

# Safety in Numbers: Group Linkages and the Persistence of Party Switching in Poland

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
# Introduction

- Party switching: everyone's doing it
  - ✧ Risks versus payoffs?
- Rational calculus
  - ✧ Downs (1957), Müller & Strøm (1999)
  - ✧ Heller & Mershon (2009),  
Mershon & Shvetsova (2008)  
Kreuzer & Pettai (2009)  
Shabad & Słomczyński (2004),  
Zielinski et al. (2005)

# Introduction

## •• A *group-basis* of defection

**Figure 1. Number of switches and MPs who switched in Poland, 1991-2011.**



**Table 1. Party switching in Poland, 1991-2011.**

Parliamentary cycle	# Switches	MPs switched <sup>1</sup>		Group-based switches <sup>2</sup>	
		#	%	#	%
I Kadencja (1991-1993)	174	124	26.78	130	74.71
II Kadencja (1993-1997)	178	68	14.26	142	79.78
III Kadencja (1997-2001)	134	93	19.29	100	74.63
IV Kadencja (2001-2005)	490	178	36.40	406	82.86
V Kadencja (2005-2007)	99	37	7.74	75	75.76
VI Kadencja (2007-2011)	170	91	17.50	133	78.24

1. The Sejm has 460 deputies at any given time; the total number of deputies in a given cycle may be greater due to the termination and re-assignment of mandates.

2. Refers to the proportion of group switches to the total number of switches.

# Research Questions

- Why do sitting parliamentarians persistently and frequently switch parties?
- On the group-basis of defection:
  - ⊗ Why, and to what extent, do group linkages affect decisions whether or not to switch parties?
  - ⊗ What is the effect of group-based dynamics on political party systems and democratic development?
  - ⊗ Is this phenomenon unique to Poland, or is it a feature of other democracies?

# Contributions

## •• Central Argument

- ✘ Group ties have a substantial effect on MPs behavior, thereby overshadowing individual material incentives
- ✘ Old principles, new applications? (Latham 1952)
- ✘ Social Identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner 1986)

## •• Direct contribution

- ✘ Distinction between individual versus group-based motivations for party switching
  - What is group-switching?
  - How to measure or account for group linkages?

## •• Broader contributions

- ✘ Political party and behaviour scholarship
  - Elite behaviour
  - Implications and broader domestic (and regional?) consequences

# Methods

## •• Methods:

### ⊗ Quantitative analysis

n Novel data

n EAST-PaC

### ⊗ Qualitative analysis

n Elite Interviews

n QCA, past media

# Incorporation of EAST-PaC

- Primary data is my own
- EAST-PaC's contribution:
  - ⊗ Further testing during an informative time-gap in primary data
  - ⊗ MP biography/demographics accuracy check

# Appendix

## References

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- ✘ Latham, Earl. 1952. *The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-Point Legislation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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