP) started out as a joke and ended up supporting the interests of business and the environment.

In the end, 29 groups and parties found representation in the Sejm and 13 in the Senate, which illustrates the degree of fragmentation of the Polish political scene. With an average turnout of 43.2 percent, the first free elections were far from a political and social success. This
can be explained by the poor, amateurish election campaign and poor party identification due to numerous splits and mergers of parties. The ruling the UD did rather badly in the Sejm with 12.31 percent of the vote and insufficient strength to form a government. They were followed by the SLD and WAK, while in Senate the top parties were the UD, Solidarity, PC, and WAK. Such results provoked fears of government instability and the possibility of Wałęsa attempting to take over (Millard 1992).

After a tumultuous short term of various short-lived coalitions, when Hanna Suchocka's cabinet received a vote of “no confidence,” President Wałęsa dissolved the Parliament and announced premature elections in 1993. The electoral system had been changed to limit fragmentation of the Parliament and it succeeded in achieving this goal: only six parties entered the Sejm, along with two small groups representing the German minority. The previous winner, the UD, had split up in 1992 and the SLD became the largest party in the Sejm, though its deputies were still ostracized for their Communist past. In the 1993 campaign they ran on a platform of capitalism with a human face, in opposition to the drastic liberal reforms introduced by Balcerowicz. They won the elections and were able to form a coalition with PSL. The two successor parties were followed by the UD, the Labor Union (UP), the KPN and a newly established Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (BBWR) under the patronage of Wałęsa.

Although the biggest problem of the last elections, that is fragmentation of the political scene, was curbed by the new electoral system, new problems came up. The coalition of the LD and the PSL was significantly overrepresented in the Sejm in comparison with the number of votes they got: they received 36 percent of the popular vote yet got 66 percent of seats in the Sejm, due to the system that favored big parties. A third of the voters voted for a party that did not clear the threshold; this resulted in a stable government with little legitimacy. In the Senat, where simple majority voting was still used, the representation was much more dispersed.

The 1997 elections took place after a full term served by the coalition of the SLD and the PSL and just four months after the constitutional referendum. In the time since the previous elections the right-wing post-Solidarity groups and parties had succeeded in uniting effectively and thus won the election as Electoral Action Solidarity
(AWS), with 33.8 percent of the popular vote. They were followed by the SLD with 27.1 percent, a newly-formed Freedom Union (UW), the PSL, and the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP). The AWS was certainly helped by the fact that during the 1995 Presidential elections, won by Aleksander Kwaśniewski from the SDRP who defeated Lech Wałęsa, the old division between post-Solidarity and post-communist forces was reawakened. The AWS invoked the symbolism of the Solidarity trade union and received a premium for unity in the elections, both from voters and from the electoral system. The SLD’s campaign lacked a clear leader, and was undermined by the bad response of the government to the floods that took place in the summer of 1997. Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, then Prime Minister, stated that flood victims should have bought private insurance against flood, which caused public outrage. Along with the AWS, the UW under Leszek Balcerowicz was also a clear winner of this election as it gained the status of “king-maker” after running a good campaign. A coalition of the AWS and the UW formed a government.

The Defeat of the Post-Communist Parties

In the 2001 elections, the trend of voting the ruling parties out of office continued, as SLD won after AWS yet again fell victim to fragmentation. According to Millard (2003), this election also marked the end of the historic division between the heirs of Communism and the heirs of Solidarity.

The elections took place after a full four year term under one Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek (though since June 2000 he was the head of a minority government). The presidential election of 2000, in which Aleksander Kwaśniewski easily defeated the leader of the AWS, Marian Krzaklewski, and an independent centrist candidate, Andrzej Olechowski, marked the beginning of disarray in the AWS. After the Parliamentary elections 2001 the SLD formed a coalition with the UP. Apart from the two and the PSL, many new parties got into the Sejm. The Civic Platform (PO), created in 2000 by the so-called three tenors (Andrzej Olechowski, Maciej Płażyński from AWS and Donald Tusk from UW), was made up of many leading figures from the liberal wing of UW and stood for economic liberalism. Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona), so was a populist party
under Andrzej Lepper, which gained its support mostly from peasants and thus became a significant rival for the PSL. Law and Justice (PiS) with Jarosław Kaczyński, the Minister of Justice under Buzek, was a right-wing party with a hard line stance on corruption and harsh penalties. The League of Polish Families (LPR) was formed by politicians from ten clerical nationalist formations and received patronage from the radically traditionalist and far-right Radio Maryja. The SLD-UP got 41 percent of the votes, followed by the PO, Samoobrona, PiS, the PSL, and the LPR. Thus six parties, three of which were new, crossed the threshold. In the new Sejm, 62 percent of the deputies had no parliamentary experience and several members of Samoobrona, including the leader, were charged with or under investigation for criminal acts.

The Rise and Fall of PiS: 2005–2007

In 2005, the presidential and parliamentary elections coincided so the two campaigns influenced each other. The previous government was once again voted out of office under the cloud of corruption scandals, the most prominent of which was the so-called Rywingate scandal in 2003. The scandal was investigated by a Parliamentary commission that provided an opportunity for the rise of Zbigniew Ziobro from PiS as a staunch defender of morals in politics, and influenced the campaign of PiS, which ran under the slogans of building the “Fourth Republic” (in opposition to the Third Republic established after 1989 and which was judged by PiS as corrupt) and a radical break with post-communist transition and wide-spread lustration. They were joined in this rhetoric of moral cleansing by the LPR and together the two parties stood for Catholic values and more economic interventionism. The SO, while not advocating for the Fourth Republic, also declared itself an anti-elite party that would bring a change of direction. The PO and the newly-formed Democratic Party (made of members of the UW and some of the SLD) stood for economic liberalism, but the PO also used the language of “repairing the state.”

The PO and PiS declared they would form a coalition after the election, but that proved difficult after the harsh presidential and parliamentary campaigns, in which PiS threw strong accusations at the PO, including personal attacks on Donald Tusk, the leader of the PO. As a result, PiS gained the majority of seats in the Sejm with 27 percent
of votes and a near majority in the Senat. In the Sejm, PiS was followed by the PO, the SO, the SLD, the LPR and the PSL. As the coalition talks with the PO fell apart, PiS formed a government with two radical populist parties, the LPR and the SO, and started replacing officials on all levels and in all branches of the government. PO remained in opposition and started to be perceived as the non-radical party.

The rule of PiS with the SO and the LPR was marked by issues with a new lustration law, several of whose provisions were ruled unconstitutional, scandals involving security services, and finally security service’s sting operation against Andrzej Lepper, the leader of one of the coalition parties.

The PO, Smolensk, and Electoral Stability: 2007–2015

In August 2007 the coalition collapsed and a preterm election took place in the autumn of 2007. The election was widely perceived as a referendum on PiS politics and the PO called for the mobilization of voters against PiS. The PO won with 41.5 percent of the vote, followed by PiS, the new social democratic alliance called Left and Democrats (LiD), and the PSL. The PO formed a coalition with the PSL under the premiership of Donald Tusk.

The 2011 elections followed the 2010 Smoleńsk tragedy, where the PiS aligned President, Lech Kaczyński, along with 95 other people, including army officers and MPs, died tragically in a plane crash on their way to ceremonials marking the 70th anniversary of the Katyń massacre. The preterm Presidential elections in 2010 were won by the PO candidate Bronisław Komorowski, who defeated Lech Kaczyński’s twin brother, Jarosław.

In 2008 LiD was dissolved into the SLD and the Social-Democracy of Poland (SdPL) and seven committees with nationwide lists ran in the 2011 elections. The PO won again with 39.18 percent of the vote and continued its ruling coalition with PSL. They were followed by PiS, Palikot’s Movement (RP), the PSL and the SLD. The most unexpected and interesting development was the strong support for Palikot’s Movement, a new party formed by Janusz Palikot and widely supported by liberal young people. Its program is a mixture of economic and social liberalism, with the support of small business professionals and inclusion of such prominent left-wing figures as feminist
PO Stumbles and PiS Rises Again: 2015 to the present

In the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, PiS won substantial support of the electorate. Elections were particularly unsuccessful for the PO-PSL coalition. Due to several unpopular reforms and scandals around their leading figures, as well as successful competitors’ campaigns of candidates from PiS, incumbent PO President Bronisław Komorowski lost the Presidency to PiS’s Andrzej Duda. Elections to the Sejm later that year demonstrated the strong position of PiS again: they won 37.58 percent of the vote while the PO got 24.09 percent, Kukiz’15 (a party with emphasis on extensive popular engagement into politics) entered the Sejm with 8.81 percent, Modern (Nowoczesna) (a new party, which put emphasis mostly on economic issues) got 7.6 percent, and PSL was only supported by 5.13 percent of population. Elections to the Senat became a major victory for PiS as well (61 seats out of 100), while the PO won 34 seats. The PSL got one seat and the rest of the seats were taken by formally independent candidates. Palikot’s Movement (RP), which rebranded into “Your Movement” (TR), lost its influence. Within months of their victory, PiS introduced radical changes into state governance, including those applied to the procedures of the Constitutional Court and the dissolution of the Council for the Prevention of Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance that PO PM Donald Tusk established in 2011. These changes, among others, have led to a series of mass street protests since December 2015.

REFERENCES


In S. Ligarski, M. Siedziako (eds.) Wybory i referenda w PRL [Elections and Referenda in PRL], Szczecin: IPN, 23–44.


National Electoral Commission. Available at (http://pkw.gov.pl/).
Chapter ten

Electoral Gender Quotas in Poland

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow

Gender and electoral politics are inseparable. In this chapter I present a brief history of electoral policy known as gender quotas as they appeared in Poland from the Communist era to the electoral quota law passed in 2011. For context, I present an overview of women’s parliamentary representation since 1945.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, especially in the run up to, and during, accession to the European Union, debates have taken place on the issue of gender equality in legislative institutions (Reusschemeyer and Wolchik 2009). Parliamentarians are critical actors in these debates, as they have the authority to introduce and implement gender equality enhancing legislation. Whether parliamentarians want to enhance gender equality in parliament, and how they would like to achieve this goal, directly impacts any legislation related, explicitly or implicitly, to women’s political representation (Krook 2014; for a detailed discussion of the role of party leaders in gender equality initiatives, see Kunovich and Paxton 2005 and Caul-Kittilson 2006).

A popular yet contentious way of enhancing gender equality in parliament is through gender quotas. Gender quotas are rules that aim at securing a set percentage of women to appear on candidate lists in elections for political offices. Gender quotas can be an effective way to place women in parliament, though how well quotas function depends much on the form of electoral rules, the type of quota system adopted, and the level of enforcement of such a system (Dahlerup 2006; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Krook 2009).
In February 2011, then President of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski, signed into law The Act of 5 January 2011 amending the Law – Elections to municipal councils, county councils and regional councils, the Law – Elections to the Polish Sejm and the Senate of the Polish Republic, and the Law – Elections to the European Parliament [Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. o zmianie ustawy – Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw, ustawy – Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz ustawy – Ordynacja wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego.] This gender quota law amends existing electoral law by stipulating that, for all political parties seeking office locally, nationally, or in the European Parliament, in each district 35 percent of their candidate lists must be composed of women. This law is silent on the placement of women candidates on electoral lists.

WOMEN’S PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION IN POLAND SINCE 1945

During the postwar Communist-era, officials thought that one of the most important principles of Communist ideology was to empower groups that had been historically disadvantaged. Women were among the disadvantaged groups that the regime sought to liberate. This meant an increasing participation of women in all spheres of public life, from university education and occupational attainment to parliamentary membership. As such, Communist ideology – in which the Party played the “leading role” – idealized descriptive political representation, which can be defined as the extent to which the composition of the political elite resembles the demographics and experiences of the citizenry. In Poland, the Communist Party both praised women and actively sought to maintain traditional gender relations (Buckley 1989; Einhorn 1993; Siemieńska, 1985; Fuszara, 2005, 2010). Throughout the Communist era, while political equality was extolled, gender traditionalism was the norm.

During the transition (1989–1991), Poland focused on democratization and economic reform, and gender and descriptive representation was not prominent on the agenda (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009). The immediate post-1989
drop in Polish women’s parliamentary representation was a result of the political resurgence of pre-existing gender traditionalist attitudes and the new priorities of the young governments that struggled with the transformation and consciously relegated the inclusion of women and women’s interests to some unspecified future date (Einhorn 1993; Kunovich 2003)¹. As the post-Communist era got underway, the gender-politics relationship that emphasized equality of the Communist-era was viewed by many of the political elite and the public as artificially and forcefully imposed by illegitimate rulers, and thus viewed with resentment (Siemieńska 2003). For some, the new democratization meant that political recruitment would be blind to demographics and against policies of positive gender discrimination. As Poland prepared for entry into the European Union, their public stance was to align their gender policies with EU gender policies, e.g. gender mainstreaming, and has been influenced by the international women’s movement.

Descriptive and Substantive Representation

In studying Eastern Europe, it is important to make the distinction between descriptive and substantive representation (Celis 2008; see also Chapter 1 of this book). Substantive representation refers to advocacy and policy that reflects the diverse interests of the citizenry; such representation of interests comes from having one’s voice heard in the legislature and translated into action (Mansbridge 1999; Young 1990). Women had lesser representation because (a) the parliament of which they were a part had very limited effective control over the legislative and policy process and (b) few women were members of the central committee of the Communist Party that was the main decision-making body. In Poland, women’s political representation followed Putnam’s

¹ The emphasis on legislative priorities is illustrated well by a quote from Olga Krzyżanowska, MP during the years 1989–2001, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and then Senator: “First, it was too early for women’s rights, and then it was too late. Immediately after 1989, many MPs were of the opinion that the economy and politics were more important. I thought so too, in spite of being a woman. Because the problems of the transformation concerned everybody, regardless of sex.” See p. 40 https://web.archive.org/web/20110910235705/http://www.boell.pl/downloads/Gender_in_the_UE_WWW.pdf Accessed June 6, 2016.
Law of Increasing Disproportion: “as the importance of the office increases, the proportion of women declines” (Wolchik, 1981: 458; for Poland, see Fuszara 2005: 293 and Chapter 4). From 1948 to 1976, women’s representation in the Central Committee of Poland was at the level of 3.9 and 8.0 per cent. As a consequence, women still faced policy manifestations of gender traditionalism, such as restrictions on abortion, fewer positions in management, and over-representation in low-skilled work (Buckley, 1997; Siemieńska, 2003, 2009). Thus, during the Communist era, a form of women’s political inequality was under-representation not only in the relatively ineffectual Parliament, but also in key decision-making bodies whose decisions directly impacted women.

With regard to the relationship between gender and formal political equality, the EU policy of gender mainstreaming is illustrative of both ideological continuities with the previous era and the West’s influence on politics in the region. Defined as “integration of gender equality considerations ‘in all activities and policies at all levels’” (Bretherton, 2001: 60), gender mainstreaming seeks to fundamentally alter gender relations. Institutionalizing gender mainstreaming is “a demanding strategy” whose achievements are few because it operates in a context of deeply entrenched gender inequality (Bretherton, 2001: 61). According to article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, “[e]ach Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work” (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Article 119 as cited in Macrae, 2006, p. 531). Regulska (2001) argues that EU policies are mainly focused on “economic and work dimension of women’s life”; that the EU focuses too much on “equality and equal opportunities” (Regulska, 2001, p. 86). In many European social and political circles gender mainstreaming is widely discussed and, purely in terms of EU rhetoric, vigorously supported. Gender mainstreaming has been particularly slow to catch on in Central and Eastern Europe; such a fundamental change is difficult to accomplish in a region undergoing many simultaneous and consequential fundamental changes (Bretherton, 2001; Chiva, 2009).

Examining trends from the introduction of Communism to Poland until the early 21st century, women’s parliamentary representation has lagged far behind that of men, and never reached close to 50 percent (Figure 1). The democratic change of 1989 brought a radical decline
Electoral Gender Quotas in Poland

in women’s already low political representation. In the outcome of the partly open National Assembly elections of 1989, women took only 13.5 percent of seats in the Sejm and 6 percent of seats in the Senat. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the parliamentary representation of women remained low, best characterized as rising slowly with plateaus. Between 1991 and 2007, women’s parliamentary representation in Poland started at 9 percent of the Sejm, reached a plateau at 13 percent for two elections, and rose to a little over 20 percent by 2001, where it remained after the elections of 2005 and 2007.

Figure 1. Percent Women Representatives in the Polish Sejm, 1947–2015

The gender quota law did not have a large impact on women’s parliamentary representation in the Sejm. To quote the title of Millard’s (2014) article on the subject, “Not much happened.” After the quota law of 2011, in the parliamentary elections of that year, the percentage rose slightly to 24 (see also Gorecki and Kukolowicz 2014). Yet, there was progress after the 2015 elections, in which women filled 27 percent of the seats in the Sejm.

QUOTA POLICY DURING THE COMMUNIST ERA

How exactly quotas or quota-like systems enhanced women’s representation or what legislation or policy stipulated women’s inclusion during the Communist era is unknown. There is no work in English that details exactly women’s political ascension to political bodies
during the Communist era. Scholarship about women in politics frequently cites some version of the statement that “there were quotas” or that “there was a selection mechanism” but does not define what it meant by “quota” in that context or identify the selection mechanism. For example, Siemieńska (1985) writes that “… the electoral ticket in Poland is very carefully balanced, with specified numbers of places set aside for representatives of particular political and social organizations, age groups, the sexes, denominations, and so on” (335); similarly, Einhorn (1993) writes that, “Much has been made of the ‘milkmaid’ quota system designed to ensure representation across the social spectrum” (151); but how these quotas worked in practice is not clear, or elaborated upon.

The definition of “quota” and how it applies to the political ascension of Eastern European women during Communism is difficult to establish because this definition fluctuates across scholars, countries and time (see Krook 2014 for an attempt at standardization). Although the word “quota” is often used, it may not refer to official law or policy. It may be that the absence of official documents indicates informal policy. Unfortunately, if the quotas were “informal,” by their very nature there can never be a definitive answer to the question of how the political ascension of women worked. Informal rules are akin to any kind of unofficial discrimination; you see it after it happens, not while it happens, and rarely do discriminators leave a paper-trail. The absence of Communist era documents – i.e. “smoking gun” empirical evidence – complicates our efforts to identify quota mechanisms.

We are left with fundamental questions about the political ascension of women during Communism: What, exactly, were the mechanisms of Eastern European women’s political accession during the Communist era? Was there quota codification, or was it all unwritten policy? In the end, all we can say is that (a) the rules within any given country may have been informal; (b) due to lack of systematic analysis of the existing evidence, we cannot make a generalization across the region; and (c) parliamentarians from the early-1990s to the mid-2000s believed that there were gender quotas, and that many

For example, Gaber (2011) writes about Slovenia: “Different kinds of quota were used in socialist times as a means of equalising the position of women, peasants and young people in the spheres of decision making” (82).
of them consider it the vestige of the Communist era (Pawlowski and Dubrow 2011; Dubrow 2012).

**QUOTA POLICY AFTER 1989**

Although the idea of quotas was discussed in the post-Communist period of the 1990s, it was not put into practice by a major political party until the elections of 2001. Three political parties applied party gender quotas while preparing their lists of candidates, namely, the Alliance of Democratic Left (SLD), the Labor Union (UP), and the Union of Freedom (UW). Opposition to the quota among the SLD’s rank-and-file parliamentarians was focused on doubts about the ability of the party to fill that many list positions with women, and their frustration that the party leadership forced the decision on them (Renc-Roe 2003: 17). Through “research into its electorate,” the UW decided that implementing gender quotas could reliably boost the female vote; party leadership wanted to place “at least one woman in the top three places on each list” (ibid.: 18). Despite the decision being subject to a party-wide vote, there was strong intraparty opposition (ibid.). The SLD-UP formed a coalition and placed 36% of women candidates on their candidates’ lists, and the UW – 31%. However, quotas were not accompanied by regulation of candidate list position, an aspect widely acknowledged to be decisive for a candidate’s success (Paxton et al 2007). As is common throughout Eastern Europe, women aspirants face a bottleneck while trying to force themselves through party recruitment structures with limited space at the male-dominated top (Matland and Montgomery 2003). Indeed, in all major parties in the 2001 elections, women were very rarely members of election committees – even in parties that adopted quotas (Siemieńska 2005, 2009). While there were 36.3% female candidates on the joint lists of the SLD and the UP, these parties ended up with only 25% and 31% women parliamentarians, respectively. The UW failed to gain a single seat.

The stagnation of progress in establishing gender parity led to renewed attempts by women’s groups to introduce quotas. A recent and successful attempt came from a women’s interest organization called “Women’s Congress” (Kongres Kobiet). In advocating for descriptive representation on candidate lists, the Women’s Congress argues that
although Article 33 of the Constitution assures equal treatment of men and women in all spheres of life, this constitutional right is not being fulfilled due to traditions and beliefs prevailing in society. In October 2009, they registered a civil committee to gather the 100,000 signatures needed for a legislative proposal for gender quotas to be debated in the Sejm. According to this proposal, a modification of the electoral law was to be considered, so that the number of female candidates on the constituency list has to be at least equal to the number of male candidates to be checked at the moment of submitting the lists. Stipulation for candidate list position was not in the final proposal.

Kongres Kobiet lobbied party leaders for support. In a grand ideological coalition, gender quota legislation was supported by the late president of Poland Lech Kaczyński (PiS), and chairman of the SLD parliamentary club Grzegorz Napieralski. Leaders of the PO and PiS promised to discuss the issue at their party meetings. The Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk (PO), declared that in the next parliamentary elections the PO will assure that in half of the districts women will be in the first place on the party list, and in all districts half of the six top places will be reserved for women. At that time, Prime Minister Tusk encouraged other parties to introduce similar solutions.

While supported by some powerful political figures, there was staunch opposition, even by women in power. The PSL – the PO’s partner in the ruling coalition – was initially against these changes, though most members of the PSL eventually voted for it³. The Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment, Minister Elżbieta Radziszewska (PO), was among the opponents of introduction of quotas. In a public statement she acknowledged the necessity for increased women’s participation in public life; yet, she viewed quotas as a somewhat artificial and ineffective means to this goal. Instead, she was in favor of other solutions, namely, changing the media’s perception of women and orchestrating better institutional arrangements to support reconciling professional life and parenthood⁴ (we note that Elżbieta Radziszewska abstained from voting for the gender quota law on December 3, 2010).

They were successful in obtaining 154,000 signatures and the proposal was initially debated in the Sejm on February 18, 2010. The members of parliament (MPs) decided the proposal would be worked on by a special Sejm committee. In late November and early December of that year, the Sejm debated the gender quota law in full.

SEJM DEBATES ON THE ELECTORAL QUOTA LAW

The Sejm debated the quota law on November 24, 2010. Female parliamentarians, acting as representatives of their parties, gave impassioned speeches on the necessity of the quota law, while most of the opposition came from men (however, PiS women did speak out against the law at the debate on December 3). In her summary of the history of the quota law, Halina Rozpondek cited MP Marek Borowski as a main proponent of reducing the initially proposed 50 percent quota to 35 percent. In his speech, Borowski said that, “To jest bardzo duży skok … Oznacza to, że taki skok z 20 percent do 50 percent mógłby stworzyć pewne problemy. 35 percent w tej sytuacji jest rozwiązaniem moim zdaniem optymalnym.” [This is a very big jump ... This means that such a jump from 20 percent to 50 percent could create some problems. 35 percent in this situation is the optimal solution in my opinion] The problems are not clear, other than the “big jump” appears too big to most, but not all. Considering that, at the time, 80 percent of parliament was comprised of men, we can only assume that most men from the PO would not be comfortable with the “big jump.”

It is Poland religion matters. Both Halina Rozpondek and Agnieszka Kozlowska-Rajewicz cited a 1995 speech from Pope John Paul II, a towering figure in Polish and Catholic history. In referencing the Pope, Halina Rozpondek said,

“In 1995, Pope John Paul II, in the Message for World Day of Peace concluded: an increase in the presence of women in social, economic, political life, on local, national and international levels is a beneficial process. I think today we no longer have to convince ourselves about this fact, we should consider instead how to stimulate this activity, how to motivate women, to encourage them to become more involved in politics. This is what is promoted by the bill we are working on today.”
[“W 1995 r. Ojciec Święty Jan Paweł II w orędziu na Światowy Dzień Pokoju uznał: wzrost obecności kobiet w życiu społecznym, ekonomicznym, politycznym na szczeblu lokalnym, krajowym i międzynarodowym za proces dobroczynny. Myślę, że o tym dzisiaj już nie musimy się przekonywać, a powinniśmy się zastanowić, jak tę aktywność pobudzać, motywować kobiety, zachęcać je do szerszego udziału w polityce. Taką propozycją jest procesowany dziś projekt ustawy.”]

Poland’s role in Europe was invoked. Grażyna Ciemniak, in reference to the charge that such a law would be illegal under the constitution, said:

“I would also like to point out that Article. 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does not preclude that on the ground of proclaimed gender equality there is no room for taking measures for the benefit of the underrepresented sex. It only strengthens our legislative efforts to increase presence of women on electoral lists.”

[“Chciałabym również zauważyć, że z art. 23 Karty Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej wynika, iż zasada równości płci nie stanowi przeszkody w podejmowaniu środków zapewniających określone korzyści dla płci niedostatecznie reprezentowanej. To tylko wzmacnia nasze starania legislacyjne, aby zwiększyć udział kobiet na listach wyborczych.”]

PiS’s representative in the debate, Andrzej Mikołaj Dera, provided familiar arguments against gender quotas. The MP began by praising women in parliament, but ended up arguing that gender does not constitute a valid political category and that the Act would lead to undesired consequences:

“We choose from the lists of those who are the best, regardless of whether they are women or men, believers or unbelievers, whether they have one way or another color, because this type of segregation law can cause ... This type of act can cause a danger that some other orientation or any other religion will be considered that they should have a specified minimum percentage of the lists. It is a road to nowhere.”

[“Wybierajmy z list tych, którzy są najlepsi, niezależnie od tego, czy to kobiety, czy mężczyźni, wierzący, czy niewierzący, czy mają taki czy inny kolor skóry, bo zawsze tego typu ustawy segregujące mogą spowodować... Tego typu ustawy mogą spowodować niebezpieczeństwo, że jakieś
The importance of party ideology is most clearly seen in the final roll call voting for the law in the Sejm (Table 1). The sharp division between the PO and PiS is striking: while 85 percent of the PO voted for, not one member of PiS did so. The PSL, somewhere in the middle of the PO and PiS, mostly voted for (71 percent). The leftist parties, though small, all voted overwhelmingly for it, while the small nationalist parliamentary club Polska Jest Najważniejsza (PJN) was generally against (73 percent). We do not see striking differences by gender in either of the two major parliamentary clubs of the PO and PiS, other than not one the PO woman voted against it. Men were more likely to either abstain or not be present during the vote; this could be a cautious strategy by men to appear neither too strongly for, nor too strongly against, gender quotas.

Table 1. *Roll Call Voting for the Gender Quota Law in the Sejm, December 3, 2010: Percentages*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary Club</th>
<th>For All</th>
<th>For W</th>
<th>For M</th>
<th>Against All</th>
<th>Against W</th>
<th>Against M</th>
<th>Abstained/Absent All</th>
<th>Abstained/Absent W</th>
<th>Abstained/Absent M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platforma Obywatelska</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polska Jest Najważniejsza</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socjaldemokracja Polska</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other parties and parliamentarians</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and independents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 404 persons voted. 241 Parliamentarians voted in favor, and 154 against. The total category for %W and %M does not include other political parties and independent MPs [Inne Partie i Posłowie Niezrzeszeni] because there are no women in the category. Number of cases is available in Table A1 in the Appendix.
CONCLUSION

Gender inequality has a strong relationship to political inequality, and while the form, duration and magnitude of gendered political inequality have changed over time, under-representation in the parliament has always been the outcome. During the Communist era, women were promised political equality and there appeared to be quotas of an informal type, though the evidence of this policy is visible only through the steady rising percentage of women in the Sejm; there is no evidence of an official policy statement from the government. After 1989, the issue of women’s quotas was relegated to voluntary party quotas until, through considerable effort by women’s interest groups and inspired by the European Union, Poland instituted a gender quota law in 2011.

Arguably, there has been progress in the modern era. Polish women's parliamentary representation is rising and there is an electoral quota law. The international women’s movement continues to be influential in Poland. Yet, the perception of progress differs mightily from one’s position on the political ladder. Now that Poland is once again entering a period of electoral instability and radical and rapid political change, the future of these gains for women is in doubt.

REFERENCES


Fuszara, M. 2011. “Case Study: Poland: It’s time for women: Gender quotas on electoral lists.” Pp. 97–108 in Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Im-
plemmentation in Europe. Edited by D. Dahlerup and L. Freidenvall. Publica-
/201111/20111107ATT30766/20111107ATT30766EN.pdf).
Fuszara, Małgorzata and Eleonora Zielińska. 1995. “Obstacles and barriers to
an equal status act in Poland” pp. 15–30 in Women: The Past and The New
Gaber, Antic. 2011. “Case Study: Slovenia: From voluntary to legislated
quotas.” Pp. 109–121 in Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Imple-
mentation in Europe. Edited by D. Dahlerup and L. Freidenvall. Publica-
nt/201111/20111107ATT30766/20111107ATT30766EN.pdf).
Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candi-
Kunovich, Sheri and Pamela Paxton. 2005. “Pathways to Power: The Role of
Political Parties in Women’s National Political Representation.” American
Journal of Sociology 111 (2): 505–552.
in National Politics: Predicting Electoral List Position”. Comparative
Macrae, Heather. 2006. “Rescaling gender relations: the influence of European
in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. edited by A. Przeworski,
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Rep-
Women to National Legislatures: A General Framework with Applica-
tions to Post-Communist Democracies.” Pp. 19–42 in Women’s Access to
Political Power in Post-Communist Europe, edited by Richard E. Matland
cal Theorists, Parliamentarians and the Meaning of Unequal Representa-
Paxton Paxton, Melanie Hughes, and Jennifer Green. 2006. “The Interna-
tional Women’s Movement and Women’s Political Representation, 1893–


Table A1. *Roll Call Voting for the Gender Quota Law in the Sejm, December 3, 2010: Number of Cases*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>TOTAL Parliamentarians per Party</th>
<th>For Total</th>
<th>W For</th>
<th>M For</th>
<th>Against Total</th>
<th>W Against</th>
<th>M Against</th>
<th>Total Abstained/Absent</th>
<th>W Abs</th>
<th>M Abs</th>
<th>W Total</th>
<th>M Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platforma Obywatelska</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polska Jest Najważniejsza</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socjaldemokracja Polska</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other parties and parliamentarians independents</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>367</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter describes the electoral system and election outcomes of Hungary from 1990 to 2014.

The electoral law used in Hungary in the elections between 1990 and 2010 was passed in 1990. According to this law, Hungary has a unicameral Parliament, the National Assembly, composed of 386 members. During this period, and up until 2010, voters chose parliamentarians according to a complex three-tier system for a four-year term of office.

The first tier comprised single member districts (SMDs), where 176 members were chosen in two-round elections. To run as a candidate it was necessary to collect 750 signatures. The first round could be won by a candidate if there was a voter turnout of over 50 percent and a candidate received an absolute majority. If this didn’t happen, there was a run-off election with a 25 percent minimum turnout required and a plurality of votes to win. The run-off election was held among candidates who received over 15 percent of the vote or, failing that, the top three candidates. If the second round of elections was still unsuccessful, candidates were chosen in by-elections.

In the second tier, up to 152 seats were distributed in 20 regional, multi member constituencies. They were allocated according to the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula among parties that cleared the 5 percent nationwide threshold (only 4 percent in the 1990 elections, in all subsequent elections 5 percent), 10 percent for lists of two parties, and 15 percent for three or more. The same minimum turnout was
required as in SMDs for the first and second round of elections to be valid. Seats not filled in the second-round were automatically added to the national list.

The national list was the third tier. It was separate from the other two tiers and voters did not vote for the national list directly. It had a minimum of 58 seats (more if some regional constituency elections were not valid) and the seats were distributed according to the d’Hondt rule of the largest average. The votes counted were all the votes cast in SMDs for the candidates who were not elected and the remainder votes from regional lists. This was the compensatory element of the system and the 5 percent threshold applied here as well as in regional lists.

Voters cast two separate votes: for an SMD candidate and for a regional party list, which was a closed list, so the voters had no influence over which candidates made it into the parliament. Parties were able to submit regional lists in constituencies in which they had candidates in at least one-quarter of SMDs, and they could submit national lists if they had regional lists in at least seven constituencies.

THE 1990s: TWILIGHT OF THE POST-COMMUNISTS

In the 1990 Parliamentary elections in Hungary, six parties got into the Parliament, all of which had few grassroots ties and short histories (Racz 1991). The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) with 24.7 percent of the vote, was the oldest opposition force. It had been established in 1987 as a movement and in 1989 as a party. It was a centrist party that defined itself in opposition to extremism and stood for transformation, historical tradition, a social market economy, and development of political culture. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a social liberal party, advocated a quick transformation to a market economy and received 21.3 percent of the vote. The Independent Smallholders and Citizens’ Party (FKGP) received 11.7 percent of the vote and traced its roots back to the interwar period. It was a proponent of private property, while at the same time recognizing community and state property to a small extent. It was a Christian Democratic party with strong support in the countryside and advocating the dismantling of the large scale agricultural production units. The Hungarian
Socialist Party (MSZP) with 10.9 percent of the vote retained ties to the former Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP). It advocated comprehensive reform without losing the positive communist and socialist values. In terms of foreign policy it stood for correct relations both with the Soviet Union and with Europe. The Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) with 8.9 percent was born from a young intellectuals’ movement and stood for liberalization, the free market system, privatization, and protection of the Hungarian minority abroad. The Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) with 6.5 percent of the vote stressed the importance of family and Christian values and the agrarian issues in the economy. The MSZMP and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (MSZDP), which had merged with the communists in 1948 and now advocated for more moderate transition model with free market but also welfare at the center, remained outside of the Parliament.

While no party achieved an absolute majority, a coalition government with the MDF, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats was created, with József Antall as the Prime Minister. The MDF was a centrist party and began major steps towards transformation as a post-communist force. However, support for socialist parties had not disappeared, since the MSZP was still the fourth force in the Parliament and there were two other socialist parties that didn’t clear the threshold. The MDF coalition proved to be a stable one as it finished its mandate.

In the 1994 elections out of the 15 parties with national lists only six cleared the five percent threshold and got into the Parliament. The winner by a landslide was the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) with 54.14 percent of the seats in Parliament, which since 1990 had cut its ties to Marxism and redefined itself as a social democratic party. During its term in opposition under Zoltan Gal, the party was very articulate and skillful and managed to build ties to liberal parties as well as an electoral alliance with the National Federation of Hungarian unions (a labor union organization). The MSZP ran on a platform of social-liberal orientation and cutting bureaucracy. Even though it wasn’t necessary because the MSZP had a majority in the new Parliament, it still formed a coalition government with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which received 19.74 percent of the votes by supporting market competition, a wide scope of individual freedom,
and limited state power, mixing socialist and liberal elements in their program. They defeated the MDF and the rest of the coalition, which for this campaign went back to their anti-communist slogans, but this time they misjudged the social mood and turned out to be less successful. The MDF came away with 11.74 percent of the vote as a result of internal conflicts and splits in the coalition. The Smallholders underwent a split when Jozsef Torgyan’s radical populist fraction broke the coalition with the Forum and as a result only received 8.82 percent of the votes. The other parties in the government were Fidesz and the KDNP.

In the complex and multi-level Hungarian electoral system, with single member districts with the majoritarian system, multi-member districts with proportional representation, and national level lists filled by the “unused” votes from the other two levels, most SMD results were only decided in the run-offs that allowed less stringent rules regarding voter turnout and a majority ratio in order for the election to be valid. In these elections, 174 SMD seats out of 176 were filled in the run-offs.

The MSZP and SZDSZ coalition used its term to continue an economic stabilization program and move the country towards future European Union integration, but the good economic results were not enough to retain public support lost due to the difficult economic measures taken. As real wages declined, protests against the economic reforms erupted in 1997; the coalition was voted out of office in 1998 when the disenchanted socialist voters shifted their support to the right, to the Smallholders.

In the 1998 campaign, the MSZP ran on a moderate platform, but was defeated by Fidesz that shifted from the center toward the right of the political stage. Fidesz managed to gain the support of both liberals and traditional conservatives with its bold and populist program. Since Fidesz won the election but found itself short of a majority, a coalition was formed with the Smallholders as well as some elements of the KDNP and Forum. Interestingly, due to electoral math, Fidesz got the most seats despite the fact that the MSZP received the most votes. Another surprising development was the fact that the extreme Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) found enough support to get into the Parliament with 5.5 percent of the votes.
Viktor Orban became the Prime Minister in the Fidesz’s coalition government. During the 1998–2002 term the Smallholders party disintegrated. Forum decided to join with Fidesz for the 2002 Parliamentary elections to boost its chances of getting into the Parliament.

In the 2002 elections the bloc of Fidesz-MPP (Alliance of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party: a new name since 2003) with Forum (MDF) got 41.07 percent of the votes. Their new identity was generally more right-wing and focused on traditional conservative values. In the campaign Fidesz used divisive rhetoric by taking an “us vs. them” stance and positioning anti-communists strongly against communists, supporters of the nation vs. traitors (Ilonszki 2003). They were defeated by the MSZP which ran on the platform of continuation of the previous stabilization and modernization efforts as well as broadening democracy, and received 42.05 percent of the votes. For the first time there was a difference between the overall results and the results in SMDs, where Fidesz won 94 seats to the Socialists’ 78. The extreme right wing party the MIEP didn’t clear the threshold this time. The MSZP formed a coalition with the SZDSZ (5.57 percent), whose support was necessary to form a government this time.

Between the two rounds of the election, there appeared conflicts “on the street level” between supporters of the two major parties. The results were contested by some smaller parties, including the MIEP, and a wave of protests and demonstrations took place in the country, some of which needed to be met by the police. In that election, 44 SMD seats were won in the first round, as opposed to only two in the previous elections that suggested rising political polarization.

The 2002 Parliament was the first without any independent MPs and with only three political forces: the MSZP, Fidesz-MDF, and the SZDSZ, which later turned into four when the Forum decided to split from Fidesz. Peter Medgyessy became the Prime Minister of the MSZP/SZDSZ government and he managed to withstand the scandal when he was unmasked as a former counter intelligence agent. Meanwhile, Fidesz took up a new strategy of setting up “civic circles” and doing politics at street level, in opposition to institutional politics. In 2005, the SZDSZ became the Hungarian Liberal Party (Liberals).
The 2006 Parliamentary campaign was once again a close fight between the socialist MSZP and the conservative Fidesz. The MDF, previously Fidesz’s ally, now came under attack from Fidesz, but was able to present a sound conservative economic program. The liberals weren’t able to criticize the ruling MSZP as they expected to stay in the coalition. Christian Democrats (KDNP) decided to run on a list with Fidesz. The situation from 1998 was reversed when Fidesz received more votes (42 percent in both SMDs and MMDs to the MSZP’s 40.3 percent in SMDs and 43.2 percent in MMDs), yet fewer seats than the MSZP (164 to 186). The same four parties ended up in the Parliament, and when the KDNP decided to split from Fidesz there were five.

The 2006 elections were marked by a decreasing level of trust in politicians. After the elections there were multiple demonstrations and protests against the government, some turned violent, in front of the Parliament building and the Hungarian Public Television. The fact that this time as many as 67 SMDs were safe in the first round suggests further political polarization.

Fidesz gave the government formed by the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition a warning to leave and threatened demonstrations until their demands were met. Fidesz did not distance itself from groups with extremist slogans that alluded to Nazism. After they won local elections, Fidesz demanded that the government leave yet again, but the cabinet received instead a vote of confidence. The demonstrations continued in 2007 with a right-wing paramilitary group called the Hungarian Guard taking on a leadership role. Fidesz used populist instruments to drum up their own support and the conflict between representative and direct democracy became even more visible as Fidesz called for referenda on a number of important governmental initiatives, including health care reform.

In 2008 there were substantial changes in the government after a referendum on health care and after the Liberals left the coalition. In an atmosphere of economic crisis and rising social conflicts between Hungarians and the Roma minority, the Hungarian Guard became the basis of a new party: Jobbik, The Movement for a Better Hungary. This extremist right-wing party used racist and nationalistic slogans in their political platform and stood for traditional, conservative, Christian and fundamentally Hungarian values. It received almost 15 percent
of the votes in the European Parliament elections and with them three seats. In 2009, Gordon Bajnai replaced Ferenc Gyurcsány as the Prime Minister. The necessity of introducing austerity measures to meet the directives of the International Monetary Fund and the EU, as well as corruption scandals, brought further trouble for the government.

2010s: THE RIGHT WING CONSOLIDATES THEIR GAINS

In the 2010 elections Fidesz won with an overwhelming majority of 53.73 percent of the votes, benefitting from the previous government’s problems. The MSZP came in second and the Liberals and the Forum did not clear the threshold. Two new parties appeared in the government: the radical right-wing Jobbik and Politics Can be Different (LMP), a green-liberal party that attracted younger voters. In the second round of elections Fidesz-KDNP won an absolute two-thirds majority that enabled them to change the constitution.

The ruling coalition under the Prime Minister Viktor Orban began an immediate legislative push. The constitution was changed in 2011 (went into force on January 1, 2012) and caused significant internal and international controversy as only reflecting the ruling party’s conservative worldview. Dual citizenship was granted to Hungarians living outside Hungary, provided they could speak Hungarian and prove some Hungarian ancestry. This sparked tensions with Slovakia, home to a large Hungarian minority. Talks with the IMF were suspended and the government introduced their own recovery plan independent of international organizations. Fidesz’s candidate for President, Pal Schmitt, was elected by the Parliament. Hungary was widely criticized by the EU for its new constitution and its lack of neutrality. It received a BB/B financial rating by the international rating agency Standard & Poors and was warned that the rating might slip even further.

In 2011 a new electoral law was introduced by the parliament in which Fidesz had a two-thirds majority. It was one of many laws introduced after Fidesz came into power in 2012, including the new constitution.

According to the new law, the number of representatives in parliament decreased from 386 to 199. The system remains a mixed system,
though now it only has two tiers: SMDs and national lists. Under the new law, 106 seats are now filled in SMDs and 93 from national lists. SMD elections are now one round only, with plurality rather than a majority necessary to win. Voters still have two votes, but now they vote for a SMD and a national (rather than regional) party list. The way in which national seats are allocated has also changed. Votes cast for losing candidates in SMDs are added along with “extra” votes cast for winning candidates: those over the number necessary to win. The seats are then allocated according to the d’Hondt formula. SMDs now make up 53 percent of all seats in the parliament, while previously they comprised only 46 percent. This change, coupled with the fact that winners’ votes are also transferred to national lists, weakens the compensatory element of the electoral system.

In order to run a candidate in an SMD it is now necessary to collect 1000 signatures (raised from 750 in the previous system), and to have a national list 27 candidates in SMDs across nine regions are required. This means that running a national list has become more difficult, which clearly favors larger parties.

Some further changes were made in terms of the franchise, which has been extended to Hungarian citizens with no permanent residence in Hungary. This can be seen as a part of a larger effort to support Hungarian minorities outside Hungary. National minorities living in Hungary have received some electoral privileges for the first time. They only need to secure a quarter of a quota of voters, that is a little less than 0.27 percent of all list votes cast nationally to be able to gain a seat in parliament. Other minorities have been granted a non-voting spokesperson in the parliament.

The new law went into effect for the 2014 parliamentary elections, when the ruling coalition Fidesz-KDNP won 45.04 percent of votes. Such a result can be partially explained by the strength of the coalition of right-wing forces. Left-wing parties, on the other hand, remained fragmented until 2014, but for the elections MSZP-EGYÜTT-DK-PM-MLP formed a union and got 25.67 percent of electorate support, 20.30 percent gave their vote to the far-right Jobbik and the LMP got 5.36 percent.

Except for legislative changes enumerated above, the critique of the parliamentary elections of 2014 was addressed towards spread of political influence to the media, campaign regulations biased towards major
parties, as well as tight bonds between political elites and business and dependence of civil society on government funding. Further government policy adopted after the elections raised major concerns. These concerns included tendencies for political isolation and a simultaneous shift to rhetoric favouring authoritarian regimes. New government policies were not regarded as completely satisfactory by the population and this led to protests against corruption and growing threat to freedom of information flow. As the right wing in Hungary consolidates their gains, the opposition attempts to better organize.

REFERENCES


Part 4

COLLABORATION
Chapter twelve

Multi-disciplinary Scientific Collaboration across Countries and Time: Managing the Electoral Control Project

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Olga Zelinska

The Electoral Control in Eastern Europe project brought together a multidisciplinary mix of young and established social scientists from across many countries to construct and analyze data on parliamentarians and candidates of Central and Eastern Europe that can address concepts and theories of representation, accountability, and political inequality. The project began with some basic ideas of how to make cross-national scientific collaboration work best. Aided by healthy introspection, we developed our ideas over time, adapting as the situation warranted, and in so doing we learned new ways of doing scientific collaborative work. This chapter describes the evolution of the project and the process of facilitating collaboration between this team of scientists.

VIRTUES OF WORKING IN SCIENTIFIC TEAMS

The social sciences are undergoing a radical social change. Across the sciences, including the social sciences, scientific collaboration is on the rise (Hunter and Leahey 2008; Jones et al 2008). Quantitative analyses and data collection efforts are, if one rationally considers the level of difficulty, fertile grounds for scientific collaborative teams. Jones et al (2008) found “a remarkable and nearly universal rise since 1975 in the frequency of collaborations between authors located at different universities” (1259). In sociology, there have been dramatic increases in

“Social scientists are now transitioning from working primarily on their own, alone in their offices – a style that dates back to when the offices were in monasteries – to working in highly collaborative, inter-disciplinary, larger scale, lab-style research teams. The knowledge and skills necessary to access and use these new data sources and methods often do not exist within any one of the traditionally defined social science disciplines and are too complicated for any one scholar to accomplish alone” (166).

Increasingly, these scientific teams are multi- or interdisciplinary (Lungeanu et al 2013). Interdisciplinarity is the integration of two or more disciplines that produces emergent, original, interesting and useful knowledge, and it comes to fruition when the relationship of the integrated disciplines is strong and symmetrical (Wagner et al. 2011; National Academies 2004; Dubrow 2011; Dubrow and Kolczynska 2015). The strength and symmetry of disciplinary relationships depends on the relative similarity in objects of study, methods of inquiry, the size of the profession and its disciplinary apparatus, and evolutionary history (Dubrow 2011). There are plenty of examples of when this potential does not lead to interdisciplinary knowledge, such as that of sociology and American Studies (Dubrow 2011; Jacobs 2014) or in political sociology (Dubrow and Kolczynska 2015).

Scientific teams are research situations in which individuals bring their expertise to the problem at hand. Multidisciplinary teams examine the problem from their disciplinary vantage points. Interdisciplinary teams work together to bridge their disciplinary divides to create new and emergent knowledge with a vocabulary that everyone in the team can understand. In their research on scientific teams, Uzzi et al (2013) found that when scientists with narrow specialties collaborate with scientists outside their specialties, true scientific breakthroughs are more likely to occur. Though interdisciplinary or cross-field collaboration is fraught with challenges, “models of creativity emphasize that innovation is spurred through original combinations that spark new insights” (Uzzi et al 2013: 468). Indeed, this is what they found. “Our analysis of 17.9 million papers spanning all scientific fields suggests,” Uzzi et al (2013) wrote, “that science follows a nearly universal pattern: The
highest-impact science is primarily grounded in exceptionally conventional combinations of prior work yet simultaneously features an intrusion of unusual combinations” (468). They find that team work most often leads to these breakthroughs.

*Properties of Good Teams*

As manager of the project, Dubrow was concerned with facilitating collaboration between team members from sociology and political science who had various degrees of prior collaboration: some had worked with each other before, some were familiar with the work of some of the team members, and some team were completely unfamiliar with each other. It was a network of weak ties that Dubrow tried to turn into strong. The key was working together in physical and virtual places where direct communication was necessary and creativity was encouraged.

What makes a team productive? Recent scholarly attention has turned to the well-functioning of scientific teams. Analyzing National Science Foundation (NSF) proposals, both funded and unfunded, a team of researchers discovered that pre-existing collaborations or familiarity with one’s work promote co-authorship and citations of that work (though excessive cross-citations of each other’s work leads to worse outcomes) (Lungeanu et al 2013: 68). “From a practical perspective,” (Lungeanu et al 2013) wrote, “researchers are more likely to be successful if they worked together before and therefore show successful collaboration records. However, they also need to come from different research areas, and draw upon different areas of expertise.” Their study was funded by the NSF.

Small group dynamics play an important role. Google, one of the most successful of the new technology firms and one of the wealthiest companies in the world, insists that their workers collaborate. Being a data-driven company, Google collected data on their work groups to find out why some were successful and why some were not (Duhigg 2016). Google found that successful teams share a common set of traits: the team allows one another to freely discuss issues important to them in an environment that encourages sharing of ideas, no matter what the ideas are. This happens when everyone in the team respects one another and is in tune with each other’s verbal and non-verbal cues,
and when they respond appropriately. “In the best teams,” (Duhigg 2016) wrote, “members listen to one another and show sensitivity to feelings and needs.”

The Electoral Control project attempted a synthesis of knowledge from sociologists, political scientists, area studies experts, and data archivists. Our intention was interdisciplinarity, but the knowledge we produced was usually segmented into political science and sociological fields; the outcome was multi-disciplinary. The workshops and concluding event, as described below, were intentionally designed to allow everyone an equal chance to speak their mind and to share their knowledge. The frequent interaction of these scholars generated new insights and built a collaborative network that endures beyond the project.

**GENERATING SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION**

*Case Study: Bell Labs*

There are important lessons from the history of the creation of scientific teams and institutions that span disciplines and expertise. In this chapter, we briefly discuss three of these. The first is AT & T’s Bell Labs. From the 1920s to the 1980s, AT&T held a telephone monopoly in the U.S. It offered certain advantages: during its monopoly years it was one of the largest employers in the U.S. and was one of the wealthiest corporations in the nation, if not the world. In Gertner’s *The Idea Factory* (2012: Chapter 9, “Formula”), we learn how Bell Labs became a scientific institution whose mission was to create revolutionary innovations. Innovations can spring from economic needs that make a product cheaper or more economically efficient, or from operational needs that make the product work “better and faster” (Gertner 2012: 153). Other innovations are a cultural necessity, such as a technology that is a part of other growing technologies (as the tablet is to the laptop, as the laptop was to the desktop personal computer). Others spring from military necessity, such as radar and nuclear weapons.

During the 1950s, when Bell Labs had some of its most important breakthroughs, Mervin Kelly, a physicist, was at the helm. His job was to manage the institution of Bell Labs and its scientists. Under him was a structure in which there were supervisors of various scientific teams.
Kelly set the policy for Bell Labs and during his time Bell Labs created a series of revolutionary technologies – such as the transistor – and theories – such as Claude Shannon’s information theory. Under his tenure, Bell Labs scientists won a series of Nobel Prizes. Kelly’s job was to create and maintain an “institute of creative technology.”

Gertner outlines the basics of how Kelly created and maintained this institute. A key Kelly policy was unselfish cooperation and open communication between scientists. While individual achievements were celebrated, the policy was for scientific teams to communicate with each other. Only when a potentially revolutionary idea was near would teams be secretive, but this was only at the discretion of Kelly and other AT&T higher-ups and only for the purposes of patent. After all, Bell Labs was the Research & Development arm of AT&T, and its ultimate purpose was to make AT&T better off economically. As such, any scientist could approach and expect help from any other scientist.

“At the Labs this was sometimes known as going to ‘the guy who wrote the book.’ And it was often literally true. The guy who wrote the definitive book on a subject – Shockley on semiconductors, John Tukey on statistics, Claude Shannon on information, and so forth – was often just down the hall. Saddled with a difficult problem, a new hire at Bell Labs, a stuttering nobody, was regularly directed by a supervisor toward one of these men. Some young employees would quake when they were told to go ask Shannon or Shockley a question. Still, Labs policy stated that they could not be turned away” (Gertner 2012: 151).

Another of Kelly’s ideas was that physical proximity was necessary. When Bell Labs relocated to New Jersey, the building was specifically designed so that scientists would be forced to run into each other; the architecture created serendipity. It was also designed to encourage individuals from different disciplines to run into each other. Along the long hallway connecting labs from different disciplines, the chemists, physicists and engineers would have no choice but to be in the same space at the same time. Often, interdisciplinarity emerged.

Bell Labs attracted the best and the brightest. They stockpiled so many of them that people at the Labs would say that it created a “critical mass” that led to great ideas. Not only were very smart people from across many disciplines all in the same place, forced to run into each other, but Bell Labs also trained their young scientists. They did this
“not for reasons of altruism but because industrial science and engineering had become so complex that it now required men and women who were trained beyond the level that America’s graduate schools could attain” (Gertner 2012: 153). Bell Labs gave the best and the brightest the tools needed to explore their ideas. Some of these tools were physical, such as machines, and others were personnel. Within Bell Labs were thousands of assistants who possessed practical knowledge. They had a long history, and therefore not only institutional memory but the store of practical knowledge that enabled research scientists to carry out their theoretical ideas.

A major factor underwriting the success of Bell Labs was money. AT&T was a monopoly with a steady and large influx of cash. This money allowed them to buy and keep the best and the brightest and the tools necessary for their success. Perhaps most important, the large and steady funding allowed Bell Labs to think in the long term, “five, ten, and even twenty years away” (Gertner 2012: 154). The ability to allow science to fail is important, because most science fails to produce anything. Successes are infrequent and innovation is exceedingly rare. For example, even as Bell Labs was developing the transistor, they were pursuing improvement in vacuum tubes; the transistor would eventually make the tubes obsolete. Years of false starts and failed experiments eventually gave way to revolutionary innovation. Patience is a function of money.

The voracious market appetite for the output of their research allowed Bell Labs to more easily define the problems they wanted to solve. Bell Labs worked in an applied science framework, but was fueled by basic research. Scientists were given freedom to pursue what they liked, so long as they were working on a problem of interest to Bell Labs. “Working in an environment of applied science, as one Bell Labs researcher noted years later, ‘doesn’t destroy a kernel of genius – it focuses the mind’” (Gertner 2012: 154).

Finally, the innovations themselves generate new needs and, thus, more possibility for innovation. Once the transistor was proven effective, it forced changes in telephone switching and the computer revolution. It was the transistor that enabled Xerox Parc, that other great industrial lab (that itself was patterned on Bell Labs) to lay the foundations of the computer era and the internet. Innovations generate new innovations.
Xerox was not an AT&T-esque monopoly, but by the 1960s they had virtually cornered the market on photocopying machines (Hiltzig 1999). These machines became vital for businesses, governments, and offices of all types, large and small. Xerox both built and sold the machines and they had the expertise on maintenance; they employed a small army of Xerox trained maintenance workers who were deployed across the country to fix the machines their company built. The name “Xerox” became a synonym for photocopying. Xerox had a lot of money.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, Xerox bought a computer company that wanted to rival IBM. Xerox then created a computer research lab in Palo Alto, California. The computer company they bought never brought the monetary success they thought it would. The computer research lab, dubbed “Xerox Parc,” became one of the great scientific labs of the 20th Century. The foundations of the personal computer we have today – from hardware to software – were invented there.

Hiltzig (1999) cites four factors as to why Xerox Parc was successful. The first was money. Xerox had a humongous market share of one of the most sought after products for businesses and governments. This money underwrote the lab. The second was the timing of its creation; at the beginning of revolutionary technology – such as the mass production of the transistor and the semiconductor – they created revolutionary ideas about computers. The third is connected to timing: hiring the best and the brightest. This occurred during the 1960s when Xerox was the only one with the money and willingness to attract the best and the brightest computer minds at the very time when the computer industry was just getting started. Normally the major funder of computer research, the U.S. government, as they fought the Vietnam War, was too busy slashing funding for such research. Xerox Parc was allowed to cherry pick the best young minds from the best programs (and, the few universities that had computer departments at the time). The fourth was good management: Xerox Parc managers knew how to set interesting problems and allow the best and the brightest to invent solutions to them, all the while insulating them from the unwieldy and rigid Xerox bureaucracy.
In sum, just analyzing two of the most successful scientific labs of the 20th Century, to build a great lab, you need:

- unselfish cooperation and open communication
- physical proximity
- to attract and hire the best and the brightest
- to train young scientists
- to provide the right physical and personnel tools
- money
- to think big and in the long term
- a market for the product

Case Study: Harvard University’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science

Gary King at Harvard University built the Institute for Quantitative Social Science (IQSS) that speaks directly to these principles. When they thought of such an institute, King and his colleagues asked academic leaders about what makes for a successful lab, especially with comparison to Bell Labs and others of its kind. “Most said more or less the same thing in different ways,” King (2014: 168) wrote: “Yes, you need the obvious components such as space, money, staff, colleagues, and projects, and of course the end product in terms of the creation, preservation, and distribution of knowledge is the ultimate measure of success.” The glue that holds all this together was community. “The world’s best research centers,” King (2014: 168) wrote, “each had an enviable research community that caused individual scientists to want to join in and contribute.”

But building one where scholars have perhaps divergent reasons for joining is no easy task. IQSS solved it, first of all, by being at Harvard, and second, by offering services across disciplines and across the university that ranged from administrative management to technical training. They built their lab on a common infrastructure across departments, each sharing resources and using components that already existed in the university. To connect disparate parts is, in part, a political job:

“A good approach is to carefully map out the local political landscape and find existing units that already have some type of financial support. Then talk to those individuals who are in charge of each unit and find out what they need, how to empower them, how they can accomplish their goals by working together with you” (King 2014: 170).
DIGITAL COMMUNICATION

The Electoral Control project spans different time zones and geographies and thus required modern digital tools. We developed the following principles of tools to use, based on cost (our budget was sufficient but not large) and the principles of sharing knowledge, especially because it was funded by tax payer’s money: (1) we want to use free cloud-based software; (2) we want a simple, intuitive interface; (3) the software must solve more problems than it creates; (4) the software should improve our cross-national work process and increase productivity; (5) the software should allow us to keep an enduring record of the research activity. The direct outcome of using this software should be (a) a smoother workflow and (b) an excellent electronic record of the process that led us from our ideas to the finished product. A by-product is that the software allows us to create a useful and enduring free website that not only has our private electronic record of the process, but also a more limited visible public version.

We also considered the separation between disclosure of data files and logistical technical inter-team issues. Ideally, team members need a way to discuss: (i) project related issues such as contracts (these should be private between the team leader and the team member); (ii) logistics – e.g. date of the next conference – that should be open to all team members; (iii) technical issues – e.g. troubles with data and software use; and (iv) methodological issues, to which all team members could share information.

Since our project was concerned with collecting, cleaning and matching data, part of our communication process included how to share the data, and with whom. With regard to making different versions of data for different countries available, there are four forms of data availability. The first category is “unlimited,” e.g. when any user can download file on a requested country. There are no requirements except for a suggestion to use the recommended citation and send a copy of the resulting publication. It is difficult to trace the use of the data if the citation for the data is not used. The second major category is “limited by license agreement,” e.g. World Values Survey, when a user has to provide personal and professional information and agree to the terms of use. The third is “limited by registration,” e.g. all GESIS databases, when any user may download requested files by
Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Olga Zelinska

completing the registration form in the GESIS database, with some files available at additional cost. The fourth is “limited by cost,” e.g. users must pay for the right to use the data, and often there is a substantial registration process. Sometimes the use is institutional, such that universities or particular academic units complete the agreement and pay the fee. Registration allows easier track of its use and increased citation. However, this requires either the registration procedure or disclosing personal information in a consent form.

For the Electoral Control project we chose free Google products, such as Google Sites and Google Drive to store the files created from the project, and Google Hangouts to post intra-group messages. In the beginning, the Google Site was restricted to project team members. As the project ends, we curate the site and release information that will be of use to future EAST PaC data users. In this, we decided that EAST PaC data use is “unlimited,” meaning that anyone can use these data without restriction. These data are archived in the Polish Data Archive and are being prepared for Harvard’s Dataverse and GESIS.

DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL LABORATORIES

Using these tools requires a digital infrastructure. To do empirical social science and be a leading international research institution, a fully functioning modern computer lab is not a luxury; it is a necessity. A 21st Century social science research computer lab in an international academic institution should have:

- Powerful, up-to-date computers with hardware and software capable of reading in and outputting information both locally – via USB and CD ports, and other input spaces as technology develops – and via the Internet with European Union standards of connection speed.
- Computers equipped with computing power sufficient to handle “big data,” i.e. large data sets, and the software that can analyze these data.
- Up-to-date office software that allows for access and modification to files locally and via the internet.
• Computers equipped with specialty software for different kinds of social science data analysis (qualitative and quantitative).
• Sufficient wireless access points in the lab and throughout the institute where the team members meet with stable and strong signals.
• Modern and stable servers and related equipment that ensure data security and protection against data loss.
• IT personnel who are qualified to maintain the computer lab and who will quickly and efficiently assist researchers and staff with their computing needs.
• Computing space sufficient for multiple uses of the lab, including courses, seminars, workshops and conferences, as well as use by visiting scholars who demand European Union standards for computing resources.
• Audio-visual equipment that enable wireless communication between researchers outside the lab.

Information Infrastructure

Researchers and the institution that houses them depend on the infrastructure of their computing resources. The infrastructure of the computing lab – its servers and related equipment, and its devices (including computers, tablets and other information equipment) – must be strong. The computer lab must have sufficient budget to maintain this infrastructure and upgrade as needed. In the 21st Century, technology moves fast. A modern research institution must upgrade as fast as the technology. Fundamental to the infrastructure is an IT department that is well qualified to maintain and upgrade this infrastructure. “Going cheap” on any aspect of this information infrastructure puts data at an unacceptable risk and severely damages the reputation of the institute.

The Lab as a Physical and Virtual Space

The internet modifies and enhances the way in which social scientists consume science, produce it and disseminate their scientific output. It does so within physical spaces. The computing lab in which scientific collaborators work should be fully integrated with the physical
and virtual needs of its users. This means that the physical and virtual spaces of the lab are intertwined.

Researchers should have a computer lab that enables communication between them – as a workspace for exchanging ideas and producing research products – and with the international research community. The lab must be arranged to allow the exchange of ideas and have sufficient space for them to use existing devices and the devices they bring with them. They should have equipment that allows them to communicate effectively, including multiple devices and visual projection equipment. In the course of their production, consumption, and dissemination, scientists will use these devices to communicate with those outside the lab. A virtual space must be made available to them that allows audio-visual contact. Video conferencing hardware and software should be standard for this lab. The physical and virtual space should be sufficient for use in courses, seminars, workshops and conferences, as well as by visiting scholars from outside the group.

Creating a researcher-friendly computing lab creates a virtuous feedback loop: researchers will produce, consume and disseminate, which will, in turn, make them more productive, which will encourage them to use the lab in more creative ways, which will increase production and use of the lab.

DIGITAL STRATEGIES FOR PUBLISHING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The mandate of the Electoral Control project is to disseminate knowledge. The collective goals of the Electoral Control project were to build and improve upon the international social scientific community and the body of knowledge that benefits scholars and the society at large.

The internet has reached a stage that has fundamentally changed how social scientists find, access and distribute research. Digitization of social scientific knowledge is no longer value added: it is the first order. Major interrelated trends have made this possible: (a) Technological advance that makes data storage bigger, easier and faster to access. (b) Electronic communication between researchers – email, social media, video conferencing – is as fundamental as means to find, access and distribute research as is face-to-face communication. (c) The decline,
but not death, of paper. Paper and physical mail still play a substantial role and must be part of a social scientist’s research access and distribution strategy. That role is ever diminishing, but is not yet over. (d) Quantification of all research products: statistics (e.g. impact scores and gross counts) are easier to come by and are increasingly relied upon by employers and colleagues to evaluate researchers. (e) Expectations of more and faster productivity measured in quantity, not quality. “Fast research” – as opposed to “slow research” – is the norm. (f) The ideology that information should be free, abundant and easy to get.

As for access, social scientists find research products through targeted searches and serendipity. Targeted search is enhanced by digital bibliographic databases and talking with experts. What is new about the digital age is the increasing possibility of finding something unexpected, a “lucky find.” The lucky find – a new idea, a better idea, an old idea – is an opportunity for creativity in research. Social media for academics increases serendipity. Social scientists used to rely on restricted bibliographic databases such as Web of Science and SCOPUS, among others. Unrestricted bibliographic databases such as Google Scholar, Directory of Online Journals (DOAJ) and the like are contesting the supremacy of restricted databases.

Trends in finding and accessing research depend on how social scientists distribute their research. Increasingly, social scientists are distributing their published and unpublished research on personal websites, organizational websites, social media for academics (e.g. ResearchGate and Academia.edu), mainstream social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter), and working papers sites (Social Science Research Network SSRN, RePeC). This includes a greater desire or willingness to publish in open access journals. Some means of distribution challenge existing copyright laws.

To enhance the quality of their research, make their research known, and to advance their careers, individual social scientists must make use of all of the best available digital technologies and online repositories. Because the internet is decentralized, there is no singular way of finding, accessing and distributing research. Thankfully, there is no single repository of knowledge. The downside is the need to duplicate efforts to find, access and distribute research.

Restricted bibliographic databases remain the most prestigious places for research. Many social science evaluators (employers, grant
reviewers and their organizations) value Web of Science (also known as ISI and Thomson Reuters) publications over any other. Journals with an “impact factor” are considered more important than those without. The same goes for book publishers: international publishers such as Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, University of Chicago, Routledge, Springer, Polity, Palgrave MacMillan, and the like are more highly valued than smaller, national, or pay-to-publish outlets.

Unrestricted bibliographic databases are less prestigious, but are increasingly used. After “Googling,” researchers turn to Google Scholar. Personal and organizational websites, social media for academics, mainstream social media, working papers sites and publishing in open access journals increases access and the possibility of a lucky find.

Individual researchers’ digital strategies should include publishing in both restricted and unrestricted bibliographic databases, and distributing their research widely on personal and organizational websites, all social media, and open access publishers. This means writing for different audiences and publication outlets.

This digital strategy takes a lot of time. Preparation is paramount. First, the individual researcher should have an up-to-date CV. The CV should have all relevant bibliographic information on each publication (as an entry in a references section would). If heading a research project, the researcher should have a clear record of the supplementary products, i.e. data, data documentation, and other information that could be attached to the publication. Second, it is advisable to have an electronic file of all publications, in case they are to be uploaded or otherwise shared. If you are mobile, i.e. if you work in various environments (including hotel rooms and conferences), you need to access this file anywhere there is an internet connection. It is best if this file is accessible via the cloud. The minimum information to share is the full reference listing (authors, year, title, etc.) and the abstract (all products should have abstracts). A choice must be made on distribution as researchers prefer publications that they can download or read online. Violation of copyright could have strong consequences. Social scientists should have a profile in all major distribution points: Google Scholar page, personal or organizational webpage, ResearchGate and Academia.edu. If authoring a book, create an Amazon Author’s page. Mainstream social media such as Facebook and Twitter are also part of the dissemination plan.
Social scientists should also post their research on working papers sites such as the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). SSRN working papers are something that Google and Google Scholar read well, and thus prominently list. There is a debate on whether posting a working paper precludes publication in a Web of Science journal. Increasingly, this debate favors publishing as a working paper first. Economics has a strong tradition of working papers, and the rest of the social sciences, noting the new power of the internet for finding, accessing, and distributing research, are following suit.

All of these increase the chances of a successful targeted search and a lucky find. The lucky find may be the individual scholar’s: visibility increases interactions and opportunities for both the scholar and her audience. Academic product sharing websites also provide productivity statistics that can be used in many ways, e.g. one can create a personal impact factor or an h-index from information in an individual Google Scholar page.

**Digital Strategy for Organizations**

Research projects and organizations should, in general, follow the digital strategy of individual researchers. However, organizations are more limited in their distribution outlets. For example, research organizations are not well represented in restricted bibliographic databases, as it is difficult to find them through a targeted search. Instead, through creating a website that major search engines like to read (i.e. harvest or crawl over), organizations can increase their visibility in unrestricted bibliographic databases, such as Google and Google Scholar. Google Scholar can read the content of research organizations and link to their content, so long as the content is in a form that Google Scholar can read.

Organizations can increase their visibility through the social media activities of their researchers. While organizations cannot join academic social media designed for individuals such as ResearchGate or Academia.edu, they can benefit from individual researchers who list the organization in their profile. Technically, an organization can create a Google Scholar page. Organizational websites can also be distribution points: Individual researchers can post their research on organizational webpages and working papers that feature the name of the research organization improve visibility.
As a side note, publications themselves can have their own distribution strategies. Publications are separated into those done by (a) a publishing house and (b) a research organization. They are separated mainly by access and distribution. Publishing houses have potential access to prestigious and restricted bibliographic databases, but copyright laws and financial concerns limit their ability to distribute on popular and unrestricted bibliographic databases, personal and organizational websites and social media. Research organizations are poor in terms of the prestigious restricted bibliographic databases, but are rich in online distribution points that are growing in popularity. Publishing houses such as IFiS Publishers and research organizations such as IFiS PAN should take full advantage of their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. Publishing houses can reduce the distribution gap by providing more of their content for free. Research organizations can minimize the prestige gap by consistently providing free and easy access to high quality research, especially on specialized research topics. High quality open access publications potentially have the best of all worlds.

EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORAL CONTROL PROJECT

In the Preface and Introduction, we discussed the organizational foundation and intellectual impetus for the Electoral Control project, and in Chapters 1 and 2, we elaborated on its conceptual and theoretical foundations. In this chapter, we present how the project unfolded. The work of Słomczyński, Shabad and Zielinski, and later Dubrow (2015), became an intellectual basis for the grant from the Polish National Science Center (NCN), titled, “Who Wins and Who Loses in the Parliamentary Elections? From Formal Theory to Empirical Analysis.” The grant lasted from 2013 to 2016 and its base was in the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN).

The story can be told by reviewing the three workshops, two specialized courses, and concluding event that the project held between 2013 and 2015. The first Workshop for the Electoral Control project, “Winners and Losers in the Elections of Eastern Europe,” was held on October 18-19, 2013, at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology,
Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN) in Warsaw, Poland. This first international workshop brought together PhD students and young and established scholars from sociology and political science from the U.S and Europe. The workshop introduced the data collection effort for the East European Parliamentarian and Candidate Database (EAST-PaC), a dataset on parliamentarian candidates for all elections matched across time since 1989 in Poland, Ukraine and Hungary (see Chapter Three). In addition to NCN funding, we received support from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (IFiS) and the Graduate School for Social Research (GSSR) at PAN, and organizational support from Cross-National Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program (CONSIRT) at The Ohio State University and PAN. Professor Andrzej Rychard, Director of IFiS PAN, delivered welcoming remarks. GSSR provided help with personnel and allowed us to use their facilities to accommodate the larger number of participants than initially registered.

Participants of the Workshop come from institutions in the U.S., Hungary, Ukraine, Romania and Poland. The Workshop featured discussions from well-known scholars in the field, including Kazimierz Słomczyński, Mikołaj Cześnik, Henryk Domański and, via video conferencing, Jakub Zielinski. This research project engaged PhD students and encouraged them to use these data for their dissertations. Of the 17 registered participants, five were PhD students, three of whom come from GSSR, one from Central European University and one from Corvinus University of Budapest. Discussions with attendees from CEU and Romania allowed us to explore possibilities of collecting matched candidate data in Romania. Attendees of the Workshop came from departments of Political Science and of Sociology in various universities, as well as from the Institute of Political Studies at PAN. Attendees from the Institute of Political Studies were keen on research collaboration and suggested other colleagues who could open new avenues for research with the Workshop data. One intriguing possibility is collecting candidate data from 1985 via archival work and matching it with the existing data. The Electoral Control project did this (see Chapter Three and Chapter Five).

Structurally, the Workshop was designed to present substantive and methodological issues of the EAST-PaC data, encourage discussion, and facilitate networking. As such, the Workshop opened with
a presentation of the main thrust of the research project that generated creative new ideas among participants on the scientific use of these data. Afterwards, participants presented, in short form, their research biographies with regard to the subjects of this Workshop; we learned that participants come from a variety of research experiences and interests, and all of them are interested in building EAST-PaC into their current research agendas.

Presentations in the Workshop were of either substantive topics related to, or methodological issues in, candidate data. A stand-out was the presentation by Professor Zbigniew Sawiński (his lecture was the basis of Chapter 5). The efforts he and his team put in collecting, matching, and cleaning the Poland candidates data that span 1985 to 2011 has not only led to a very high-quality and unique dataset, but to building the foundations for a cross-national standard of collecting matched data of this type that was followed by Nataliia Pohorila for Ukraine (Chapter 4) and Zsófia Papp (Chapter 6) for Hungary.

The Workshop also featured hands-on training in managing EAST-PaC data, led by Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, an Associate Professor at IFiS PAN. The training was held in the Computer Lab of IFiS PAN and involved ten participants. The training featured STATA as a statistical software tool to manage such a complicated, large dataset (N > 90,000) that spans many elections.

The end of the Workshop featured a video conference of Jakub Zielinski, live from Boston, Massachusetts. Zielinski, along with Slomczyński and Professor Emeritus Goldie Shabad of the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, is an intellectual founder of this research project. Zielinski spoke for an hour with Workshop participants on substantive issues of electoral accountability and what future research should do to address these issues. The video conferencing achieved the goal of a fruitful discussion with a member of the research team who could not physically attend the Workshop.

An achievement of the Workshop was to bring people together who have common interests and expertise. We began to build on materials designed to assist researchers in creating scientific output based on these data on this topic; one outcome is this book. Based on ideas that emerged from the discussions of this first workshop, we constructed a bibliography on electoral control and accountability, along with country reports on elections that will provide subject and methods
contexts to produce scientific articles and other academic products. The Workshop generated useful ideas on how to manage communication issues, including the use of online scientific management software and websites.

WORKSHOP TWO AND SPECIALIZED COURSE

We held a workshop and specialized course at IFiS PAN on Tuesday, March 18, 2014. A sequel to the first workshop, this international workshop and specialized course brought together scholars who are interested in using EAST-PaC data. Workshop 2 and the specialized course featured (a) training in the EAST-PaC data collection effort in Poland, Hungary, Ukraine and Romania and (b) discussions about moving from research ideas to manageable research projects and publications involving the analyses of these data.

Participants presented to their Workshop and specialized course colleagues a preliminary plan for a research article featuring the analyses of EAST-PaC data. In this presentation, participants outlined the research questions they would like to address, the country or countries in the EAST-PaC data they would like to analyze, and the methodological issues involved in addressing their research questions.

This was a great opportunity for PhD students to witness, first hand, the inner workings of a research project and its administration. Thus, the Workshop functioned as a Specialized Course for PhD students in how social scientists generate ideas and manage cross-national research projects. This course was connected to a GSSR course taught by Dubrow, “From Idea to Research and Publishing in the Social Sciences.” The purpose of this course is to instruct graduate students on best practices to turn their research ideas into high quality research products, including dissertation proposals, conference presentations, grant applications, awards and fellowships, and a journal article.

There were 15 participants for the event. We hosted six international participants, including two from the U.S., two from Hungary and one each from Romania and the Ukraine. Continuing with our intention to use video conferencing technology to enhance and expand participation in the events from this project, one attendee participated via Skype from the Netherlands (a PhD student from GSSR).
Six attendees of this Workshop and Specialized Course are graduate students, five of whom are PhD students from the Graduate School for Social Research.

After an overview of the goals of the project and a review of the first workshop, Dubrow discussed the status of the data collection effort and other administrative issues. This gave event participants the opportunity to discuss various issues on project administration, a topic that was discussed again in the concluding section of the event. The text of that report and the following discussions was made available on the publicly available project website. Zsófia Papp and Gabor Molnar presented details of the data collection effort in Hungary. The rest of the event included presentations of event participants, including Papp, Natalia Pohorila, Sheri Kunovich, Mikolaj Czesnik, Justyna Nyckowiak, Claudiu Tufis and Peter Tunkis. Formal and informal discussions allowed event participants to build a scholarly network.

The project had also worked with a PhD student from GSSR who is interested in candidate data from Nepal. He had already collected the foundations of it – from the last two elections in Nepal – and we planned to help him turn this into a manageable dataset. We also worked with the Romanian candidate data collection effort by Mihail Chiru and Marina Popescu. We discuss these efforts in the Conclusion chapter.

A key issue is the harmonization of data across datasets, countries, districts and time. There are many methodological challenges in analyzing these data, as well as in harmonization. At root, harmonization starts with a specific research interest that will guide the harmonization process, including what to harmonize (Tomescu-Dubrow and Słomczyński 2016). We take a bottom-up approach by providing researchers with the best possible data and the best possible information with which to conduct their research, which will in turn inform our project on how best to proceed. We had been communicating with the data harmonization team, led by Tomescu-Dubrow and Słomczyński at IFiS PAN, whose efforts provide suggestions on how, methodologically, to harmonize such data. The only harmonization we provided at that point was matching candidates through time.

We created separate data files for candidate data and contextual data. Some of the research team suggested the creation of a party data file that would be kept as a separate file. The party file would have
unique party identifiers that enable its harmonization with the candidate data that would have the same unique party IDs in the data file. We also discussed the need for a protocol for data sharing, including a proper citation (see Appendix, this chapter).

Participants presented to their Workshop and specialized course colleagues a preliminary plan for a research article featuring the analyses of EAST-PaC data. In this presentation, participants would outline the research questions they would like to address, the country or countries in the EAST-PaC data they would like to analyze, and a sketch of the methodological issues involved in addressing their research questions. The Workshop and specialized course organizers encouraged participants to be creative in their approach to the theories and methods – including the possibility of merging EAST-PaC with other data – and to be open minded with regard to suggestions from fellow colleagues on the possible directions of the research project. The purpose is to generate ideas that can be turned into manageable and publishable research products. Each presenter had a maximum ten minutes to present their research, followed by ten minutes of discussion about it.

Project team members suggested various products that would assist them in analyzing these data. To help with literature review, they called for a comprehensive list of published articles that have used previous versions of EAST PaC data. They also said that a document on changes to the electoral systems in each country would be helpful. Discussion of possible publication outlets include a book that could present expanded methodological discussions of articles published in journals. Some suggested that a book devoted to methodology could encourage users to cite the data and use the protocol. The product of all these suggestions can be found in this book.

WORKSHOP 3 AND SPECIALIZED COURSE

This two-day international workshop and specialized course was held at IFiS PAN on December 12–13, 2014. Workshop 3 brought together the project team and students interested in these data and these topics. The focus of the Workshop was on the analysis of EAST PaC. Workshop 3 was also an opportunity to invite new scholars to
join the Project Team and to use these data. Building on the theoretical, methodological, and empirical discussions of Workshops 1 and 2, Workshop 3 featured (a) intensive discussions of empirical research that uses EAST PaC data, as well as similar data in Romania and Nepal; (b) methodological discussions on collecting and analyzing candidate, contextual and electoral data; and (c) networking and planning of academic products that present the empirical analysis of EAST PaC to be published in 2016 and beyond. Workshop 3 also functioned as a Specialized Course for PhD students on theoretical issues in electoral control and political inequality, as well as the methodology and analysis of EAST PaC data. We invited PhD students from the Graduate School for Social Research to be part of the two-day proceedings. Attending the Specialized Course, as with all Workshops from this grant, was free of charge.

There were 21 participants for the event. We hosted seven international participants, including one from the U.S., two from Hungary, three from Ukraine and one from Romania. We also hosted two Polish scholars who traveled from the University of Zielona Góra. In addition, we welcomed Mikołaj Cześnik and Michal Kotnarowski from the Institute of Polish Studies at PAN. There was a large participation of PhD students from GSSR. There were eight GSSR students in attendance, many of whom are contributing members of Project Team of this grant: Nika Palaguta (Ukraine) became the co-editor of this book; Sanjaya Mahato (Nepal) is adapting the methodological knowledge created by the Project Team to collect a unique matched dataset of candidates and parliamentarians in Nepal that spans from the 1990s to the present; Olga Zelinska (Ukraine) is co-author of this chapter; Marcin Ślarzyński (Poland) is lead author of Chapter Nine of this book; and Kateryna Gryniuk (Ukraine) and Anastas Vangeli (Macedonia) were important contributors to the project.

An overview of the status of the project and a review of Workshop 2 gave project team members the opportunity to discuss various issues of project administration and the production of articles and books. These topics were discussed again in the concluding section of the event. The first day and a half consisted of presentations on Electoral Control in Hungary, Ukraine, Poland and Romania, and also a special presentation on the collection of parliamentary and candidate data in Nepal.
The last half of the second day consisted of two working sessions. We began with a discussion of the big questions that can be asked and addressed with EAST PaC data. We then narrowed our focus to discuss the links between individual papers of Project Team members.

**Debating the Publication Strategy**

Project members asked questions about the present and future of the project in terms of publications. Should we produce a guest edited journal or an edited volume? Which is better? This was a return to the discussion in Workshop 2. The primary concern is to produce the best work in the highest quality outlet such that the work is as widely available as possible. Edited volumes have certain advantages in that one can publish longer pieces and newer ideas. An advantage of the guest edited journal is its wider availability and perception of being “worth more” in terms of career and tenure. The eventual consensus was to pursue a guest edited journal. Some possible journal outlets suggested were *Electoral Studies*, *East European Politics & Society*, *International Political Science Review*, *Political Studies*, *Comparative European Politics*, *European Political Science Research*, and *Social Science Quarterly*. Some argued it would be better to go for more generalist journal than a specialist one. Some argued that the editors of a guest edited journal would want something more narrow, especially substantively, that they would not want something just on a dataset. Others argue that the papers can be broader, and what links them is a common theme and a common dataset. Some argued that the primary aim should be to present the data and can show the possibilities of these data.

Well after the Workshop, in a long email discussion thread, we decided to try with *Problems of Post-Communism*. In truth, our proposal of EAST PaC data driven publications was rejected by the generalist political science journals. Most said that they thought our project would fit better with specialized journals on Eastern Europe. Others

---

1 At this point, some argued that the name of the dataset is problematic, that the “east” in EAST PaC should be “Central and Eastern.” They suggested a change in the acronym. In Dubrow’s view, a change at this point would be more problematic than beneficial. Dubrow decided that EAST PaC is easier to write and say than “CEE PaC.” There is an ongoing debate on the use of geographical markers for historical periods and it will not be resolved in this project.
said that they no longer do special issues (even though this information is not on their website). As a group, we decided to pursue two major publication strategies in 2016: a guest edited Web of Science journal consisting of five to six articles (which will become the forthcoming Guest Edited issue of the journal, *Problems of Post-Communism*), and a group publication on electoral politics in Ukraine from the 1990s to the 2010s, both featuring analysis of EAST PaC data.

Some argued that it is important to write and publish a methodological description. This will allow users of the data to cite a publication of these new data in their substantive articles. This is the importance of the methodological description: to encourage future use and to be able to cite in substantive articles, to explain the data in-depth. We took this suggestion seriously, and *Part 3: Context* of this book is the result.

*Seeing the Big Picture*

It is easy to become too narrowly focused; to remind ourselves of the big picture, we discussed the major themes from political science and sociological perspectives. From this discussion, a few main themes emerged. One theme is *Demographic Characteristics and Political Biographies*. This theme is about the relationship between personal characteristics of the candidate and their electoral outcomes. Why is this important? Merit? Personal characteristics? With whom you associate? In trying to understand elite behavior, we consider their personal characteristics. We assume that these things matter for how they behave. More broadly, candidate and parliamentarian characteristics are important for the quality of democracy because it is part of the discussion of representation. Professionalization of parliamentarians and incumbency has implications for the quality of democracy and the quality of representation. Who wins and who loses continues to matter for society. What is the relevance of parties for how parliamentarians behave or how voters behave? Do people vote for people or parties? Through these discussions we developed big ideas that EAST PaC data is especially suited for. With these data, we can ask, ‘What makes candidates successful?’ If the strategy is successful, then we can expect more of these kinds of representatives in the future.

During this Workshop, Peter Tunkis formulated well, and simply, the value of EAST PaC data. I paraphrase his formulation here: In
theory, we ask, “Who are these people, and does it matter?” With EAST PaC, we now know who these people are, and we can show that it matters for major issues in representative democracy, over time. We expect to understand if popular pressure changes the composition of candidacy and parliamentarians.

A second big picture question was, Why is it important to study this in Central and Eastern Europe? CEE is composed of “new” “post-Communist” democracies and thus its context is different from other regions of the world. We discussed a book by Roberts on policy representation in CEE and accountability. Legislative recruitment influences the quality of democracy, and the quality of representation and these remain critical issues in CEE. The region remains interesting because of the volatility, especially in Ukraine, but also in Poland and Hungary and Romania. It is important to understand the conditions of how democracies develop.

There is intense interest in Ukraine, and as such we invited many Ukrainians to discuss electoral politics. We then discussed the possibility of a group publication on Ukraine featuring EAST PaC data. What would the book cover? It would cover all eight elections, institutions and changes in electoral law. It would provide a holistic picture of electoral politics in Ukraine, including the emergence and development of the party system and history of party ideologies. The parties that won, and the parties that lost: all of their ideologies matter. A major theme is the consequences of civil and political unrest from the 1990s to now. This publication is also a place for a description of the collection and cleaning of the Ukrainian data in detail. Ultimately, this plan did not materialize as a book in and of itself, but the discussion led to a focus on Ukraine in this book, as well as a planned edited book on electoral politics in Central and Eastern Europe that includes several substantive chapters on Ukraine.

A third big picture theme was “change.” With long term data, we show empirically how politics evolves. A key feature of EAST PaC is that we can look at change, such as the changing nature of social and political cleavages. There have been changes in how gender matters, or social class or age, or their intersection. Another type of change is change in political participation: there are fewer parties and fewer candidates over time. Is this good for democracy? Is this good for the quality of representation? Twenty five years are long enough to observe
careers. With EAST PaC, we can witness the long path. On this note, we can also examine changes in exclusion and inclusion. Usually we focus on the careers of winners. How about the careers of losers? Who are excluded? Who are excluded from the process of building political institutions from the inside? With EAST PaC, we can examine the truly politically excluded. With EAST PaC, there are many possibilities.

CONCLUDING EVENT

The concluding event for the project was titled, “Building on EAST PaC,” and was held on December 18, 2015 at the IFiS PAN. We (a) discussed possibilities of merging EAST-PaC with longitudinal survey data, such as the Polish Panel survey (POLPAN) 1988 – 2013 and (b) had a special session on the possibilities of using EAST PaC and longitudinal survey data for the study of women in politics worldwide – the leaders of this discussion were well-known social scientists working in the fields of gender political inequality: Amy C. Alexander, Quality of Government Institute Sweden, Catherine Bolzendahl, University of California-Irvine USA, and Tiffany Barnes, University of Kentucky, USA. In addition, we (c) facilitated networking and planning of academic products – including this edited book – that presented the empirical analysis of EAST PaC or addressed the key concerns posed in the grant proposal, to be published in 2016 and beyond.

In their presentation, Alexander, Bolzendahl, and Barnes argued that global, longitudinal public opinion survey data, the cornerstone of thousands of scholarly articles and practitioner reports, provide critical insights into the core challenges facing equality, empowerment, and peace worldwide. Quantitative research published in leading academic journals across many disciplines strongly suggests that gender indicators hold great explanatory power (Alexander and Welzel 2011; Davis and Greenstein 2009). Yet, the leading longitudinal cross-national surveys – e.g. World Values Survey, European Social Survey, International Social Survey Programme, and the regional barometers – devote very little space in their questionnaires to gender-related items. The space allocated to gender values questions is minimal in quantity and scope, and most existing items are simplistic or outdated. As such, they outlined a plan for a global gender survey designed to understand the
three major aspects of gender in society that existing surveys do not adequately address: (1) Gender As Process, i.e. that gender is a lifelong process and not just a fixed state; (2) Gender As Multi-Level Context, i.e. gender is both a characteristic of individuals and a phenomenon acting in multiple levels of the social structure; and (3) Gender As Inequality, i.e. how gender differences lead to inequality.

To realize a Gender Values Survey it will be important to pursue opportunities to collaborate with regional and international experts, to leverage existing data, and to pursue funding to execute the project. There are many obstacles to developing a cross national longitudinal survey—both practical and methodological—but the necessary first steps in this process are to start a dialogue, to identify pressing but unanswered questions regarding gender values, and to recognize the challenges ahead. Their presentation was a critical first step.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we described the progression of the Electoral Control project and the process of facilitating collaboration among the multi-disciplinary mix of young and established social scientists that comprised the team. We learned best practices about the process of scientific collaborative work by developing and adapting our ideas over time.

Multi-disciplinary scientific collaboration across institutions and countries has become the norm of doing science. Such collaboration allows for the creativity and productivity that produces innovations and breakthroughs. Scientists must learn how best to work together. Research sponsored by the National Science Foundation and Google support the idea that environments must have particular characteristics that are conducive to creative and productive teamwork: (a) encouragement of sharing a wide variety of ideas and allowing everyone ample time and space to express them and (b) respect for one another in terms of sensitivity and manifested by appropriate response to verbal and non-verbal cues. These ideas had been implemented to good effect in the Electoral Control project.

The history of scientific teams and institutions that span disciplines and expertise inform our own ways of managing the project. We examined Bell Labs, Xerox Parc, and Harvard’s Institute for
Quantitative Social Science for insight. We found that the most successful scientific labs are based on unselfish cooperation and open communication, physical proximity of its team members, have a mix of established and young scientists who are bright and eager to work together and have the physical and personnel tools they need to do the job, as well as funding, thinking in terms of the big picture and long term, and identifying a market for the product.

As the Electoral Control project spanned different geographies and time zones and thus required modern digital tools, in this chapter we discussed some principles of the type of tools we used. In principle, we sought tools based on cost and the capacity to easily communicate and share expertise and findings. We then discussed principles for the digital infrastructure that allows these tools to be of use, including the necessity of a fully functioning modern computer lab that enables physical and virtual communication.

The main goal of the Electoral Control project was to share and disseminate knowledge that the international social scientific community can use and that benefits society at large. There is no single way of finding, accessing and distributing research. Increasingly, social scientists make use of popular available digital technologies and online repositories to both find research products through targeted searches and serendipity, and to disseminate their own research. Publicly funded by tax-payers, the Electoral Control project plans to make as much of the generated research available freely available, without hiding behind paywalls and onerous copyright laws.

In this chapter, we presented how the project unfolded by reviewing the three workshops, two specialized courses, and concluding event that the project held between 2013 and 2015. In general, these events were designed for (a) intensive discussions of empirical research that uses EAST PaC data; (b) methodological discussions on collecting and analyzing candidate, contextual, and electoral data; and (c) networking and planning of academic products that present the empirical analysis of EAST PaC. We attempted to implement the lessons we learned about managing a multi-disciplinary scientific team across countries and time zones. By promoting a creative environment and providing the space and tools that the team needed, we met the goals of the project.
REFERENCES

How to cite data files? Citations depend on multiple factors, such as availability of the master file for download, acknowledgement of producers, presence of the distributor, and access limitations. However, there are several categories present in all citations and these include producer of the study, study title, and year of fieldwork.

GESIS, being one of Europe’s largest data files distributors, suggests the following minimum standard for the scholarly citation of archive based data sets, in the following referred to as “data file” or “research data”:

- **Author(s) of the Study** – primary investigator, research group and/or institution (and location) according to bibliographic citation format
- **Year of publication** – year, when the study was published
- **Study title** – In accordance with the GESIS data catalogue
- **Survey period** – year or fieldwork period (survey data) or report period (historical data) if not part of the title
- **Origin / distributor** – always “GESIS Data Archive, Cologne”
- **Study Identifier** – “ZA” + “four-digit study number”, e.g. “ZA4863”
- **Version-ID** – “Version” + “version number”, e.g. “Version 2.0.0” of the data file
- **DOI** – Digital Object Identifier of the data file, e.g. “doi:10.4232/1.10059”

These categories are also used in suggested citations on the producer’s webpages.

Thus the proper citation of EAST PaC is:

Conclusions

Lessons Learned and New Questions

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Nika Palaguta

The East European Parliamentarian and Candidate dataset (EAST PaC) and its in-depth methodological description is intended to aid societies and their citizens towards increased electoral control over their democracies. Studies of the early post-Communist era had found that, though there is much party switching in Central and Eastern Europe, repeated elections do function as a form of electoral control over politicians and parties (Zielinski et al 2005; Słomczyński and Shabad 2011; Roberts 2008). Updated, comprehensive information about parliamentarians and candidates continues to be a fundamental resource for citizens and scholars to understand how well the electoral system functions and to hold parliament, parliamentarians, and parties accountable for their actions.

There is much more work to be done. Methodological findings of this book, built on previous works, suggest new questions to ask. The first question concerns the nature of political and party ideologies. We ask this about Ukraine, where party ideology seems subservient to outside interests.

WHAT IS POLITICAL IDENTITY AND PARTY IDEOLOGY IN POST-INDEPENDENCE UKRAINE?

Ideologies might seem to be an established attribute of all political parties and yet, when faced with extremely politically unstable countries such as Ukraine, the questions about the notion, the content,
necessity, and even existence of ideologies need to be re-interrogated. Some political scientists and philosophers debate on whether we are facing post-hegemonic, post-ideological society, where politicians and population merely take part in a ritual of democracy; indeed, they are aware of the instrumental character of party ideologies. How instrumental are party ideologies in Ukraine?

**Political identity**

Voter political identity both shapes and is shaped by electoral politics; its manifestations can impact electoral control of parties and politicians. In countries where elections take place, political identity refers to the personal connections an individual makes to electoral politics and the ways in which they see themselves and the political world around them. Individuals form their political identity in many ways, and like most phenomena of its type, it is formed by individual and group location in the social structure, the society’s history of inequality, and the current state of economic and political affairs.

Where there is a political identity, there is the possibility of political cleavage. Parties and politicians play an influential role as they have an outsized capacity to shape the political agenda and the policies that impact daily life, and thus the uses and abuses of political divides. Sarah Birch (2000) elucidated the formation of political cleavages in the region:

“... scholars of post-socialist transformations in Eastern Europe generally agree that the political divides which emerge at the mass level after the demise of the old regime depend on (a) the social and political structure of society before the regime change, (2) the form the regime change takes, and (3) the nature of the ensuing transformations, including the extent to which parties are successful in mobilizing voters...” (18).

In its early post-Independence years, Ukraine’s electoral politics and political identities were heavily influenced by both the early 20th Century and its Soviet past, though as of 1998, according to Birch (2000), “there is ... little evidence to suggest that this structure has yet molded itself closely to the party system (or vice versa)... this was undoubtedly due in large measure to the electoral inexperience of many
party strategists, but it can also be attributed to popular aversion to party politics as such and a tendency for many voters to vote on the basis of the non-party attributes of candidates” (141).

Considering the last 25 years of electoral politics in Ukraine, the question arises as to the extent to which parties are guided by ideology or are guided by the idea of “power for power’s sake.” Ideologies are generally regarded as an established attribute of all political parties in all nations. Candidates and politicians, as citizens themselves, may have difficulties in forming strong party attachments and stable political identities based on ideology rather than personal attributes. That they, too, may have these characteristics can help to explain the weak formation of party ideology in Ukraine.

Research on the nature of ideological attachments reflects changes in the organizational structure of Ukrainian political parties over time. Attempts have been made to classify the parties according to existing Western types. For example, Wilson and Bilous (1993) wrote that early 1990s parties have the following characteristics: small; few members; despite the fact that some of them claim to be all-Ukrainian, they are mostly regional and party organizations rarely exist outside regional borders; limited access to the national media; weak identities due to the fact that the former Soviet state prevented groups from organizing openly; parties represent interests of their small groups, but not a society as a whole; and a division between elite and all the rest of the society.

Wilson and Bilous (1993: 697–701) classified five types of party blocs as (i) ultra-nationalists (the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, the Federation of Ukrainian Statehood and Independence, the Ukrainian Nationalist Union and others united into the Ukrainian Nationalist assembly (UNA) – had a Parliamentary wing – the Ukrainian National Self-Defense Forces); (ii) national democratic (Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party and Democratic Party of Ukraine); (iii) liberal-democratic (the United Social Democratic party of Ukraine, the “Green Party”, the Ukrainian League of Businesses with Foreign Capital, the Confederation of Industrialists, the Union of Co-operative workers New Ukraine, the Union of Political Revival of Ukraine, the Social-Democratic party); (iv) state-bureaucratic (Kravchuk’s party); and (v) socialist (the Socialist party of Ukraine, the Peasant Party of Ukraine).
In his later work, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (2000), Wilson stresses that there has been an increasing oligarchization of the parties and a detachment from their own manifestoes, names, and logos. According to Wilson (2000), this may be regarded as an overall reason for the failure of the Ukrainian left (see also “Reinventing the Ukrainian Left: Assessing Adaptability and Change, 1991–2000” (2002)).

After 2000, it became apparent that Ukrainian members of parliament only weakly identified with their own parties. In the period from 1998 to 2002, “462 deputies changed party affiliation 527 times” (Thames 2007: 224). Thames (2007) asked whether the party system is important for Ukrainians, since there are many MPs elected without party attachment and that they frequently enter into coalitions in the Parliament independent of party membership. He concluded that deputies are aware of their careers; they switch to the successful parties that increase their chances for reelection. Ukrainian social scientists also argue that there is a materialistic reason – mainly connection to business groups and self-promotion– that heavily influenced political party behavior and fostered a lack of ideological attachment.

Herron (2002) searches for the answers to this question by paying close attention to the system of factions in the Ukrainian Parliament. He finds that there are several reasons for fluid party membership: (1) legislation, which allows changing membership; (2) no punishment for switching; (3) events and circumstances may influence the desire of the deputies to change faction; and (4) low threshold to faction formation. He concluded that factions contribute to volatility of the political party system. Analyzing the ideology of Ukrainian political parties after the Orange revolution Miklaschuk (2009) argues that political parties did not have a strong ideological position because of frequently changing legislation, low political knowledge in the population, and effective political engineering.

Interviews with other political scientists conducted in 2010 by the Razumkov Center (a large social science research center in Ukraine), lends support to Miklaschuk’s (2009) argument. Igor Kogut, the Head of the Council for Legislation Initiatives, said that “the pure notion of “political projects [in distinction to political parties] illustrates very clearly a transplant of business approaches into the activity of contemporary political parties.” Andrii Malyshevich, the Head of the Institute of Legal Sciences of Kyiv-Mohila Academy, argued that “...parties stay
“fragile”, personified [identification of the party with party leader] and mostly non-ideological. They do not have roots in the society and do not represent interests of the population; the level of social trust in them is very low”. Oleksij Garan, a Professor of Kiev-Mokhyla Academy and Scientific Head of the School of Political Science, points out that while it is too early to talk about the “end of ideologies” in Western societies, in Ukraine there is a tendency to eliminate strict borders between main political currents. He said, “we can say that there are no parties with well-defined ideologies: social-democrats, liberals, conservatives. Those niches are vacant, but it also means that Ukrainian society has no need of them.” Igor Zdanov, President of analytic center “Open Politics” argued: “In reality, activity of the majority of Ukrainian parties is concentrated on translation, integration and provision of interests either of a group of politicians – political leaders, or their sponsors from the same Financial-Industrial Groups. Their most effective function coincides with the goal for which the party is created – struggle for power. However, parties are used as instruments of political struggle. Frequently there is no real content in them in a form of developed political programmes that would not only represent strategic vision of Ukrainian development, but also a number of real policies that would allow for the achievement of goals”.

Volodymyr Fesenko, Head of the Board of Directors of the Center of Political Research “Penta”, argued that “Parties as institutes do not influence on system of power as much as party leaders and their circles, and powerful business groups inside and outside the party”. He goes on to say that, “Contemporary parties alienate more and more from representing social interests, they rather represent interests of charismatic leaders and certain business groups... While forming their electoral campaigns, parties do not care so much about certain social interests, as they play with social instincts, imitation of social interests, and manipulation”.

The debate on weak ideological attachment is also taken up by Shveda (2012). He concludes that only thirty Ukrainian parties have some ideological stances indicated in their programmes. The names and content of party programmes are frequently very different and parties rebrand quite often. Ideology of the parties (if there is one declared) has an instrumental character: not only do party members switch from party to party (or faction), but parties also enter into alliances that do
not correspond to their ideological positions (e.g. Between the Communist Party and the Party of the Regions that represents business interests of major corporations). Shveda finds that few parties participate in the political life of the country (even fewer took part in more than three elections), a significant number of parties do not have subsidiaries in regions, or on local, city level. If they are registered, most of the population is not aware of their existence. He also points out that many parties – as the state does not finance them – are subsidized by business interests; thus the function of the parties shifts from representation of people’s interests to representation of business interests.

Lilia Goniukova (2009) finds that while the number of political parties in Ukraine grows, the number of party members hovers around two to five percent of the population. Party membership usually grows during the elections mainly because people search for material reward for their participation, rather than for ideological succor. Prymush (2014) argues that Ukrainian parties are almost-parties

“which are formed around some leader or certain Financial-Industrial Group with the aim to form state policy, that is why ideological principles are of the second order, the place of ideologies is taken by the ‘hybrid ideology,’ which unites some positions of classical ideologies in a united ‘proto-ideology.’ This leads to a paradoxical situation in which parties stop representing citizens’ interests, but rather turn into private electoral enterprises” (195).

Elections are oriented on the party leader and the position of the party changes significantly after the elections. While there are more than 200 political parties in Ukraine, major parties tend to represent business and, for financial reasons and with poorly defined political positions, the small parties cannot compete with them.

According to the institutional approach, expressed by North et al (2007), despite similar institutional forms to the West, developing countries are different in their core. Countries are required to comply with formal requirements of financial supporters (e.g. the IMF and the World Bank). When the institutional forms are established, there is no intention and little possibility for them to function properly. For those states North et al (2007) apply the notion of “limited access orders” (LAO), by means of which, in order to secure a stable income, elite groups engage in rent-seeking to monopolize violence and prevent external actors from entering. Elite groups will bargain among
themselves, and unless someone strongly disagrees and desires for any reason to enter in open conflict, these groups will attempt to maintain peace. Disputes sometimes end up with armed conflict.

North et al (2007) distinguish three types of LOA: fragile, basic, and mature. Fragile states are characterized by a very unstable political coalition, with commitments of dubious force. Coalitions resort to violence when they determine that the reward for violence is desirable. In basic states, the coalition is relatively stable and rights and commitments among the elite are largely respected and institutionalized. Violence is under control of the state. Individuals who wish to enter into political activity have to use the state, while organizations outside the state are perceived as a threat. The USSR is a classic case of a basic state. In mature LOAs, there is a variety of organizations outside the state that have to be sanctioned by the state. There is state bureaucracy that helps to resolve disputes in the coalition. In this LAO, political and economic activities are exercised by the same actors (e.g. contemporary Russia).

In contrast, North et al (2007) wrote, an Open Access Order (OAO) exists when “a society is able to produce three outcomes: (1) entry into economic, political, religious, and educational activities is open to all citizens without restraint; (2) support for organizational forms in each of those activities are open to all citizens; and (3) the rule of law is enforced impartially for all citizens” (17).

In order to move from a LAO to a OAO there must be a transition though “(1) the rule of law for elites; (2) support for perpetually lived elite organizations; and (3) centralized and consolidated control of violence” (19).

LOA theory applies to Ukraine. There are institutional forms that did not function properly. Political parties were a new construction that tried foreign institutional forms. In the first years of independence, the names and the images the parties created for themselves did not match those found in the West, e.g. except for the names, the Social-Democratic Party (united) and the Green Party had nothing in common with European social-democrats or environmentalists. In the following years, especially in 2004 and afterwards, there emerged large business groups that became closely connected to the political elite. Some became the political elite directly or indirectly. Their coalitions were not stable, as occasionally the political elite went looking for
opportunities to publicly confront their opponents, as was the case in the Orange Revolution of 2004. The same elite continued functioning until 2013, when growing crisis inside the elite and in the Party of the Regions in particular provoked open conflict.

Overall, LOA theory regards civil society as a positive development, as well as a means of communication. North et al (2007) highlight the historical importance of the free media. However, in Ukraine media manipulations and the creation of fake civil society groups took place that suited the needs of particular politicians and parties. Ukrainian political parties were positioned between basic and mature LOA, when institutions outside the state were allowed, as there was a large number of political parties and civil organizations registered officially. Due to technological advances adopted by Ukraine, the means of communication were opened as well: internet, social networks, and media outlets that are independent of state control. But because of poor economic performance of the country, a weakened civil society, and the presence of many small political organizations and parties, the means of communication and the institution of elections serves the goals of a non-consolidated elite. In addition, unlike in OAO, parties in Ukraine emerge rather by demand of the market and big political players rather than on demand of the underrepresented population.

The case of Ukraine shows that political parties can function without ideologies, but as a result it is difficult for the population to predict their behavior by simply looking at their names and programme documents.

HOW CAN EAST PaC BE USED?

EAST PaC offers a window into understanding not only why personal characteristics and biographies matter, but how they affect elections and democracy across a range of general and case-specific contexts. Generally, EAST PaC’s value lies in its selection of cases as well as in the time and number of elections that it spans across each case. First, the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are new: less than three decades since transitioning to democratic regimes, the systems in this region are still in the process of consolidation and institutionalization (Markowski 2006). As such, these systems share
many of the characteristics found across most new democracies: fluid party systems, electoral volatility, nascent or often weak institutions. EAST PaC provides an opportunity to understand the conditions of how democracy and one of its central institutions (regular elections) develop. Second, it is important to understand how this develops over time. EAST PaC permits the researcher to observe and understand the changing nature of political and social cleavages in or across contexts, how the characteristics of those competing in elections change, and what this means for the development and consolidation of electoral behavior (by participants and voters alike) as well as of political party systems in new democracies. Third, if who the candidates are matters, then EAST PaC also provides a window into understanding who everyone is and what this means. Put differently, scholars of elections and legislative assemblies are overwhelmingly interested in who wins—but what about those who lose? Who are they? What do they do? Does this contribute to their lack of success, or does the answer lie in something systematically structural?

Harmonization with other Data

While many analyses can be done with EAST PaC as such, perhaps an even more popular use will be to harmonize it with survey and non-survey sources. As for survey sources, both Shabad and Słomczyński (2011) (see Introduction) and Dubrow (2007) connected an earlier version of EAST PaC to POLPAN.

The presentation of Alexander, Bolzendahl, and Barnes during the concluding event for the project (see Chapter 12, this book) was designed to allow engagement in an extended discussion on harmonizing survey data sources of EAST PaC on the topic of gender political inequality. Cross-national surveys provide useful data on the values and attitudes that are both the foundation of individual and group behaviors and the underpinnings of inequality and discrimination. Gender values and attitudes are embedded in everyday social, economic and political relations. In calling for better data on these relations, Davis and Greenstein (2009: 100) put it succinctly and well: “Decisions we make in our lives are often guided by the way in which we believe the relationships between women and men should be.” There is wide agreement in the international scientific community that gender values
and attitudes are important, but we can do better to understand how gender matters. A critical dataset that can be harmonized with gender values surveys is EAST PaC. Gender and age are common variables across all three countries, and as such demographic intersections can be constructed. Contextual data that measures the structures of power at the district level can be brought in to understand gender as a multi-level context.

As for non-survey sources, there are many imaginative possibilities, and the effort by Peter Tunkis (forthcoming in *Ask: Research and Methods*) is exemplary. Comprehensive data on the biographies and activities of parliamentarians can address fundamental questions of accountability, representation, and political inequality. EAST PaC can be connected to roll-call voting and other parliamentary data. Tunkis compiled data on the affiliations, assignments, positions, and biographies of Polish parliamentarians that cover three parliamentary terms between 1997 and 2007. What Tunkis has called the Members of Parliament Affiliations Data (MPAD) includes information about party affiliations, government/parliamentary office positions, committee assignments, select electoral data (preferential votes, incumbency/history), and select biographical information (level of education, alma mater, past political associations). Tunkis connected MPAD to EAST PaC and produced a forthcoming methodological article in *Ask: Research and Methods* and a substantive article forthcoming in *Problems of Post-Communism*.

**Expanding EAST PaC to Other Countries**

The Electoral Control project encouraged scholars working on countries outside the main focus on the project to collect their own “EAST PaC” data. In the course of this project, we have been in contact with researchers and students who are interested in candidate data outside our target countries of Poland, Hungary and Ukraine. We worked with Mihail Chiru and Marina Popescu on the collection of Romanian candidate data that improves upon and updates the previous effort from the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe at the University of Essex that was initially led by Marina Popescu. Chiru and Popescu attempted to collect the universe of candidates who ran for national election from 1990 to the present. However, they found that critical information about the candidates
during this period has vanished (see forthcoming article in *Ask: Research and Methods*). During Workshop 2 (see Chapter Twelve), Chiru and Popescu documented the efforts of a team of researchers to uncover and reconstruct candidate data in order to build a comprehensive matched panel data set. The data they have been able to collect varied by election. They found that the data improve over time. The Romanian Permanent Electoral Authority (ROAEP) told the Romanian team to go to the county tribunals, which should have archived the candidate lists, according to ROAEP’s interpretation of electoral law interpretation. In mid-January 2014 they sent freedom of information (FOI) requests to all 43 county tribunals in Romania asking for electronic copies of the 1990–2004 electoral lists used in those counties, or for the possibility to copy them ourselves. As of March 2014 they received 14 substantive answers, but the news is rather mixed. Some claim to have destroyed the lists following a law that apparently makes mandatory the destruction of voting materials three months after the elections. Others say that they have sent the documents to the National Archives. Finally, only two courts did send them the lists, while two others invited them to visit their archives to make copies. Of the two courts that sent them the lists one has made illegible much of the personal information (e.g. profession and year of birth).

Czech data had been collected for prior elections in a previous project, including also by the University of Essex. Project participants suggested that these data should be available in any form, and that interested scholars can update these data. Our project played a limited role, but we hope that, by investigating the possibility, future funding can be secured or, at least, it provides information for the international scientific community to update and improve these data.

Sanjaya Mahato, a PhD student at the Graduate School for Social Research of IFiS PAN, attended all of the events of the Electoral Control project in an attempt to learn how to collect EAST PaC data for Nepal. According to Sanjaya, candidates self-report their biographical information during the nomination for their candidacy. They fill a form and submit it to the election commission. For the legislative elections 1991, 1994 and 1999, the data were taken from the library of the Election Commission which was recorded in the form of a physical book, as no electronic version was ever produced in Nepal. Sanjaya visited the election commission office in Kathmandu, sat in
the office, and typed the whole thing into his laptop. For the Constituent Assembly elections of 2008 and 2013, the data were available in the website of Nepal’s electoral commission. The information was clear, portable and easy to access. All data are in original Nepali version that he then translated into English. Nepalese election data contains information on district; constituency number; name of the candidate; ethnicity of the candidate; gender; age; political party; votes received; and results (elected or not). The Nepali data lacks information on education, occupation, and place of residence, and in the data there are some spelling errors that Sanjaya had to correct. As with the methodological problems of matching data in EAST PaC, Sanjaya found that the last name of the some candidates appeared in one way in an earlier election to reappear as a new last name in subsequent elections. To assist him in this painstaking work, during the Workshops a core member of the team, Zsófia Papp, spent considerable time training Sanjaya on how to deal with these methodological problems. Sanjaya is using these data for his dissertation.

The Polish team, led by Zbigniew Sawiński and Dorota Laskowska from IFiS PAN’s ORBS, their fieldwork center, has amassed considerable methodological expertise in collecting and cleaning candidate data. Their methods and their software enabled scholars in other countries to better collect and manage their own candidate data.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although this project is well within the realm of political sociology it also has an obvious interdisciplinary component. In theoretical and substantive domains, it joins sociology with political science. This project’s links to the area studies on CEE enhance our knowledge of the functioning of democracy in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary.

Perhaps the greatest benefit of EAST PaC data is that its very existence compels scholars to take the long view of electoral politics in Central and Eastern Europe. The history of elections is now easily accessible; the contours of the electoral scene are clear and present in these data. We invite scholars to use the information in this book and these data to build stronger electoral controls over the parliaments, parliamentarians, and political parties of Central and Eastern Europe.
REFERENCES


This appendix describes a schema for coding the issue positions of Ukrainian political parties of the Parliamentary Elections of 2012 and the Extraordinary Parliamentary Elections of 2014.

**METHODOLOGY**

According to the Ukrainian State Registration Service (USRS), between 1990 and 2015 there were 242 registered political parties in Ukraine. Not all of them took part in the parliamentary elections of 2012 and 2014. In the report of the Central Election Commission, in 2012 there are electoral results for 21 parties, although 87 parties were indicated as having participated in those elections. Among the 21 parties that were registered as having participated, 13 did not cross the threshold of one percent\(^1\). As a result of the elections, five parties crossed the threshold: (i) the Communist Party of Ukraine, (ii) VO “Svoboda” (the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”), (iii) “UDAR” Vitalii Klichko’s party (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms), (iv) VO “Bat’kivshchyna” (the All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”), and (v) the Party of the Regions (CEC 2012).

\(^{1}\) In 2011, the threshold to enter the Parliament was raised from three to five percent and the electoral system was changed to a proportional majoritarian system: 50 percent of members of the Parliament were to be elected within the list of the party and 50 percent were to be selected in single-seat electoral districts (Law № 4061-VI).
As for the early parliamentary elections of 2014, the legislation stayed the same. The Central Election Commission’s (CEC) report indicates 52 parties having taken part in the elections, among which 29 have results published by the CEC. There were six parties that crossed the five percent threshold: (i) Narodnyi Front (the People’s front), (ii) Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc, (iii) the Opposition bloc, (iv) the “Samopomich” Union, (v) Oleg Lyashko’s Radical Party, and (vi) VO “Bat’kivshchyna” (the All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”).

For my coding scheme, I chose parties based on whether they met or were near the threshold. Some were influential in the past (“Nasha Ukraina”), some hoped to be more successful (Nataliya Korolevskaya’s Party “Ukraine Vpered”, “Sylna Ukraina”, Gromadyanska Posytziya (Anatolii Gritsenko)), and some became internationally known (“Pravy Sector”).

The information on the ideological stances of the political parties was obtained mainly from their official webpages and programme documents. In some cases the information was taken from other publicly available sources (e.g. YouTube). The resources contain parties’ programmes, manifestoes, statements, constitution projects, leaflets, local newspapers, propagandistic materials, and party members’ speeches.

I examined Ukrainian political parties for the presence of 27 different characteristics:

1) **Foreign Relations.**
This was indicated as present (+) when a party declared that it has a position. For example, the CPU declared that it is in favor of Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but the Opposition bloc does not declare its position so clearly (-), as it tends to develop relationships with all neighbors but mentions them only as mediators in resolving a military conflict. In contrast, UDAR insists that Ukraine abandons its unaligned status, but also thinks it should keep the broadest external relations possible, indicating the names of the countries and preferable strategic partners; thus it manifests a presence of affiliation.

2) **Attitude towards European Union**, 3) **Attitude towards USA**, 4) **Attitude towards Russia**, and 5) **Attitude towards NATO**.
The attitude was regarded as positive (+) when a party called for especially close co-operation with a particular country or alliance. (For instance,
Gromadyanska Posytziya (Anatolii Gritsenko) calls for a military alliance, especially with the USA and Great Britain; or VO “Bat’kivshchyna”, which insists in Ukraine becoming a member of NATO; the Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc manifests for Ukraine entering the EU. The Oleg Lyashko’s Radical party position is clearly anti-Russian and he is in favor of association agreement with the EU, but generally the programme of the party is based on proclamations rather than on a consistent plan of actions; thus the majority of question of external relations are not specified (n/s). If a party is against a close relationship with a country or an alliance (e.g. the CPU and an association agreement with the EU or NATO membership) I attributed a negative sign (-).

6) **Attitude towards Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan** and 7) **Association Agreement with the EU**.
Theoretically a clear support of any of them excludes the support of another union, though logical inconsistencies can occur. Sometimes the parties did not mention one of the unions in their manifestoes at all. In this case, a “not specified” (n/s) sign was attributed.

8) **Federalization** and 9) **Centralization**.
Generally if a party supports one of these concepts of state building it rejects the other one (e.g. the CPU clearly states it is in favor of federalization if needed and VO “Svoboda” obviously supports centralization, especially concentration of power in the hands of the President). There are interim variants, such as decentralization, and some parties may not support centralization and federalization equally; thus they have the (-) sign in both.

10) **Freedom and Human Rights** and 11) **Democracy**.
Practically all Ukrainian political parties advocate for human rights protection and democracy in their programme documents (+), except for far-right parties, as VO “Svoboda” or “Pravyy Sector”. They have a negative sign (-). Oleg Lyasko’s party does not pay attention to the problems of human rights or democracy that is why it has an (n/s) sign.

12) **Corruption**.
Since no party is pro-corruption, the (-) sign was attributed to those parties that mentioned the need to fight the corruption.
13) **Nationalism.**  
A (+) sign was attributed to those parties that insist on a state grounded in national principle: Those are VO “Svoboda”, “Pravyy Sector”, the “Samopomich” Union, Oleg Lyashko’s Radical party and Nasha Ukraina. All of them, except for Nasha Ukraina, are recognized as right wing or right wing populist parties. They largely refer to the notion of “nation” in their programmes. Nasha Ukraina refers to the importance of nation building in the second chapter of its programme. The rest of the parties have (-) sign as according to their programmes they do not consider nation building to be equal to state building or do not refer to the notion of “nation” at all.

14) **Marxism.**  
Only CPU supported Marxism (+).

15) **Protection of Minorities.**  
A party was attributed (+) if it clearly stated that it is in favor of protection of minorities. For instance, Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc in the first part of its programme pays attention to protection of the minorities (+). Oleg Lyashko’s Radical party does not touch upon this question (-). VO “Svoboda” and “Pravyy Sector” have a mixed positive/negative sign (+/-) because they agree to protect the minorities, but only if they support their ideas.

16) **Liberal/Conservative.**  
Conservative parties favor traditional morality, Ukrainian ethnic values, minimum government intervention, organic rather than evolutionary changes, and private ownership. Liberal parties favor civil and political liberties, individualism, and a state regulated system of social security.

17) **Free market** and 18) **Protectionism.**  
Practically no party is against the free market. Only parties that support protectionism and government control over the market as a whole or its parts have a negative (-) sign. Those are VO “Svoboda” and “Pravyy Sector”, which think the state has to control key industries and give preference to Ukrainian producers.
19) **Protection of Workers**; 20) **Protection of Farmers**; 21) **Protection of the Middle Class**; and 22) **Support for big business**.
I attributed a (+) sign when a party stated that it supports one or another social group. For example, the CPU advocates protection of workers and is against protection of big business, and mainly it is about full employment and progressive taxation. VO “Svoboda” prefers to protect farmers by giving them subsidies, and VO “Bat’kivshchyna” also suggests protecting small and medium business by subsidies as well as by introducing a luxury tax.

23) **Science and technological advance**; 24) **Expansion of Education** and 25) **Cultural development**.
Though they might have different visions of scientific and cultural progress, all the parties that mention those criteria are in favor of them.

26) **Traditional Morality**
Traditional morality includes a support for the nuclear family that consists of a man and a woman, a ban on abortions, domination of men over women, religiousness, and attachment to traditions. The parties that have (+) sign are the above-mentioned right wing parties (VO “Svoboda”, “Pravyy Sector”, the “Samopomich” Union, Nasha Ukraina) and the CPU.

27) **Multiculturalism**.
This is clearly not supported only by radical right, mainly VO “Svoboda” and “Pravyy Sector, who seek to impose “national values.”

*Abbreviations and Signs*

+ : a party demonstrates clear positive attitude to the category, or it can be concluded to be so with regard to statements indirectly connected to the category;
- : a party demonstrates clear negative attitude to the category, or it can be concluded to be so with regard to statements indirectly connected to the category;
*n/s* : an attitude to the category is not specified;
**VO** : Vseukrainske Ob’ednannia – All-Ukrainian Union
### Table A1. List of parties that entered the Parliament or were close to entering the Parliament after the elections of 2012 and their ideological views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name/ Ideology</th>
<th>Communist Party 13,8%</th>
<th>VO “Svoboda” 10,44%</th>
<th>“Udar” Party of Vitalii Klichko 13,96%</th>
<th>VO “Bat’kivschyna” 25,54%</th>
<th>Party of Regions 30%</th>
<th>Nasha Ukraina 1,11%</th>
<th>Nataliya Korolevskaia’s Party “Ukraina Vpered” 1,58%</th>
<th>Oleg Lyashko’s Radical Party 1,08%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Relations affiliation (present/absent)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards European Union</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards USA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Russia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards NATO</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Agreement with the EU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalization</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and human Rights</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>Protection of minorities</td>
<td>Liberal/Conservative</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Protection of Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of minorities</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Conservative</td>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>populist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Workers</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Farmers</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Middle class</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of big business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and technological advance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Expansion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural development</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Morality</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2. List of parties that entered the Parliament or were close to entering the Parliament after the elections of 2014 and their ideological views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name/ Ideology</th>
<th>Petro Poroshenko's Bloc 21.82%</th>
<th>Narodnyi Front 22.14%</th>
<th>Opposition bloc 9.43%</th>
<th>“Samopomich” Union 10.97%</th>
<th>“Sylna Ukraina” 3.11%</th>
<th>Gromadyanska Posytsiya (Anatolii Gritsenko) 3.10%</th>
<th>Pravyy Sector 1.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Relations affiliation (present/absent)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards European Union</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards USA</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Russia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards NATO</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Agreement with the EU</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and human Rights</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of minorities</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Conservative</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Workers</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Farmers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Middle class</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of big business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and technological advance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>n/s</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture and education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Expansion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural development</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Morality</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following describes each political party and the sources of their party ideology.

**The Communist party of Ukraine (CPU)**  
Website: kpu.ua

The programme of the CPU opens up with the Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels slogan “Workers of the world, unite!” This indicates their ideological affiliation with Marxism. The party regards itself as a direct follower of the Communist party that existed in the USSR and earlier.

The CPU’s stated mission is “…to save the Ukrainian people from physical extinction, intellectual and moral degeneration.” The programme emphasizes aligning Ukraine with Russia rather than with other post-Soviet republics. It blames the fall of the Soviet Regime on an increase of delinquency and epidemics. The CPU is against Ukraine becoming a member of NATO or any other military bloc. It favors a revision of conditions for participation in the World Trade Organization and other international trade and non-trade organizations and associations, except for the CIS and the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which it is much in favor of.

The CPU is in favor of democracy and internationalization and proclaims a need for taking into account the interests of all groups of people. It rails against nationalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and censorship. It is against language discrimination and favors two (Ukrainian and Russian) official languages. The party strongly opposes any kinds of separatism, but favors federalization if needed (CPU, programme). In its project of improvements to be constitution the party suggest substituting the word “federal” the word to the word “unitary” in phrase “Ukraine is a unitary state” (CPU, Constitutional amendments). The CPU is a secular party, but it is against any type of discrimination on the grounds of religion or worldview.

In the economic sphere the party claims to support the idea of a state planned economy, nationalization of industries and lands (which cannot be sold to foreigners), intrastate investments in modernization, innovations and energy saving technologies, state regulated alcohol production, subsidies to state-owned agriculture, return of capital assets kept abroad and a ban on credits from international financial organizations on “discriminatory conditions.” The CPU does not call
for elimination of private property or capitalism through violence, but considers it necessary for constructing a communist state and expects it to be done through an outpouring of popular will.

As for the social sphere, the party emphasizes the need for full employment, establishment of a real living wage and providing workers with this wage, progressive taxation, state regulated prices, free medical care and education, state financed construction for poor and young families, social protection, differentiated pensions, high standards of ecological protection (CPU, programme).

As for the cultural sphere, the CPU attends to youth development and maintaining historical memory. It particularly opposes vandalism of monuments to Lenin and advocates criminal prosecution for the promotion of fascism (although the document does not specify the exact forms of promotion of fascism then should be regarded as criminal) (CPU, programme).


VO “Svoboda” (The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”)
Website: svoboda.org.ua

The aim of VO “Svoboda” is “building a strong Ukrainian state on the grounds of social and national justice.” Primarily the programme pays attention to the power elite. The main idea here is lustration: to ban all officials who had connections to the former Soviet system from occupying state positions. The party also suggest introducing a “nationality” section in the Ukrainian passport and criminal responsibility for any manifestation of anti-Ukrainian sentiments (the programme does not specify these sentiments specifically). “Svoboda” suggests that Ukrainian citizenship must be granted only to those who were born in Ukraine or are ethnically Ukrainian (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 1). The party wishes to establish a reciprocal visa regime with foreign countries and also to break off the readmission agreement with the EU (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 4). It wishes to monitor
foreign students who arrive in the country, mainly to prevent them from staying longer than allowed by the contract with their education establishment. The party suggests abandonment of following foreign educational traditions, mainly the Bologna Process, (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 5) but several articles later in the document suggest extending co-operation with foreign scientists. The document suggests introducing equal representation of Ukrainians and minorities in executive power (VO “Svoboda”, programme, part 1).

“Svoboda” promotes protectionism in education, labor, trade, media, and agriculture. “Svoboda” favors state ownership of land and key industrial facilities. It argues against selling land to foreigners and proportional taxation. It encourages additional taxation on alcohol, tobacco and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). In the social sphere “Svoboda” pays a lot of attention to protection of farmers, but it also mentions protection of the middle class in one article (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 2).

The party suggests subsidizing education and scientific research, as well as a search for alternative sources of energy and energy diversification (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 2). It advocates the creation of a Ukrainian computer operational system (OS) and enforced installation of it on all government computers (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 5).

They pay a lot of attention to historical memory. “Svoboda” insists on declassifying the archives of KGB agents. It insists on a revival of investigation into Holodomor, as well as on introduction of criminal responsibility for denial of Holodomor as genocide of Ukrainians. It demands compensation from the Russian Federation, recognitions of members of the OUN-UPA as heroes, to cancel all Soviet holidays, and destruction of the Soviet monuments (VO “Svoboda”, programme, part 6).

Most controversial in the programme are the articles 31 (I), 3 (III), 8(III), 10(IV), 21(V) and 9(VII). The first states the need to allow all people (mentally sane and with a clean record) to carry guns and edged weapon (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 1), the second proclaims bans on abortion and the third suggest introduction of criminal responsibility for promotion of drugs and of “sexual perversions” (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 3). None of these notions are specified. The fourth suggests a ban on adoption of Ukrainian children by
foreigners (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 4) and the fifth is censorship (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 5). The last one insists on restoration of Ukraine’s nuclear status. The party favors Ukrainian military co-operation with Europe, Great Britain and the USA. “Svoboda” wants to make the Russian military leave Ukrainian territory and to make Ukraine leave all organizations that can be regarded as initiated by Russia (VO “Svoboda,” programme, part 7).

In general, according to programme documents, the main ideologies of the party seem to be nationalism and protectionism. In spite of that, “Svoboda” actively advocates an association agreement with the EU and for Europeanization of the country.

“Svoboda” also has a project for their own Constitution. This constitution is even more controversial than the programme. The project barely touches upon basic human rights and it opens with the suggestion of a return to the death penalty. They advocate the creation of an Academy of Ukrainian Language for purification of the language. Nobody can intrude into personal life except in the cases of immoral activity, which are not specified. The power of the president is much extended in comparison with the current Constitution: they nominate ministers, the government of the main bodies of power, and prosecutors (VO “Svoboda,” Project of Constitution).

VO “Bat’kivshchyna” (All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”)
Website: batkivshchyna.com.ua

The current party programme states its aim as being to establish peace, but “not to give up any piece of Ukrainian land;” it wants to improve the economic situation, to fight corruption, to introduce new procedures of lustration, and to build a strong army. According to the party’s manifesto, it has a strong will to build a democratic, European country.

“Bat’kivshchyna” states the urgent need to stop the war (by winning it). In order to do so, it wants to rely on international organizations and international law. The party claims that it is the only one to have sufficient connections with Western countries on the highest level that are helping it to promote Ukrainian interests abroad. “Bat’kivshchyna” also strongly insists on Ukraine becoming a NATO member, having joint trainings with militaries of European nations, and strongly opposes any negotiations with representatives of the so
called “DNR” and “LNR”: Donetsk National Republic and Luhansk National Republic, which are representatives of governing bodies of the territories in Eastern Ukraine, where the military conflict takes place. It proclaims a need to reform the army and to introduce Martial Law in occupied territories.

The party argues that corruption has to be eliminated and high European standards of governance have to be followed. In order to achieve these standards, the party suggests to introduction of an anti-corruption bureau, reduction of the number of government officials and the nationalization of the property of those officials who are corrupt, and imposing the highest possible fines for bribes. “Bat’kivshchyna” proclaims the need for lustration, especially of those officials who collaborated with the Yanukovich regime. The party is in not favor of legal immunity for the President, members of the Parliament and judges; it seeks introduction of an impeachment procedure.

The party insists on introducing and engaging the representatives of the civil society in state governance. It also advocates a need to improve monitoring of human rights. It insists on keeping Ukrainian as the only official language.

In the social and economic sphere, the party wants to introduce a luxury tax, to increase fines for workers’ discrimination, mainly fines for not paying workers in due time, to review calculations for pensions, and to keep an eye on non-discrimination of disabled people and youth (VO “Bat’kivshchyna,” programme). “Bat’kivshchyna” suggest protecting small and medium business, as well as the farmers; it also advocates rules under which the farmers would not be able to sell their lands to anyone but the state. The party insists on decentralization so that taxes are used for local needs.

The party has become significantly smaller since 2012 because some major political figures left it before the Parliamentary elections of 2014.

Oleg Lyashko’s Radical Party
Website: liashko.ua

Between the elections in 2012 and 2014, Oleg Lyashko significantly raised the number of his deputies in Parliament. This is mostly due to massive media promotion campaign, the main instruments of which were numerous videos of “interrogations of separatists” and
Appendix A: Coding Issue Position of Ukrainian Parties… 277

“participation” in anti-terrorist operations in eastern Ukraine (e.g. Oleg Lyashko, website video) According to these videos he is a brave warrior and uncompromising fighter against terrorism and anti-Ukrainian activity.

The program of Oleg Lyashko’s Radical Party states as its main goals the “creation of the society of equal opportunities and welfare” as well as victory in war. It proclaims the need for urgent “de-separatisation,” by which it means getting rid of all separatists and their oligarchic sponsors, whose property has to be nationalized. The party suggests nationalization of the property of those who are proved to be guilty of taking bribes. Lyashko also calls for the return of the nuclear status of the country.

In the economic sphere, Lyashko insists on reforming industry in order to sell not raw materials, but goods. He also suggests providing people with credits for small and medium business for 10 years, simplified accountability procedures, low taxes for small and medium business, high taxes for oligarchs, support for less-well-off sections of society and 10 times more government spending for medical care.

In external relations, Lyashko’s party favors the association agreement with the EU, but it suggests demanding that Ukraine is freed from 75 percent of its external debts (on the grounds that they were taken by dishonest officials) and, as a response to aggression, to free Ukraine from all debts to Russia unilaterally.

Generally, the program of the party seems not to contain proclamations without substantive policies. Lyashko wants to introduce a ban on land selling, a ban on land sales to foreign residents, and state controlled land rent. Human rights protection is limited to Ukrainians (Oleg Lyashko’s Radical Party, programme). Many characteristics in the table are not specified for Oleg Lyashko’s the party because they are not specified in the party’s programme and proclamations.

“UDAR” Vitalii Klichko’s party (the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms)
Website: klichko.org

Programme documents of “UDAR” are detailed and vast. Generally the programme refers to liberal, democratic values, civil society development and public political participation. The programme opens with the statement that the Ukrainian state has to be built not on the
principle of state compulsion, but on the principle of citizen’s independence and free democratic expression of popular will. The party aims for the rule of law, respect for human rights, and public needs and interests. It is in favor of integration into international society, pays attention to such problems as ecological protection, protection of minorities, public representation. The party proclaims a need for educational expansion, professional mobility, and a broad worldview.

In order to achieve those goals, state governance should be reformed. More political power should be given to local communities. A proportional system of voting with open lists of candidates should be introduced. Public access to information and the possibility to unite into groups and organizations freely has to be guaranteed, and the state can only control this right without directly interfering in the life of civil society. “UDAR” also suggests introducing a procedure of public voting for decisions that touch upon the society and certain groups in the society. The mechanism of such a system is not explained. It advocates for a public internet referenda. Transparency and accountability of the government will be guaranteed through public access to information about state expenses and incomes. They advocate government financing of political parties, mainly the parties in the Parliament and those parties, which lack one percent or less to enter the Parliament. “UDAR” also insists on limiting deputies’ immunity, rigorous control of the personal voting of deputies (each MP votes only once for each law, him/herself), decentralization, judicial reform, as well as the reform of the public prosecutor’s office and the military sector.

As for economic issues, the party addresses elimination of corruption. A market economy has to be achieved by facilitating the procedures for business registration, fiscal police reform, tax system reform, by punishing unfair competition, and introducing state subsidies for education, infrastructure and science. “UDAR” insists that only individuals, citizens of Ukraine can be owners of agricultural lands. In continuation “UDAR” emphasizes the need for judicial reform to provide the country with a fair and transparent judicial system.

The party also touches upon social development: state subsidies that already exist should be decreased. The pension system has to be reformed and to become a system of individual savings, guaranteed by the state. A lot of attention is paid to the development of the civil society, which should be secured and encouraged by the government
by material and non-material means. The programme also discusses
the problems and the ways of solving of gender issues, the low birth
rate, disabled people’ employment issues, medical care problems, and
non-discrimination on cultural or ethnic grounds.

“UDAR” insists that Ukraine has to build healthy relations with
all its neighbors, it especially stresses the importance of the relations
with the UN, the European Council, the EU, NATO, the OSCE,
the Russian Federation, the CIS, the USA, Turkey, China, India, and
Brazil (“UDAR” Vitalii Klichko’s party, programme).

Party of Regions
Website: partyofregions.ua

The Party of the Regions positioned itself as a party with extensive
political experience. It claimed that its goals were in line with interna-
tionally recognized aims, such as democracy and equal representation
of all regions in central government. It stood for principles of local and
regional democracy and political transparency as well as for creation of
a favorable environment for regional developments. The party empha-
sized the importance of creating a strong civil society, increasing youth
participation, and the role of women in public life. It also insisted on
providing good living conditions for war and labor veterans. The party
said that the political process in Ukraine should have had a consistent
strategy and that “democracy, freedom, rule of law, economic develop-
ment are part and parcel of this strategy and patriotism, statehood,
spirituality and pragmatism are the basis of it.” The party stands for
a strong state, and political culture, effective and honest government,
constitutional order, settlement of social issues, for civil rights and
freedoms, stable development of the country, a historic perspective,
a high level of education, culture and healthcare, and social benefits.

A main target is European living standards in Ukraine. It was much
in favor of joining the European Union, but it also insisted on keeping
good relationships with the CIS and especially the Russian Federation.
It was in favor of making Russian an official second language of the
state.

As for civil rights, the Party of the Regions aimed to strengthen the
judicial system and to make it more efficient in protecting individual
rights of citizens and their property. The party wanted to keep the
Nika Palaguta

nonaligned status of Ukraine and thinks that membership in NATO and any other military organizations has to be decided by referendum.

The Party of the regions paid a lot of attention to economic development of the country. It wanted to force economic growth, to promote an effective budget policy, to create a favorable environment for entrepreneurship, and agricultural development, and an accurate and balanced external policy. The party aimed to create a favorable environment for small and medium businesses, but it also wants to support big export-oriented business. Party of Regions encouraged innovations and investments, low taxes, adoption of a long-term industrial and infrastructure strategy, scientific modifications, creation of technology towns, energy efficiency and diversification, development of unconventional sources of energy, subsidies for coal mines, and improvements of nuclear plants.

As for social policy, the Party of the Regions paid attention to the pension system (it also suggested creating a voluntarily pension insurance system), the creation of a programme for family protection, encouragement of educational initiatives, 50 percent of state guaranteed jobs for young specialists, accommodation subsidies for young families, healthy lifestyle propaganda, and reform of the medical care system. The Party of the Regions claimed it would create a flexible educational system, suitable for contemporary demands, increase funding for education and improvement of its quality. It promised subventions for culture and sport (Party of the Regions, Programme).

Nasha Ukraina
Website: razom.org.ua

Nasha Ukraina positioned itself as a new European force. It was led by President (2005-2010) Viktor Yushchenko. The party claims that the main instruments it has are democratic institutions and civil society.

There are several priorities for the party. Social priorities are grounded on equality of people and their rights and equal access of everyone to information, education, the labor market, and financial resources. The party sees medical care, the fight against diseases and promotion of high standards of child care as crucial.

Nasha Ukraina considers it important to revive economic and political co-operation in the country, to achieve government transparency,
to build a strong state based on the rule of law, to achieve decentralization, and to integrate into European security programmes.

As for economic issues, the party thinks that the reform of education is needed in order that new specialists would meet market demands, thereby also creating fast technological advance. It insists on liquidation of subsidies for certain business (but it does not state which), on tax free regime for innovative businesses, a simplified tax system for small and medium businesses, energy efficient technologies, and agricultural advance.

A part of the programme is dedicated to the importance of the Ukrainian national idea. It also seeks for support of the Church. It recognizes the Ukrainian language as the only state language, but wants to protect foreign dialects.

Another part is dedicated to mechanisms to achieve these aims. This includes, first of all, building strong relations of co-operation between the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Parliament and civil society. The party promises to provide everyone with equal rights in the political process as well as to engage media and other communication tools (Nasha Ukraina, programme). As for the rest of the programme it can be characterized as general and not touching deeply upon any issue.

**Natalya Korolevskaya’s Party “Ukraina Vpered”**
Website: ukraina-vpered.com

The key message of the party is the need for economic development. It seeks young and energetic voters as the programme highlights that during the years of independence, the parties changed, but the politicians did not, and that it is time for the young generation to appear.

Primarily, the party programme suggests that relatively fast and profound reform should be carried out in industry. Korolevskaya insists on state subsidies for national industry, especially for technical restructuring and implementation of new technologies. The party suggests offering special credit lines for investment oriented businesses, improving conditions for small and medium businesses, and establishing state support for export expansion. The programme indicates that the party is in favor of computerization of bureaucracy and of diminishing the number of officials, instituting a very simple tax system, and defending private property.
A lot of attention is paid to revival of and state support for strategic sectors of the economy: aircraft building, shipbuilding, machine building, among others. It also insists on creation of technological parks, educational advance and a favorable environment for foreign industries to locate in the country. Korolevkaya intends to build a strong agricultural sector, to construct powerful infrastructure, to decentralize the budget and to improve industrial life in small cities.

In the social sphere, the party aims to improve the level of education (special stress is put on computer education) and to bring it in line with market demands, to create large quantities of cultural centers, libraries and gyms, and free medical care for the underprivileged population (Nataliya Korolevkaya’s Party “Ukraina Vpered”, programme).

Narodnyi Front (The People’s front)
Website: nfront.org.ua

Narodnyi Front is a party created in 2014. The head of the political council is Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Prime Minister of Ukraine until Spring 2016. The main goal is Europeanization. The party thinks that the aims for the government should be: protection from foreign military threats, protection of civil freedoms and rights, and promotion of European social standards. Reforms grounded in the Association Agreement with the EU are the main instruments for achieving those goals.

The first chapter of the programme is dedicated to security, in which the party primarily means military security and security of borders. Narodnyi Front considers this aim to be achieved by allying with NATO, creation of a national security strategy, military reform and rearmament and social guarantees for soldiers.

The party wants to build modern democratic state with the rule of law. The priorities are measures to prevent usurpation of power, clear division of branches of power, strong civil society, decentralization, creation of an anti-corruption institution, and reform of the police and judicial system.

As for the economic sphere, Narodnyi Front stresses as key points the end of monopolies and liberalization of business activities. It also states that the middle class has to become the basis for the Ukrainian economy and Ukrainian agricultural products have to become leaders
on the international market. Ukraine has to diversify its energy re-
resources, to create an energy partnership with the EU, to substitute
imported gas with its own gas, and to build an efficient energy system.

As for the social sphere, the party suggests encouraging charity pro-
grammes and insists that business circles have to take part in them. It
recognizes that the country is in a difficult condition, but nevertheless
it is against social programs for underprivileged groups of the popula-
tion. It encourages use of new technologies and educational advance.
The party also pays attention to media development and reforms in
education and healthcare.

The last part of the programme touches upon zones of military
conflict. Narodnyi Front considers it necessary to engage international
society in reconstruction. It sees it as an opportunity to build a new
infrastructure and industry (Narodnyi Front, Programme).

Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc
Website: solydarnist.org

The party emerged on the basis of a previously existing party “Solidar-
nost.” It does not have a very specific ideology. This is a secular, centrist
party, in favor of reforms, democracy, human rights and the rule of
law. It proclaims a need for transparency and public control. The party
states that there is also a need for transformations in different spheres
of public life. The parliamentary-presidential form of governance has
to be improved. The principle of political responsibility should be
regarded as very important. The party promotes decentralization in
contrast to federalization. Its programme says that the country has to
be a unitary state with one state language, but the specificity of every
region should be taken into the account. In addition the protection of
private life and freedom from any kind of repressions are regarded as
important. The programme also emphasizes protection of minorities,
especially Crimean Tatars.

In external policy, the party advocates entering the European Union
as a main goal. It is in favor of a free market, but emphasizes the need
for improvement in the work of the anti-monopoly committee. It also
suggests establishing a decent system of social protection and reform
of the police and court system. As for corruption, the party thinks that
rejection of bribe-taking should become a national idea.
To build a new strong army, the party promises heavily increased material assistance to the military and reform; this will, according to the party, guarantee the safety of the Ukrainian people (Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc, official website, programme).

**The Opposition bloc**
Website: opposition.org.ua

The Opposition bloc emerged from the Party of Regions. As it was created in 2014, its rhetoric is in line with the current political situation in the country. The Opposition bloc proclaims an urgent need to stop the war and to find a compromise. They claim their goals to be: realization of a truce plan, which would include representatives from all Ukrainian regions; investigation of deaths in the Maidan and Odessa, and an amnesty for citizens who did not commit serious crimes; activation of negotiations with Russia, with participation of the European Union and the USA; disarmament of all illegal paramilitary groups and modernization of the army; social protection for those who took part in the anti-terrorist operation, and protection of the right to vote for citizens of the East and Crimea to vote.

The Opposition bloc calls for stability and moderation. It proclaims that rights of the citizen have to be protected regardless of region, religion, native language or world view. The bloc is in favor of decentralization of the country and for a plan for the reconstruction of the Donbass. It argues for introduction criminal liability for “fomentation of interregional hostility.” The Opposition bloc wants to introduce the notion of a minority language for the places where minorities live. It proclaims a need to stop political repression and to reform the police and judicial system.

As for the economy, the Opposition bloc wants to improve the investment climate, to introduce indexation of pensions and salaries indexation according to the level of inflation, to stop inflation at a maximum level of 5 percent (the period is not indicated), lower the taxes for small and medium businesses, to provide state support for national industries, to have a policy of stable currency, to make steps towards energy efficiency, to exempt businesses in zones of military conflict from taxes, to introduce medical insurance, to introduce social protection for the underprivileged population, and social help
for young families and internally displaced people, to provide graduates from technical schools with first jobs, to increase the number of gyms, sport sections, and activity centers for young people. It argues for a nonaligned status for Ukraine (Opposition bloc, programme).

“Samopomich” Union
Website: samopomich.ua

The contemporary “Samopomich” Union is also a creation of the 2014 parliament election. It proclaims that the members of the party are Ukrainians with no regard for their ethnicity and that the Ukrainian nation is a nation of peace. It also states that the duty of every Ukrainian is to protect the integrity of the country. The Parliament, the President and Cabinet of Ministers should co-operate “to form a new war doctrine.” It suggests production of a “proactive state information policy,” to support citizens who “protect the freedom of Ukrainians and the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” and to revoke the nonaligned status of the country.

“Samopomich” suggests decentralization of political power and tax collection, introduction of municipal police and creation of work opportunities.

The Union wants lustration, ending of deputy’s immunity, co-operation between government and civil society, improvement of administrative procedures for businesses and citizens, creation of a special institution for investigation of corruption, reform of the police, the judicial, and the public prosecutor’s office, instituting an effective anti-monopoly policy, and economic deregulation. It also suggests developing economic knowledge and bring the business and educational spheres closer together.

The program makes some unclear statements: it suggests development of highly technological machinery and the processing industry, which will be export and import substitution oriented, to create technological parks, modernization funds, to develop telecommunications, but also says that the Ukrainian economy may develop by export of raw materials. Or it states, for example, that Ukraine is a peaceful country, but insists that it has to participate in the into international fight for natural resources. The character of the fight is not clarified ("Samopomich” Union, programme).
“Samopomich” has a manifesto that contains ideological orientations. According to the manifesto, the members of the party share the following values: the importance of having a mission in life, the necessity of faith, love for neighbors, search for the truth, etc. A person, according to the manifesto, has to feel that they are a part of something bigger, has to act for something that has an aim, and to learn from good deeds. It says that the “Samopomich” Union brings the principles of Christian morality and common sense (“Samopomich” Union, official webpage, manifesto).

Gromadyanska Posytziya (Anatolii Gritsenko) (the Citizen’s position)
Website: parlament2014.grytsenko.com.ua

The head of the party, Anatolii Gritsenko, was from 2005 to 2007 the Minister of Defense of Ukraine (Gromadyanska Posytziya). Gromadyanska Posytziya works together with the Democratic Alliance party and the civil initiatives “Chesno” and “Reanimatsinyi paket reform” (“Reanimation reforms package”). Its image is based on the alliance of young civil activists and an experienced leader.

According to the programme, the party has three main goals to achieve: safety, justice and renovation. By safety the party means not only military safety, but also safety of property, health security, human rights, freedom of expression, and ecological security. The party says that alliance with NATO, membership of the EU and bilateral alliances with the USA and Great Britain are all important for achieving those goals. Citizen must be protected according to EU safety standards. The party advocates for improvements in the military sector, mainly in the army, in the military industry, and cybersecurity. It is also in favor of safety for businesses, ecological security, and energy independence.

In the sphere of justice, Gromadyanska Posytziya pays most attention to transparency. It insists on disclosure of information on government expenses and financing of political parties. It insists on judicial reform, equal educational opportunities, a guaranteed health care package, social policy for military personnel, social help for disabled people, and state controlled prices for medications.

Gromadyanska Posytziya insists on lustration, decentralization, ratification of an association agreement, abolition of the fiscal police,
deregulation for small and medium business, and simplified administrative services (Gromadyanska Posytziya, programme).

“Sylна Ukrainа”
Website: silnaukraina.com

“Sylна Ukrainа” is led by Sergey Tigipko, a former member of the Party of the Regions and a politician with a long political history. It is a moderate party without clear affiliation. It advocates peaceful regulation of the military conflict. It calls for multilateral peaceful negotiations, with UN participation, elections in the Donbass with the participation of international organizations. The party proposes budget formation, tax rate regulation, and police appointments in all regions. External policy, national security, and defense are to be governed by the central government. “Sylна Ukrainа” insists on creation of a strong army, with high salaries for military personnel.

In the economic sector, the party suggests promoting the agricultural sector and machinery and metallurgy industries with government support, improving Ukraine’s internal market, opening new markets to Western countries, limiting raw materials export, import restrictions, industrial modernization, duties on raw materials, corruption control with civil society engagement, deregulation of the economy, and improvement of the investment climate. No comments about WTO rules are made.

As for the social sphere, the party insists on active National Bank intervention to support the national currency and a substantial increase in salaries and pensions, social help for young families, state-controlled prices for housing services, and discount credits for small and medium businesses. Despite the attractiveness of the plan, the party does not state any clear methods for its realization (“Sylна Ukrainа,” programme).

Pravyy Sector
Website: pravyysektor.info

Pravyy Sector is an ultranationalist, religiously oriented party with Dmitrij Yarosh as a head of the party. The programme of the party is quite large, but optimistic. Pravyy Sector sees only three problems in Ukraine: (1) Absence of a national ideology of state building; (2) The bases for state building are “borrowed doctrines but not the idea of
statehood of the Ukrainian nation – not the Ukrainian national idea;” and (3) the national will does not control politicians.

The main motto of the party is “God! Ukraine! Freedom!” The party believes that the road to God lies through the Fatherland; thus, the protection of the Fatherland is a way to God, and the realization of God’s will. Pravyy Sector openly proclaims Ukrainian nationalism as their ideology.

As for other nations, there are three options: (1) The party is friendly to foreigners who also fight for a Ukrainian national state; (2) Tolerance of foreigners who agree with the aims of the party; (3) Hostility to those who impede Ukrainian national state creation.

Pravyy Sector proclaims as harmful: imperialism, chauvinism, communism, Nazism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, cosmopolitanism, globalism, pseudo nationalism, and everything that impedes Ukrainian state creation.

Pravyy Sector considers the nation-state as a goal for all Ukrainians, where every citizen’s deeds are assessed according to what they did for the nation. The aim of internal policy is consolidation of citizens under the idea of nation; external policy has to remain nonaligned because the policy of alliances is misleading – it complies only with state security, not national security or security of the nation. The answer to economic, and social problems and problems in the agricultural sector can be solved only by the creation of a nation-state. The education system has to breed nationally conscientious citizens willing to sacrifice for the nation. Culture has to “produce spiritual immunity to alien cultural imperialism,” because youngsters fall victim to “instilled and cultivated perversions: drug addiction, alcoholism, dissoluteness, homosexuality, violence, lack of spirituality, lack of national idea, political indifference.” Pravyy Sector highlights the need to control the information flow. It also wants to help Crimean Tatars (but only on Ukrainian territory, if they support national Ukrainian idea, only as a form of autonomy). In external policy, the party picked Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Turkey and Georgia as partners. In addition, Pravyy Sector suggests the creation of a national church that leads people to God as God himself wanted, and “not giving an opportunity for occupation forces and their heirs, who are often obviously Satan’s helpers, to change them.” Pravyy Sector intends to continue a revolutionary fight until the nation state is created.
In social policy, the party is in favor of lustration on different levels, reform of the police, judicial system, the customs service, and the military, the right to carry firearms, creation of an anti-corruption committee, decrease in the number of government officials, protection of national business, energy independence, land ownership only for Ukrainians, big infrastructure projects, foreign investments, a simplified tax system, state controlled strategic industries, state intervention in the economy, abolition of corruption, decentralization, agricultural modernization, big investments in education (but the party mentions only school education as free), social protection for teachers, support for high-tech, free non-commercial medicine, European standards of ecological protection, visa regime cancellation, and revival of co-operation with Western countries with a prejudice against Russia (Pravyy Sector, programme).

REFERENCES

Ukrainian State Registration Service. 12 February 2015 [http://www.drsu.gov.ua/party].


Appendix A: Coding Issue Position of Ukrainian Parties


Oleg Lyashko’s. Video. A conversation with alleged member of separatist movement. 17 August 2014 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkNLm03tr9g]. Internet archive. [https://web.archive.org/web/20140817044049/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkNLm03tr9g]


Appendix B

Codebook for EAST PaC Hungary, 1990–2010

Zsófia Papp

This is a technical appendix that serves as a codebook for the EAST PaC Hungary data 1990–2010. It presents a series of tables on the variables as they appear the dataset and ends with values for the main variables. I begin with the general availability of variables in the entire dataset, and then specifics on types of variables. For an explanation of the data collection, cleaning and matching, see Chapter Six.

Table B1. Availability of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate name</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of birth</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List placement</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List length</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Codebook for EAST PaC Hungary, 1990–2010

Table B2. Background Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Candidate name in Hungarian name order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family name</td>
<td>Candidate’s family name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle name</td>
<td>Candidate’s middle name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maiden name</td>
<td>Candidate’s maiden name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First name</td>
<td>Candidate’s first name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra name</td>
<td>Candidate’s extra name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born</td>
<td>Year of birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B3. Main Electoral Variables in EAST PaC Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Election tier</th>
<th>Election round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constit_1990_1</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_1990_1</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_1990_1</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1990_1</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1990_1</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1990_1</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_1990_2</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_1990_2</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_1990_2</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1990_2</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1990_2</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1990_2</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1990_3</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1990_3</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1990_3</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1990_4</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1990_4</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1990_4</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_1994_1</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_1994_1</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_1994_1</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1994_1</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1994_1</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1994_1</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_1994_2</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_1994_2</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_1994_2</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1994_2</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1994_2</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1994_2</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1994_3</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1994_3</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1994_3</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1994_4</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1994_4</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1994_4</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_1998_1</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_1998_1</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_1998_1</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1998_1</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1998_1</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1998_1</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_1998_2</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_1998_2</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_1998_2</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1998_2</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1998_2</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1998_2</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1998_3</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1998_3</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1998_3</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_1998_4</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_1998_4</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_1998_4</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_2002_1</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_2002_1</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_2002_1</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2002_1</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2002_1</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2002_1</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_2002_2</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_2002_2</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_2002_2</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2002_2</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2002_2</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2002_2</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2002_3</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2002_3</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2002_3</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2002_4</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2002_4</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2002_4</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_2006_1</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_2006_1</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_2006_1</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2006_1</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2006_1</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2006_1</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_2006_2</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_2006_2</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_2006_2</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2006_2</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2006_2</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2006_2</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2006_3</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2006_3</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2006_3</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2006_4</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2006_4</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2006_4</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constit_2010_1</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_2010_1</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_2010_1</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2010_1</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2010_1</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2010_1</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B: Codebook for EAST PaC Hungary, 1990–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Election tier</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constit_2010_2</td>
<td>Constituency ID within county</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes_2010_2</td>
<td>Number of candidate votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VotePer_2010_2</td>
<td>Percentage of candidate votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2010_2</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2010_2</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2010_2</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2010_3</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2010_3</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2010_3</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CountyName_2010_4</td>
<td>County of nomination</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResultNum_2010_4</td>
<td>Winner</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PartyNum_2010_4</td>
<td>Nominating party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The variable “Constituency” refers to a Single Member District, and that each Single Member District within a county has its own unique number. The SMD number is only a number, and for it to have any meaning, it must always be attached to the county variable. Example: Constit_1990_1=3 connected to CountyName_1990_1=4 means: Békés 3, or the 3rd SMD in Békés county.

**Table B4. Additional Electoral Variables Available Only for 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Election tier</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RegPlacement_2010</td>
<td>List Position</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegSize1_2010</td>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Actual value of district magnitude (same for all parties in the county)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegSize2_2010</td>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Maximum value of district magnitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegLength_2010</td>
<td>List length</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Different for all parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegVote_2010</td>
<td>Number of list votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Same for all candidates of the same party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegProp_2010</td>
<td>Percentage of list votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Same for all candidates of the same party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegVoteSMD1_2010</td>
<td>Number of votes cast for the candidate's party list within the candidate's SMD</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegPropSMD1_2010</td>
<td>Percentage of votes cast for the candidate's party list within the candidate's SMD</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegParty-won_2010</td>
<td>Number of seats won by the party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatPlacement_2010</td>
<td>List placement</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatSize1_2010</td>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatSize2_2010</td>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatLength_2010</td>
<td>List length</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatVote_2010</td>
<td>Number of list votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatProp_2010</td>
<td>Percentage of list votes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NatParty-won_2010</td>
<td>Number of seats won by the party</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FirstParty_2010_1</td>
<td>Party listed first at nomination</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FirstParty_2010_3</td>
<td>Party listed first at nomination</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B5. *Technical Variables Used in Matching Process*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>TECHNICAL: Candidate ID from the 1990–2006 dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZON</td>
<td>TECHNICAL: Candidate ID from the 1990–2006 dataset for matching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>azon2010</td>
<td>TECHNICAL: Candidate IDs from the 2010 dataset after automated matching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>azon2010_corr</td>
<td>TECHNICAL: Candidate IDs from the 2010 dataset after manual matching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id_merge</td>
<td>TECHNICAL: Candidate ID used for merging 1990–2006 data with 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>link</td>
<td>TECHNICAL: 2010 candidate profile on Elections Office website</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We now present the values of selected variables.

*Electoral history is a 12 digit number:*

1\(^{st}\) digit: candidate in 1990  
2\(^{nd}\) digit: elected in 1990  
3\(^{rd}\) digit: candidate in 1994  
4\(^{th}\) digit: elected in 1994  
5\(^{th}\) digit: candidate in 1998  
6\(^{th}\) digit: elected in 1998  
7\(^{th}\) digit: candidate in 2002  
8\(^{th}\) digit: elected in 2002  
9\(^{th}\) digit: candidate in 2006  
10\(^{th}\) digit: elected in 2006  
11\(^{th}\) digit: candidate in 2010  
12\(^{th}\) digit: elected in 2010
**County of nomination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CountyName_[YEAR]_[TIER]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 National List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bács-Kiskun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Baranya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Békés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Budapest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Csongrád</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Fejér</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Győr-Moson-Sopron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Hajdu-Bihar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Heves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Komárom-Esztergom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Nógrád</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Pest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Somogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Tolna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Vas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Veszprém</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Zala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Winner**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ResultNum_[YEAR]_[TIER]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Round not conclusive (only for 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nominating party, 1990–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PartyNum_[YEAR]_[TIER]</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A Magyar Érdek Pártja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agrárszövetség – Hazafias Választási Koalíció (HVK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Agrárszövetség – Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Agrárszövetség – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Agrárszövetség – Szövetség A Faluért A Vidékért</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Agrárszövetség</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Centrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cigányok Szolidaritási Pártja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Civilek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Családi Szövetség</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Demokrata Koalíció</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Demokrata Párt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Demokratikus Roma Párt (DRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Egyesült Kisgazda Párt (EKGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Együtt Magyarországért Unió</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Élőlánc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Fedisz Kiskunfélegyháza – Tedisz Kiskunmajsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (FIDESZ), Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt, Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Fidesz – Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP) – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Fidesz – Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Fidesz – Liberális Polgári Szövetség Vállalkozók Pártja (LPSZ VP) – Agrárszövetség – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Fidesz – Liberális Polgári Szövetség Vállalkozók Pártja (LPSZ VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Fidesz – Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP) – Vállalkozók Pártja (VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Fidesz – Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Fidesz – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Független Kisgazda- Nemzeti Egységpárt (FKNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Független Magyar Demokrata Párt (FMDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Földi-Élet-Pártja: Földlakók- Élet- Igazság- Beke- Szabadság- Pártja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>FPSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Party Name and Acronym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt (FKGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Független Szociáldemokrata Párt (FSZDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Független: Independent Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Függetlenek Közössége</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Hazafias Választási Koalíció (HVK) – Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Hazafias Választási Koalíció (HVK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP) – Egyesült Kisgazda Párt (EKGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Kereszténydemokrata Párt (KDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Kelet Népe Párt – Kereszténydemokrata Párt (KDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Kiegyezés Független Kisgazda-, Földműves és Polgári Párt (FKKGP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Kisgazdapárt a Kisgazda Szövetség Pártja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Konzervatív Párt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Köztársaság Párt – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Köztársaság Párt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Korrupcióellenes Polgári Demokrata Párt (KPDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Létalap Párt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Lehet Más a Politika! (LMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Liberális Polgári Szövetség Vállalkozók Pártja (LPSZ VP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Magyar Anyák Nemzeti Pártja (MANP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Magyar Nép Pártja (Manép)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Magyar Vállalkozók Egységpárt (MAVEP) – Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KNPD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Magyar Cigányok Demokratikus Pártja (MCDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>MCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Magyar Cigányok Szociáldemokrata Pártja (MCSZDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Magyar Dolgozók Demokratikus Centrum Párt (MDDCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) – Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) – Fidesz – Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) – Magyar Nyugdíjasok Pártja (MNYP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
62 Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) – Szabolcs-Szatmár Bereg megyéért
63 Magyar Demokrata Néppárt (MDNP) - Néppárt
64 Magyarok Egymásért Szövetsége (MESZ)
65 Magyar Függetlenségi Párt (MFP)
66 Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP)
67 Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP) – Jobbik
68 Magyar Munkanélküliek Pártja (MMNP)
69 Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség (MNJSZ)
70 Magyar Néppárt (MNP)
71 Magyar Nyugdíjások Pártja (MNYP)
72 Magyar Radikális Párt (MRP)
73 Magyarországi Szövetkezeti és Agrárpárt (MSZAP)
74 Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt (MSZDP)
75 Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP)
76 Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
77 Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) – Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt (MSZDP)
78 Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (SZDSZ)
79 Magyar Természetgyógyászok és Életerformerek Pártja (MTÉP)
80 Munkáspárt
81 Munkáspárt 2006
82 Magyar Vidék és Polgári Párt (MVPP)
83 Magyarságéért Választási Szövetség (MVSZ)
84 Magyarországi Zöld Párt (MZP)
85 Nem Párt
86 Nemzeti Demokraták
87 Nemzetiségi Fórum
88 Néppárt
89 Nemzeti Kisgazda- és Polgári Párt (NKGP)
90 Nemzedékek Pártja,Nyugdíjasok és Családok Pártja (NPNY)
91 Nők Pártja
92 Nyugdíjasok Pártja
93 Összefogás A Fennmaradásért
94 Összefogás Megyénkért
95 Összefogás Megyénkért – Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF)
96 Összefogás Párt
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Towards Electoral Control in Central and Eastern Europe

About the Authors

Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow received his PhD from The Ohio State University and is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN). He is the Editorial Advisor for Ask: Research and Methods, and recently edited the book, Political Inequality in an Age of Democracy: Cross-national Perspectives (Routledge, 2015) and co-edited the International Journal of Sociology (Taylor and Francis) 2016 issue on “Political Behavior and Big Data.” He is a co-author of the forthcoming book, Dynamic Class and Stratification in Poland (CEU Press). He is the Principal Investigator of the National Science Centre funded project that led to this book.

Anna Kurowicka is an assistant at the Institute of Slavic Studies and a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Social Research at the Polish Academy of Sciences. Her dissertation is on gender and sexuality in Poland and the United States.

Nika Palaguta is a PhD Candidate of the Graduate School for Social Research of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences and a research assistant for this National Science Centre funded project. Her dissertation is on right wing parties and populism in Europe. Her research has recently appeared in the Journal of Refugee Studies.

Zsófia Papp is currently a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Science (Hungarian Academy of Sciences). She obtained her PhD in 2014 at the Corvinus University of Budapest. Her research is focused on the career-tracks of national representatives and its connection to
behaviour in parliament and electoral performance. She is also interested in electoral system effects under mixed-member electoral rules, and investigates how system characteristics influence campaign personalization, constituency orientation and focus of representation. She regularly teaches introductory and quantitative methodology classes at the Corvinus University of Budapest at the MA and PhD levels.

**Nataliia Pohorila** works for SOCIS – Center for Social and Marketing studies, Ukraine. Nataliia supervised a team that compiled the candidate data in all democratic elections in Ukrainian Parliament in 1992–2002, and is the leader of the Ukrainian team that has updated these data for the Electoral Control project until 2014. Her work on trust in politicians was published in the *International Journal of Sociology* in 2005.

**Zbigniew Sawiński** is Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN), and Professor at the Educational Research Institute (IBE) in Warsaw. His research focuses on social stratification and mobility, educational inequality, and methodology of cross-national research. His publications appeared in *European Sociological Review*, *Quality & Quantity*, *Social Science Information*, *International Journal of Sociology*, *Ask: Research and Methods*, *Studia Socjologiczne*, *Edukacja*, and in GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

**Marcin Ślarzyński** is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School for Social Research of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences. His professional interests include comparative-historical and theoretical studies of nationalism, civil society organizations, and right-wing politics in Europe with a focus on Poland. His research combines qualitative and quantitative methods.

**Kazimierz M. Słomczyński** is Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Director of CONSIRT, and is Professor of Sociology at IFiS PAN. He has been the director of the Polish Panel Survey (POLPAN 1988–2013) since its beginning. His research on stratification, politics, and social change has appeared in the *American Sociological Review*, *World Politics*, *Party Politics*, and the *International Journal of Sociology*, among many others. He is a co-author of the forthcoming book, *Dynamic Class and Stratification in Poland* (CEU Press). His current research is
on methodological and substantive applications of cross-national *ex post* survey data harmonization.

**Yuriy Taran** graduated from the Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of Sciences. He works as a political analyst in Ukraine and currently comments on Ukrainian politics for the Polish media. His academic interests are in political trust, national identity, and geopolitical relations.

**Olga Zelinska** is a PhD Candidate of the Graduate School for Social Research of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and a research assistant for this National Science Centre funded project. Her dissertation is on contentious politics and the Maidan in Ukraine.
TOWARDS ELECTORAL CONTROL
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

In modern democracy, voters should be able to use elections to control parties and politicians. Citizens lose control when their electoral voice does not compel them to act according to the will of the people. Repeated free and fair elections are supposed to function as a mechanism of electoral control.

To evaluate electoral control, citizens need the right data on candidates, parties, and parliamentarians. In this edited book, we present a step towards electoral control by presenting the methodology of the East European Parliamentarian and Candidate dataset (EAST PaC). These data are the universe of candidates and parties who stood for national parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary from the 1990s to the 2010s. Candidates are matched over time, rendering a dataset that allows researchers to track the political careers of every candidate, from the thousands who never won to the few political lifers whose parliamentary careers are decades long. With EAST PaC, we can achieve new insights into electoral politics of Central and Eastern Europe.

This book contains everything that scholars need to use EAST PaC. We designed the book for regional specialists and non-specialists; for seasoned scholars of representation, accountability, and political inequality, and for those who are newly interested in these concepts. We hope to intrigue potential users of EAST PaC and to attract new scholars to study electoral politics in Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary.

This book is funded by Poland’s National Science Centre (Sonata Bis decision number 2012/05/E/HS6/03556).